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The objective of the thesis was to identify and analyse the challenges and opportunities for 
democratization in Ethiopia's recent political reform process. As such, the thesis explores how 
the recent Amhara and Oromo youth struggle for democracy has contributed to the activation 
of a movement that exposed Ethiopia's long-standing political vulnerability, bringing together 
social forces and social groups that were rival and fragmented in the interest of creating a 
national protest movement to challenge the status quo and topple a deeply entrenched 
authoritarian regime. For addressing these objectives, I employed a qualitative approach of a 
deductive nature, which allowed the formulation of a theoretical framework, consisting of nine 
preconditions, as determinants of democratization. The synthesis of these factors provides a 
useful set of conditions that have helped explore the extent to which Ethiopia meets the 
preconditions. The thesis also analyses Ethiopia's predicaments for achieving democracy over 
a longer historical trajectory, which are deeply rooted in the making of the modern Ethiopian 
state. Moreover, contrary to the assertions of modernization theorists, that most countries that 
have managed to create stable democracies achieved high rates of economic development 
before the transition to democracy, the experience of Ethiopia shows that economic 
development does not necessarily lead to democracy. Rather, it seemed to support the 
deepening of authoritarian rule by creating a dominant party regime that controlled security, 
military, politics, and economy under the ideological guise of revolutionary democracy, which 
remained an anti-thesis of democratic development.  
The thesis also explores the diverse understanding of democracy and the lack of consensus as 
to what constitutes it among the political entities involved in the current transition, as to 
whether democracy is primarily a substantive way of life, encompassing social and economic 
aspects as defining criteria, or rather a set of procedural rules that are mostly concerned with 
the process of institutional arrangements. There are many democratic characteristics explored 
in this thesis, but the consideration of societal democratic values and culture has received the 
most attention in the analysis. The thesis argued against the trends of importing/emulating 
theories and models from outside to solve the long-standing democratic deficits of the country. 
I argue that the interest in building a democratic culture must arise from a political imagination 
that engenders the expression of social realities through the indigenization of modern 
democratic theories in a way that reflects the Ethiopian context. Such a theoretical framework 




shape local governance in the Oromia region. In the Gadaa political tradition, popular rule 
means not only, as in the representative model, consent to power, but also that the ordinary 
citizen has access to the exercise of power through various mechanisms that place them at the 
centre of political institutions. Similar political traditions, reminiscent of a form of "deliberative 
democracy", are also found in other local ethno-regional traditions in Ethiopia and these might 
serve as basis to rethink democracy in Ethiopia, creating a common indigenous political 
framework more rooted in society. Finally, the thesis analyses the nature of political relations 
in the post-protest period, examining how the transition process and the main political actors 
attempt to respond to the challenges of democracy in Ethiopia. This sheds light on the types of 
institutions and policy approaches to address the challenges impeding the emergence of a 
vibrant democracy in the country. Based on the key findings of this thesis, the main challenges 
facing the current political transition in Ethiopia include the ineffective transition management, 
the fragility and disunity of countervailing forces such as political parties and civil societies, 
increased competition between contending ethno-nationalist groups, and the contradictory 
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Map-1: Ethno-regional map of Ethiopia 
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The links between democracy and development have been studied and discussed for decades 
with the expansion of liberal democracy (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski & Fernando, 1997; 
Robinson & White, 1998; Shelley, 2004; Carothers & De Gramont, 2013). The approaches to 
their relationship can generally be classified into three main groups. These include (i) the 
democratic governance approach, which stresses the importance of democratic governance for 
development; (ii) the developmental state approach, which believes that development comes 
first and democracy later; and (iii) the multiple path perspective, which emphasizes that 
development can be achieved by different governance systems but must be organized in highly 
context-specific paths (Carothers and De Gramont, 2013: 207–208). This thesis spins around 
Ethiopia’s quest for development and democracy vis-à-vis the protest movements that 
advanced against the repressive actions of the developmental state. Its analytical focus, 
particularly, is in line with the debates in the second group, trying to address the theoretical 
issue of concepts, processes, models, and practices that advance or limit the frontiers of 
democracy in this context.  
The view in the developmental state approach is that the key to rapid growth and economic 
transformation is centralized decision-making, commitment to development and poverty 
eradication, massive investment, and an autonomous and capable bureaucracy (Woo-Cumings, 
1999; Mkandawire, 2001; Edigheji, 2010). This view builds on the tremendous developmental 
successes of East Asian countries.   
In Ethiopia, the emergence of the developmental state can be seen in three contexts. First, as 
Clapham (2006) explained, it can be seen as part of the ‘emulation policy’ of the successive 
Ethiopian regimes, which began with imitation of Imperial Russia as the first model of 
modernization and development in the mid-19th century. As part of the Ethiopian People's 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), since the beginning of the new millennium, 
Ethiopia tried to emulate the development paths of East Asian countries: Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and China (De Waal, 2012; Planel, 2014). Clapham (2006:149) claims that Ethiopia 
consistently tried to solve its long-standing political and economic problems by emulating the 
models from different countries, but all have failed. In this sense, the thesis highlights the need 
to reflect on models, institutions and values that best fit the complexities of Ethiopia's reality. 




prevailing paradigms, the thesis rejects the trends of importing theories and models from 
abroad to solve its long-standing democratic deficit.  
Second, another reason for adopting the developmental state model in Ethiopia was due to the 
strong political determination of the ruling party to create single-party dominance under the 
pretext of development projects to solidify its grip on power (Vaughan, 2011; Lavers, 2012). 
Political leaders in dominant party regimes have different survival strategies, including creating 
a strong party that dominates the economy, controls areas of political competition and uses 
coercion to increase their chances of staying in power (Way, 2005). Between 1991 and 2018, 
the EPRDF was a de facto coalition controlled by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), 
dominating key political, military and security positions, and controlling the economy. The 
political ideology of revolutionary democracy allowed the EPRDF to merge the party and state 
to facilitate monopoly and domination. In fact, the 2005 contentious elections, which left the 
ruling party at risk, were a defining moment for the EPRDF to realize that it lost legitimacy so 
that it quickly changed its strategy, strongly pushing towards developmentalism to enable the 
party to retain not only power, but also heavy hands on the economy (Vaughan, 2011:632). 
From this viewpoint, the thesis empirically analyses the attempts of the TPLF/EPRDF to 
establish a dominant party system in Ethiopia based on ethnic federalism, in which the formal 
adoption of the model has led to the reformulation of democratization measures in the context 
of the doctrine of the developmental state, making discourses of economic development and 
poverty eradication a central aspect of the EPRDF’s claims of legitimacy while setting aside 
democratic credentials.    
Third, the emergence of the developmental state model in Ethiopia was also part of the 
widespread global response to the failure of neo-liberalism in the developing world, especially 
in Africa, which led to a reassessment of development approaches (Di Nunzio, 2015:1182). 
Meles Zenawi (2006) argued that the liberal paradigm has come to a dead end as a mode of 
African development, and the new developmental state approach is the most viable alternative. 
This paved the way for Ethiopia’s ambitious plans to become a middle-income economy by 
2025, demonstrating that the developmental state should be one of the two pillars of the 
Ethiopian Renaissance, while ethnic federalism – presented under the guise of ‘revolutionary 
democracy’ - was the other: the legitimacy that comes from the latter is considered so important 




With the adoption of two consecutive growth and transformation plans in 2010 and 2015, 
respectively, Ethiopia has shown steady economic growth, including expanding access to 
education, road and rail infrastructure, an increase in the country's average income, and 
doubling the proportion of people with access to electricity. It has also reportedly achieved six 
of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): reduced the prevalence of extreme 
poverty by half; the prevalence of HIV/AIDS; malaria and other diseases amongst the adult 
population has dropped; it has achieved universal primary education; reduced child mortality; 
improved environmental sustainability and developed a global partnership for development. 
On the other two lagging MDGs, namely gender equality and the empowerment of women, 
and improving maternal health, significant progress was reported (UNDP, 2015:1).  
However, despite this impressive performance, the country faced an unprecedented political 
crisis, especially since the spring of 2014. This revealed that the EPRDF's interest in building 
a developmental state and deepening democracy was not without problems. Despite sustained 
economic growth averaging 10% between 2005 and 2015, studies confirmed that the EPRDF 
regime did not progress in creating democratic structures that would facilitate meaningful 
political participation (Bach, 2011; Hagmann & Reyntjens, 2016). In this regard, the thesis 
traces the dynamics in Ethiopia's experience of development and democracy and empirically 
explores their practical implementation to explain why the impressive economic growth could 
not ensure political stability in the country.  
For scholars monitoring Ethiopian politics, the main criticism of the EPRDF in recent decades 
has been the narrowing of the political space in its emergence as an almost single party, trying 
to create a developmentalist state that claims legitimacy on the delivery of developmental 
outputs, abandoning the constitutional pledges of multi-party democracy. Multiple flawed 
elections, including most recently in 2015, as well the horrific details and reports of human 
rights abuses, land grabbing under the guise of ‘development projects’, suppression of dissent 
and closure of democratic spaces, and restrictions on the independence of the media and civil 
society organizations (CSOs) illustrate this abandonment (Abbink & Hagmann, 2016; Abbink, 
2017; Allo, 2017).  
As a result, the country was still in a difficult situation, and, in fact, the four years preceding 
the appointment of Abiy Ahmed to the post of prime minister in April 2018 were marked by 
the unprecedented protests that had not been seen since the EPDRF took power. The outbreak 




political life, but also demonstrated the EPRDF's inability to achieve legitimacy stemming from 
development outcomes. The developmental state model was under pressure, with demands for 
more civil and political rights to ensure political accountability and respect the autonomy of 
the regional states.  
One of the triggers for the protests was that in April 2014, Addis Ababa officially announced 
plans to expand the capital city to respond to the city's industrial and human growth. The social 
movement, known as the Oromo protests, soon began when students across Oromia protested 
against this plan to expand Addis Ababa by 1.1 million hectares deep into the surrounding 
Oromia region. Other protests erupted in the Amhara region against the persecution and 
imprisonment of outspoken individuals who were members of the Committee advocating for 
the reintegration of the Wolqait area into Amhara and other groups advocating for the identity 
of the Qemant people. These together spawned an uprising in late July 2016. In its efforts to 
put down unrest, the government allowed the security forces to use lethal violence against the 
protesters in both regions (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Aljazeera, 2016). Despite the 
government’s heavy security measures, protests continued to rock the country, disrupting its 
relative social and political order, until Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in April 
2018. With that in mind, the thesis analyses the historical background of the Oromo protests 
that are deeply rooted in the making of the modern Ethiopian state, as the latter remains one of 
the main predicaments for achieving democracy in the country. After examining this context 
in depth, the thesis moves on to a critical analysis of the key political events during the Amhara 
uprising and Oromo protests with detailed explanations of how they started, their causes and 
basic demands, strategies for mobilizing the protesters, government reaction to the protests and 
how the protest movement eventually led to the hope of transformation since then. 
With the appointment of Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minister, Ethiopia began to undertake political 
reforms covering a wide range of issues that have made the country hit the headlines in many 
international media outlets for several reasons: the unbanning of so-called terrorist 
organizations, making peace with Eritrea, freeing political prisoners, expanding political space, 
freeing journalists, lifting a ban on media and civil society organizations and making significant 
political changes within the ruling party. These are some of many significant changes that 
inspired hope for transformation and made Prime Minster Abiy win the 2019 Nobel Peace 
Prize. Abiy's award reflected the hope of a transformational change in Ethiopia but has also 
raised many questions from different perspectives. In this context, the thesis analyses the 




for deepening democracy, as well as the challenges facing the transition, both within the regime 
and from the outside. 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
The general objective of this thesis is to explore the challenges and prospects for democratic 
transition in the current political reform process. With this overall objective in mind, this thesis 
has attempted to address the following research questions: 
A. What are the determinants of democratization in terms of concepts, processes, models, 
approaches, and practices that advance or limit the frontiers of democracy in the context 
of Ethiopia?  
B. How do we understand the origin of the Amhara uprising and Oromo protests in 
Ethiopia and the background factors of the youth movement? How have youth activists 
played a role in advancing the cause of democracy, and in what form? What was the 
role of party competition, factional squabbles, and intra-elite rivalry of the ruling party 
in terms of bringing about the current transition? 
C. How have divergent and contrasting views of the state and nation-building efforts 
affected the quest for democracy in Ethiopia? What are the challenges and prospects 
for the transition to democracy under Abiy's leadership, and how can we reconcile 
Abiy’s Medemer discourse (meaning synergy, coming together), with contending 
nationalisms and other political ideologies during this transition period and beyond? Is 
it possible to create a common political framework more rooted in Ethiopian society by 
reconstructing the tenets of various indigenous traditions into an alternative paradigm 
of democracy that inspires as a basis for rethinking democracy in Ethiopia? What 
institutional features can be extracted from Oromo indigenous democracy to inspire or 
help overcome some of the inherent flaws of representative model, and on what levels 
would it work?  
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
This section explains the theoretical approach to this thesis, research design, research methods 
chosen to collect data and an overview of how field work was conducted in Ethiopia. There are 
also separate sections that present the relevance of the study, ethical considerations observed 
in the research process and study limitations. Methodology is defined as a series of choices: 




systematic way to solve a problem. It is a ‘science’ of studying how research is to be carried 
out. Essentially, the procedures by which researchers go about their work of describing, 
explaining, and predicting phenomena constitute the research methodology (Kothari, 2004; 
Marshall & Rossman, 2014).  
This study used a qualitative approach of a deductive nature, which allowed me to collect data 
to address the research questions mentioned above. A deductive research process is an 
approach to the relationship between theory and research, in which the latter is formed from 
the former (Bryman, 2016). After a thorough review of the prevailing Western theory of 
democracy, nine conditions were formulated to assess the democratization process in the 
context of Ethiopia (see below). 
Qualitative research in its most basic form includes analysis of any unstructured data, including 
responses to open-ended interviews, literature reviews, recordings, etc. Breman (2016) 
describes a qualitative study as an approach that uses words rather than quantitative numbers, 
allowing the researcher to understand the mechanisms of social processes and provide an 
explanatory basis for analysis (Bryman, 2016). Hence, since a core objective of the study is to 
explain how the youth protest movements contributed to major changes in Ethiopia, an in-depth 
qualitative approach based on a case study was used as an explanatory tool to study a complex 
political crisis in Ethiopia. A basic case study includes a detailed and extensive analysis, in this 
case of the Oromo protests and the Amhara uprising, which helps to expand knowledge by 
analysing the case in accordance with the theoretical framework adopted in the study, as a way 
of determining the applicability of the wider categories of the theory to which it belongs 
(Bryman, 2016). Such an approach is also flexible enough in the sense that it allowed me to 
modify my questions as the investigation progressed.  
Thus, that is exactly what I have done in this thesis, assessing the main questions of the study 
based on the theoretical structure, becoming a natural focus in the analytical process. I have 
considered more precisely: How have divergent and contrasting views of the state and nation-
building efforts affected the quest for democracy in Ethiopia? What are the assumptions on 
which Ethiopia claims to be a democratic state? What are the core problems that obstruct 
democratic transition in Ethiopia? What are the collective grievances of the youth protesters, 
and how they have evolved and organized their grassroots networks? How do the reform 
measures under Prime Minster Abiy advance or limit the development of a new political 




played in the movement? How do key political actors seek to influence the course of the 
ongoing transition? Is there a chance for democracy today in Ethiopia? How can a democracy 
rooted in the country’s indigenous traditions contribute to the development of a democratic 
culture and national renewal? To answer these important questions, the study was supported 
by semi-structured interviews and literature reviews, which are mostly drawn from Ethiopian 
sources. Information from seminars, workshops, news, and commentaries was another 
important part of this research process.   
1.3.1 Theoretical Approach 
The research approach used in this thesis is a deductive approach driven by democratic theory 
and supported by an empirical analysis of the protest movements, experiments of development 
and democratization in Ethiopia. The deductive approach allows the theoretical framework 
presented in the second chapter to be used to analyse Ethiopia's political development in a 
longer historical trajectory and determine the extent to which Ethiopia meets the preconditions 
that are defined as the determinants of democratization. It reflects the theoretical understanding 
of democracy taken from Dahl (1989), which outlined five criteria to test whether a particular 
political reform is democratic: inclusion, control over the political agenda, effective 
participation, equal voting, and enlightened understanding (deliberation). This cluster of 
criteria can be described as the right to protection of civil and political rights, the right to 
democratic representation and equal participation in the collective decision-making process of 
one's political community. Dahl argues that none of the modern democracies can fully meet 
these criteria, but they provide a solid basis for judging ostensibly democratic institutions. 
Thus, I have used these sets of criteria to gauge the progress or lack of democracy in Ethiopia, 
assessing the evolution of Ethiopia's political predicament and recent reforms undertaken by 
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, as well as the viability of extracting relevant elements from 
Oromo indigenous democracy for the local level administration. Thus, the collection of 
secondary literature was necessarily from various Ethiopian and non-Ethiopian sources to 
support the research, which include published and unpublished materials, archival resources, 
reports and policy speeches by government officials and party leaders; newspapers; official 
and unofficial documents. Such information was very important for conducting case studies 
and using methods such as qualitative interviews (Bryman, 2009).  
This allows the study to expand on Dahl’s definition of democracy and outline a synthesis of 




overcome the limitations of modernization, structural and transition approaches of democracy: 
economic development, management of social heterogeneity and polarization, the existence of 
robust statehood, the existence of a vibrant civil society, cultural democracy, freedom of the 
press and social media, nonviolent social movements, the role of the diaspora and international 
engagements, and liberalized autocracy are emphasized. These conditions can be used to assess 
whether a given country is democratizing, although its specific composition may vary from 
case to case due to the presence of different local contexts that require varied applications.  
It was important for this study to examine the different perspectives on the relationship between 
democracy and development to further clarify the theoretical foundations of the research. The 
literatures on the developmental state have many variations, but on the main focus was on the 
developmental state debate that presupposes that the development comes first and democracy 
later to examine the Ethiopian experience. One strand of this literature is concerned with the 
developmental state in Africa, African development paths and divergences in development 
outcomes, the construction of democratic developmental states and success stories (e.g., 
Edigheji, 2010; Mkandawire, 2001; Ake, 1996; Zenawi, 2006; Noman et al, 2012). 
Another part of the literature pertains to Ethiopia's developmental state in particular, focusing 
on discussions on the policy framework that governed economic and political dynamics (see 
Clapham, 2018; De Waal, 2018; Lefort, 2012; Di Nunzio, 2015; Fantini, 2013; Gagliardone, 
2014; Planel, 2014). It includes the policy and functional aspects of the federation process; 
contrasts between Ethiopia's federal system and the developmental state model; political 
economy of the dominant party regime and leadership; and regime survival strategies that are 
used to impede democratization. These can include the manipulation of political institutions 
such as parties and elections, co-option of allies and civil society organizations; and weakening 
potential competitors who can play a countervailing role to force the regime to comply with 
the principles of democracy – the principle of equal opportunity for participation and 
representation in shaping public agenda, as well the recognition of civil and political rights.  
One way or another, this set of literature corresponds to an alternative understanding of the 
political reform processes of “liberalized autocracy”, which embarks on a liberalization project 
in the political and economic spheres, not necessarily for the genuine advancement of 
democratization, but rather for the broadening of coalitions to offset public discontent and 
endorse the continuation of the regime in one form or another. Thus, the synergistic analytical 




of its contribution to broadening political participation, representation, and respect for civil and 
political rights in Ethiopia.  
1.3.2 Data Collection Methods 
Field work was carried out in Ethiopia to collect first-hand information that helps to explore 
the topic from different perspectives by conducting semi-structured interviews with informants 
from different backgrounds to better understand the complexity and multifaceted aspects of the 
political situation in the country (see Appendix 1). The fieldwork lasted for 12 weeks from 
February 23 to May 23, 2019, with visits to regions that were hit by the popular protests, 
speaking with a range of people in groups and individually from government bodies, civil 
society organizations, youth groups, academia, media, and the political elites. The first phase 
of the interviews was conducted in Addis Ababa, and then in Adama in Oromia region, as many 
of the people I spoke with before arriving in Ethiopia live in Addis Ababa and Adama. Then I 
went further north to Mekelle in the Tigray region, and north to Gondar and Bahir Dar in the 
Amhara region. These are all major urban areas in central and northern parts of the country. 
Upon return, I visited the epicentres of Oromo protests such as Ambo, Burayou, Shashamane, 
Bale, Gindhir, Awoday, Harar, Chinaksen, Jimma, Nejo, Nekemte in the Western and Eastern 
rural parts of Oromia region. I also travelled further east, to Jijiga, the capital of the Somali 
region, and talked with elders and youth. The final phase of the interviews was conducted in 
Hawassa, the capital city of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Region (SNNPR) 
during the week prior to my return to London on May 23, 2019. See Ethno-regional map of 
Ethiopia presented on page 11 (Map-1) for where the interviews took place.  
This study was originally meant to be based on secondary sources because at the time I started 
my PhD in early 2017, the political climate in Ethiopia did not allow me to return to the country. 
However, this plan changed after the political transformations that took place in early 2018. 
Thus, when I started fieldwork, I had to rely on a few people, chosen based on their knowledge 
and participation in the recent political changes taking place in the country, who helped connect 
with other potential respondents in their network. Moreover, since the time I could stay in the 
field was limited, it was not possible to conduct more surveys with ordinary people, which 
could have significantly helped the research.  In view of this limitation, I also drew on informal 
conversations, accidentally encountered while traveling around the country, to complement the 




the country, as well as personal stories about people’s lives. Thus, notes were taken from 
memory as quickly as possible after the interactions occurred.  
1.3.2.1 Interviews 
Since interviews are one of the most important methods to collect data from people through 
conversations (Bryman & Bell, 2003), this thesis employed semi-structured interviews in the 
context of informal conversation as a method of collecting data from respondents, giving them 
flexibility as to how they answer questions. This allowed us to develop the conversation further 
than indicated in the schedule but with efforts to retain the same wording for each individual 
informant in every question that was asked in order to maintain reliability and validity (See 
Appendix 2).   
Furthermore, semi-structured interviews were chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, given 
the complex nature of Ethiopia’s political context, following structured interviews could have 
contributed to non-cooperation or even hostile reaction from the respondents: most people 
preferred informal conversation, which usually takes place at informal places such as inside 
teashops, pubs, and restaurants outside of their office hours. Secondly, due to the recentness of 
political events and the topic under study, this kind of interview made it possible to collect 
updated information in a more flexible manner with ease. Thirdly, in this case of the interview, 
there was opportunity to see the reactions and facial expressions of the respondents as they 
happened in a flexible environment, providing an understanding of their emotions, and 
indicating the direction of the interview. 
The interviews were conducted with people from different backgrounds, including ethnic, 
political, and intellectual, who actively participate in and understand the contemporary political 
atmosphere in Ethiopia. In other words, the fieldwork experience involving formal and 
informal conversations with government bodies and non-state actors in various parts of the 
country had a greater impact on the study to understand the collective grievances of the 
protesters, how they evolved and organized their networks, their causes and basic demands, 
mobilization strategies, government responses to protests, and the role of the protest movement 
in advancing the causes of democracy in Ethiopia. Hence, the sample consisted of forty-four 
respondents with a wide range of backgrounds divided into different categories: government 
bodies, members and leaders of civil society organizations, youth activists, academics, the 
media, and political elites. An overview of the study participants, date of the interview, place 




with some respondents, as required by the process, because of the freshness of the research 
topic and the rapid dramatic changes taking place in the country. Due to the sensitivity of the 
topic, some of the respondents, mainly from government bodies, decided to remain anonymous, 
while others did not mind mentioning their name. However, I have maintained the anonymity 
of all participants because the snowball sampling method used to identify study participants is 
vulnerable to tracking who said what through referral chains that could easily undo the 
anonymity of respondents who did not give their consent. This also helped to ensure 
consistency throughout the analysis process. 
1.3.2.2 Sampling 
The two most well-known sampling methods are probability sampling (representative samples) 
and non-probability sampling (non-representative samples). In this study, the snowball 
technique, which is a non-probability sampling method and a subset of purposive sampling, 
was used to identify study participants. Snowballing is also called chain-referral sampling 
because the sample is achieved by asking a participant to suggest someone else who might be 
willing or appropriate for the study (Berg, 2001). At an early stage, as explained below, there 
was reliance on few people who helped connect with other potential respondents in their 
network. As research progressed, this technique helped to expand the sample to include more 
people who helped contribute to the study. 
The process began here in the UK before heading to Ethiopia, meeting with relevant people on 
social media, during social gatherings and at research conferences. This helped establish 
contacts with some of their networks within Ethiopia, which expanded during the fieldwork to 
include those who better understand Ethiopian politics and / or are actively involved in recent 
political events - from organizing and participating in the youth protest movement to those who 
tried to push the movement away from rooting in the country. The interviews were scheduled 
with five study participants before traveling to Ethiopia, based on their knowledge and 
participation in the ongoing political shifts taking place in the country, which helped to 
establish contacts with others in their networks. The sample was expanded on arrival in 
Ethiopia. The main goal was to talk with the Ethiopians with knowledge and personal opinions 
about the situation, as well as to hear from young people about their perspectives and 
experiences. This allowed the analysis to capture interesting results, especially regarding the 
actions of youth activists during the protests and how the protest movement would successfully 




translated into English, so the data presented in this study are the views of the respondents. 
Moreover, since ethnicity and political affiliation are necessary to understand respondents' 
views, this was disclosed in Appendix 1 and, as necessary, in the analysis. 
The total sample of respondents in this study was forty-four. Eleven of the respondents were 
young activists who had an active role in the youth protest movement. Eight of the respondents 
were senior government officials, while academics, members of opposition political parties and 
civil society organizations, each of which was six, consisted of eighteen people together. Two 
of the respondents were media representatives, and four were ordinary citizens, including new 
university graduates, a farmer in the suburbs of Addis Ababa, and an athlete.  
All interviews were conducted during the weeks of March to May 2019. Since the changes 
undergoing are recent, the political climate during the fieldwork influenced the study's findings 
and perspectives in two different ways: on the one hand, with the opening of the political space, 
it became possible to turn to people to talk about the state of the country without fear. On the 
other hand, since many were busy establishing their positions in the country as they were 
returning from exile and/ or were engaged in calming the conflicts that had resurfaced in the 
newfound freedom in the country, it became difficult to access politicians and experts as 
planned, as many had to postpone or cancel the interviews.  
1.4 Relevance of the Study  
There are at least three things that make this thesis relevant and offer an original contribution 
to academic knowledge and the deepening of democracy in Ethiopia. First, unlike much 
research on developmental states that has dealt with the economic modelling of East-Asian 
development, this thesis looks more closely at the political dimensions of the developmental 
state by exploring the concepts, process and policies that may advance or limit the frontiers of 
democracy in this context. This study applies an innovative framework comprising of the 
synthesis of nine conditions for democracy based on the reviews and critical analysis of 
theories of democracy prevailing in the West. The framework has provided a set of conditions 
for identifying and analysing the challenges and possibilities of advancing the frontiers of 
democracy with a focus on the latest political developments in the country. It contributes to the 
originality of the study in the way that it helps to explain whether political changes in Ethiopia 
have pushed the nation towards democratization, or if they are mainly the survival strategies 
of the regime. Importantly, this framework also contributes to broader discussions of 




the country's many cultural practices as one example, so that it may serve as inspiration for 
rethinking democracy to create a common political framework that is more rooted in Ethiopian 
societies.  
Moreover, as far as my knowledge is concerned, there is a dearth of research on the 
developmental state in Ethiopia based on primary qualitative data. Thus, a second contribution 
of this thesis is the application of qualitative interviews to understand the narrative of a 
developmental state in the Ethiopian context. By doing this, the thesis contributes to the wider 
literature on democracy and development that carries its own original knowledge, which can 
be used in debates and practices of democratic projects.  
In this regard, the results from this study are already being used to inform debates about the 
ongoing political reforms through publications of commentaries and participation in 
conferences in Ethiopia, thus putting some of the research into action. This has included 
participation in several Addis Weg forums, a discussion platform organized by the Prime 
Minister's Office, and other bodies such as the Institute of Strategic Affairs (ISA) to shape 
policy alternatives, and publishing op-eds on Ethiopian-focused and widely read websites such 
as Addis Standard and Ethiopia Insights. The commentaries have analysed the current political 
changes in Ethiopia, reflecting on the popular protests, a change in political leadership, and 
political reforms. They have evaluated the achievements, gaps and risks in the reform process 
and the gravity of outstanding challenges (see Kelecha, 2019).  
Third, this thesis interrogates Ethiopia's current political crisis and argues that this crisis is 
deeply rooted in the creation of modern Ethiopia, and in the ideologies and intellectual 
discourses used to reorganize the process, especially since the 1960s. By emphasizing the 
structural and epistemological flaws of the Ethiopian state, the thesis contributes to a discussion 
of rethinking the dominance of Eurocentric episteme and how we theorize and write history, 
which is critical to a political project to transform Ethiopia into a progressive and inclusive 
nation. This is due to the fact that Ethiopianist scholars, who, with the support of the state, 
focused on the scholarship of domination, produced an "official" history that denies the 
historical space for the Oromo and other southern peoples. These scholars were guided by the 
ideology of cultural universalism and distorted or ignored the history and culture of "subaltern" 
groups. According to John Markakis (2011: 19-21), the glaring emphasis of Ethiopian studies 
on the centre cast the periphery into a gloomy shadow, placing Ethiopianist scholars and their 




perspective of the Christian Amhara and Tigrinya people at the expense of the periphery and 
lowland people. It is fair to say that Amhara and Tigrayans have their own history, while other 
peoples have their own anthropology, as their history remains largely unwritten, if not unknown 
(Clapham, 2002:40). Partial exceptions to this trend are Oromo studies, covering a nation 
whose size, geographic distribution, and longstanding political struggles at the heart of the 
Ethiopian state make it impossible to ignore. Therefore, this thesis is aimed at a more detailed 
study of the situation with the Oromo in Ethiopian politics, focusing on the protest movement 
to contribute and fill the gaps in written literature. 
However, in the recent past, there has been a change and continuity in Ethiopian studies. While 
many scholars continue to support the Ethiopianists’ version of the scholarship of domination, 
others have recognized the need for multiple centres in the production and dissemination of 
knowledge, a marked break with the tradition of producing the narratives of domination (Jalata, 
1996). For example, Oromo scholarship has already begun to bring tangible results, since there 
is a dialectical connection between Oromo studies and Oromo national consciousness. The 
recent protest, led by Oromo students, is rooted in a deeper understanding of the indigenous 
historical and cultural knowledge system. Among other things, the work on the Gadaa system, 
Oromo's indigenous democratic socio-political system, in all its complexity was critical, as the 
key components of what existed were elevated and recognized as a solid cultural and 
experimental basis for social consciousness. This consciousness is at the heart of the cultural 
revival that has led to mass protests in recent years, which this study took interest in 
investigating.  
From this standpoint, a core contribution of this study lies in understanding and developing 
knowledge of a subject that is insufficiently represented in academia for the reasons stated 
above.  Given the systematic features of political life in Ethiopia, studies of Oromo youth social 
movements can provide new analytical ideas as a contribution to emerging trends in Ethiopian 
studies that differ from the existing generalizations about Ethiopian political change. Thus, by 
exploring the contemporary political phenomena in their real-life context, the study helps us to 
better understand how Oromo youth created a movement that contributed to the major changes 
taking place in Ethiopia. The recentness of the phenomena in question, covering the turbulent 
period between 2014 and 2020, as expected made the study challenging. Nonetheless, it was 
important to follow political developments as they unfolded in order to understand Ethiopia’s 




1.5 Ethical Considerations 
Ethics have become a cornerstone for conducting effective and meaningful research. As such, 
the ethical behaviour of individual researchers is under unprecedented scrutiny, which requires 
them to seriously consider ethics throughout the research process (Burnham, et al., 2008). 
Hence, as this research is related to human beings, it is important to explain in this section the 
ethical considerations adopted in the research process. To begin with, before traveling to 
different places in Ethiopia, I reviewed the lists of potential sources of risk and tried to fully 
understand their implications in advance, drawing on information from the relevant local 
authorities. This enabled completion of the field work without causing significant problems for 
the personal safety of the researcher and participants.  
Important ethical issues in this study also included the need for voluntary participation, 
informed consent, non-discrimination, confidentiality, and anonymity (Michael J & Waller, 
2010). The consideration of ‘voluntary participation’ is that there should be no coercion or 
feeling of it by the interviewee from the researcher. As a rule, from the very beginning, 
respondents were advised that participation in this project is completely voluntary and that they 
can freely withdraw from the study at any time without explanation. In each interview or 
conversation, I refrained from any attempts to influence the respondents, but rather explained 
my role as a doctoral researcher. There were no obligations to answer the questions and no 
negative consequences for what they replied. Accordingly, I explained in detail what the 
interviews were for and how they will be used. Only after the participants consented were the 
interviews conducted. Respondents were also informed of the precautions that would be taken 
to protect their confidentiality and anonymity in relation to research. Accordingly, the 
university also provided ethics clearance after considering and assessing risk factors and the 
mitigation mechanism before starting the field work. Moreover, given that this research was 
conducted in a socially, culturally, and complex diverse community in Ethiopia, it was 
important to adhere to the principle of non-discrimination, which I have committed to 
throughout the research process, triangulating information from multiple sources before use. 
1.6 Research Limitations  
There were several limitations when conducting the study, which are presented here in three 
groups. The first concerns the difficulties in collecting data, since the information covering the 
study period is very limited and inadequate due to the recentness of the phenomenon of study 




Prime Minister in April 2018. Due to the recentness of the research, there was a gap in written 
literatures. Most of the written information was relatively short, whether articles or 
commentaries and op-eds, and only a few reports were written about the current political 
reforms. Getting official information and data was difficult without using a special social 
network, which made the process of collecting reliable data time consuming.  
Moreover, as this thesis aims to study the Oromo protests and Amhara uprising in more detail, 
and since the protest movements were clandestine, it made it difficult to establish contacts with 
youth who played an active role in the movement. The active presence of youth on social media 
under pseudo names is mainly due to fear of harsh reactions from the security forces and this 
makes it even more difficult. Thus, finding people associated with the movement inside and 
outside Ethiopia had been a daunting task because this required establishing trust.  
Second, political topics are sensitive issues in Ethiopia. Despite the relatively more comfortable 
stance towards freedom of expression after liberalization measures adopted by Prime Minister 
Abiy since 2018, at a lower level, the cadres of the old regime are still intact and unreformed. 
Thus, writing critical articles about Ethiopian politics in general and democratization in 
particular or openly criticizing the Ethiopian government remains unsafe, so fear of possible 
consequences, such as restrictions, arrests, and imprisonment, can colour the statements of 
respondents, and therefore the data collected. The sensitiveness of the research topic has also 
limited research by limiting the number of interviewees who were willing to be taped in the 
study, so their interviews were not recorded, but I took notes. However, the relaxation of the 
political climate was useful to my research works, as study participants were then willing to 
share their views and experiences. Some contacted people declined an interview, despite 
guaranteed anonymity. And, after assessing whether my studies could have negative results for 
study participants after publication, I decided to keep them anonymous, as harm could occur 
not only during the research process, but also after the information is made public, especially 
where respondents are located in Ethiopia.  
Third, determining the time and place of the interview also took a lot of time, as the respondents 
chose the preferred time and place for the interview. Moreover, given the tense political 
situation at that time, conducting elite interviews was difficult due to the frequent 
postponement and cancellation of the agreed schedule. Thus, it was necessary to reschedule 




the country are stationed in Addis Ababa, allowing me to conduct the lion's share of elite 
interviews in the capital.  
1.7 Chapter Outline 
This thesis has the following chapter outline, dividing into seven chapters. 
Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter introduces the theoretical framework 
and key concepts of the study by reviewing the literature on various concepts of democracy, 
the determinants of democratization and the developmental state, with a focus on Africa. This 
framework consists of a synthesis of nine preconditions for democratization, which this thesis 
applies to Ethiopia's political development over a longer historical trajectory in order to 
determine and analyse the extent to which the country meets these preconditions in the recent 
reform process. 
The third chapter analyses Ethiopia’s quest for development and democracy vis-à-vis the 
causes of the popular protests, as well the political measures adopted by the regime with the 
aim of establishing a dominant party regime in Ethiopia. The chapter also provides an analysis 
of the factors that led to the restructuring of power in the EPRDF and how it recently morphed 
into a new merger party called the Prosperity Party at the end of 2019, replacing the previous 
dominant coalition. 
Chapter Four explores the contradictory accounts of modern Ethiopia state and nation building, 
the trajectory of its development, and the ideas and ideologies used to reorganize the process, 
especially since the 1960s. More emphasis is also given to the historical foundations of Oromo 
struggles for democracy and self-determination within the framework of the making of the 
modern Ethiopian state. This provides insight into the historical depth of the causes of the social 
movement led by youth activists, with a focus on the implications of historical paradoxes and 
the legacy of state-building efforts relevant to the quest for democracy in Ethiopia. 
The fifth chapter analyses the 2014-2018 social movements that brought Prime Minister Abiy 
Ahmed to power. The analysis divides the protest movements into phases based on the 
protesters' demands, the government's reactions to the youth-led social movements, as well as 
the reactions of other groups and international communities with a focus on the factors that led 
to the dynamism of the demands of the protest movements. 
The sixth chapter presents an analysis of the current measures of political reform undertaken 




possibilities of Ethiopia’s ongoing troubled transition. The chapter also carefully examines the 
different understanding of democracy among Ethiopians, and analyses the governing ideals of 
Oromo indigenous democracy, which may contribute to broader discussions of democratic 
innovation by reconstructing the core tenets of Oromo political traditions into an alternative 
model of democracy for local governance.  
Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter, which synthesises the research findings based on the 
theoretical framework. It argues that the recent public protests in Oromia and Amhara regions 
contributed significantly to create better conditions for transitioning the country into 
democratic reforms. However, problematic management of the transition process, the political 
and institutional heritage of the previous regime as well as the nature of political relations in 
the post-protest period – among the disunity among opposition parties, appear to complicate or 


















Chapter Two: Competing Concepts of Democracy, Theories of 
Democratization, and the Developmental State 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature related to the various meanings of democracy, the competing 
theoretical explanations of democratization and salient features of the developmental state that 
enable the study to address its main objectives. It provides an understanding of the factors that 
advance and limit the frontiers of the democratization process and explores how they are 
manifested in the current reform processes in Ethiopia. For this purpose, the chapter is divided 
into four main sections. Following this introduction, the second section begins by examining 
what is meant by “democracy,” the ultimate condition to which the democratization process 
leads, and then ends with Robert Dahl's (1989) definition, which offers key criteria for what a 
democratic regime should embody. The last part of this section also analyses the salient features 
of developmental states to understand their relevance to democratic development. The third 
section focuses on the various theoretical explanations of what motivates or impedes the 
development of democracy to determine the most relevant framework for this thesis. 
Accordingly, this study offers nine conditions that can be used to determine whether the 
political changes in progress in Ethiopia are pushing the nation towards democratization or are 
strategies and tactics for survival of the regime. The fourth, concluding section, presents a 
summary of the theoretical foundation of the thesis as framed in this chapter.  
2.2 Revisiting the concepts of democracy 
Democracy is one of the great concerns of the contemporary world. There is a consensus about 
the validity and legitimacy of democracy, as opposed to all forms of undemocratic regimes. 
However, if the defence of democracy is a consensus, the understanding of what it stands for 
is not. What is the meaning of democracy? The most problematic issue in defining democracy 
is the determination of whether it is primarily a substantive way of life or rather a set of 
procedural rules. This issue has a privileged position within political science, having a unique 
role in the considerations on the legitimacy and institutional designs of political systems. The 
debate resurfaced recently due to the crisis of liberal democracy in the Western world and the 
rise of authoritarianism in Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Haynes, 2013). In 
other words, since democracy embodies the tension between utopian aspirations and practical 
realities, in recent decades it has become the subject of serious debate among scholars of 




themselves, since democracy means rule by the people, not by the elites. In practice, even in 
the most vibrant democracies, ordinary citizens can choose their rulers and hold them 
accountable, but they do not rule themselves (Gastil and Erik, 2018: 304). 
There are roughly two perspectives on the concept of democracy: the first is known as a 
"minimalist conception," which is also called the “democracy of means” and its foundations 
based in Joseph Schumpeter's assumptions of what democracy is. Briefly, this can be 
understood as the result of a mutual commitment between political elites on the rules and 
procedures that produce peaceful choices, through voting and competitive elections, within the 
plurality of interests existing within societies (Schumpeter, 2006). The conceptions known in 
the literature as "maximalist" or “democracy of ends” conceive that democratic regimes cannot 
be reduced to methods of electoral choices and political institutional mechanisms. In the 
following paragraphs, thus, I have reviewed these two perspectives of democracy in detail, and 
then end with the definition by Robert Dahl (1989), who offers criteria that a democratic system 
should embody. These criteria are also translated into three categories of rights that make up 
the essential elements of modern democracy: participation, representation, minimum level of 
civil and political freedoms. 
2.2.1 The minimalist conception of democracy 
In his famous work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (the 2006 edition), Joseph 
Schumpeter discusses his “procedural” definition of democracy by criticizing the implications 
of the concept applied by political philosophers of the eighteenth century such as John Stuart 
Mill, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. They viewed democracy as rule by the people, and the 
democratic method as an institutional device for political decision-making that realizes the 
common good, allowing people to decide for themselves, choosing people who are able to carry 
out their will (Schumpeter, 2006:250). 
The above definition has been consecrated over the centuries as the classical doctrine of 
democracy. It is exactly against this view that Schumpeter would raise rigorous and forceful 
arguments, from there building what is known as Schumpeterian minimalism. Schumpeter's 
scathing criticism of classical theory begins by attacking the two pillars upon which it 
structures itself: the common good and the general will. According to this doctrine, the people 
enjoy a definite and rational opinion on all the questions that are presented to them to decide, 
since the common good implies precise answers to all the questions, to the point of every fact 




of some public business requires special skills and techniques that require it to be entrusted to 
specialists, even then the principles of the common good and the general will would not be 
affected, for experts will simply act in a manner to carry out the will of the people (Schumpeter, 
2006:250-1).  
The Schumpeterian objections, therefore, start from the premise that there is no such thing as 
a single, well-defined common good, upon which all people agree through rational arguments. 
Its non-existence stems not from the fact that some people desire things different from the 
general interest, but from the simple and obvious reason that for the different individuals and 
groups the common good is bound to mean different things. On the other hand, even if the 
opinions and wishes of citizens were precisely defined and independent, with which the 
democratic process could work, and even if everyone acted towards them with ideal rationality, 
it would not necessarily follow that the political decisions produced by that process represented 
anything that could be called convincingly the will of the people. This is because whenever the 
wills of individuals are divided, it is very likely that the political decisions produced will not 
conform to what the people really want (Schumpeter, 2006: 254).  
In Schumpeterian objections, what really exists is a government produced and approved by the 
people, which he believes to be more truthful about the facts of life (Schumpeter, 2006: 273). 
Hence, Schumpeter understands democracy as a method, a means that makes it possible to 
reach a certain end - political, legislative, and administrative decision-making, by the elected 
leaders of the people. In its conception, democracy represents nothing more than an instrument 
- not an end in itself - in which individuals, through competitive elections, acquire the votes of 
the people to thereby enjoy decision-making power in their place. In addition to highlighting 
democracy as a method, the theory embodied in that definition underscores the vital aspect of 
leadership, hitherto neglected by classical doctrine, which gave the electorate an unrealistic 
degree of initiative (Schumpeter, 2006: 270). Moreover, the conception of democracy as a 
method simply means that the reins of government should be given to those with more support 
than any of the competing individuals or group. This allows the acceptance of the rules of the 
democratic game, which is actually necessary for its survival, and then promotes pluralism, 
that is, the coexistence of conflicting interests (Schumpeter, 2006: 301).  
According to the Schumpeterian view, democracy does not mean that the people actually rule; 
it simply means that the people have the opportunity to accept or refuse the persons appointed 




by Weber, that rationalization is a necessary part of a complex world that requires an impartial 
and functional ordering and that only "governments of specialists" can direct the administrative 
apparatuses of the State. Only a highly restrictive model of democracy can be sustained in 
contemporary circumstances (Held, 2006:145). It is precisely in this, therefore, that democratic 
elitism is intrinsically associated with the minimalist conception: the reduction of the concept 
of popular sovereignty to the electoral process and the justification of political rationality as a 
result of the presence of political elites in government (Melucci & Avritzer, 2000:511-15).  
For the minimalist view of democracy, the concept of competition for leadership is also 
intrinsically related to competition in the economic sphere. Just as in the economy the 
competition is never absent, something similar occurs in political life, where there is always 
some competition for the people's adhesion. This precisely justifies considering Schumpeterian 
minimalism as an economic theory of democracy. By defining the democratic system as a 
method for reaching political decisions through free competition for free voting, Schumpeter 
makes democracy a market in which political entrepreneurs vie for the preference of voters, 
consumers of public goods (Schumpeter, 2006:271). In this market, voting is the only currency 
that voters use to buy the achievement of the common good, casting their votes for potential 
leaders from those who compete for political leadership (Przeworski, et al., 2000:16).  
Competition for voting, however, requires a great deal of tolerance for differences of opinion. 
A competitive regime is one in which the government tolerates the opposition instead of 
repressing it, and the opposition, in turn, tolerates the government, accepting the possibility of 
rising to power through participation in free elections and not by revolutionary means. 
Competition only becomes effective through tolerance from one side to the other. In this 
scenario, rival political forces obey the results of people's vote for their chance to win office. 
People who have weapons obey those who do not. Adam Przeworski called this the miracle of 
democracy. Conflicts are regulated, processed according to rules, and thus limited (Przeworski, 
1999: 15-16).  
Hence, the Schumpeterian definition of democracy is strictly procedural: democracy is only a 
method for the choice of rulers, a set of rules that establish how those who must make political 






2.2.2 The maximalist conception of democracy 
Beyond elections and basic civil liberties, maximalists often associate democracy with ideals 
such as popular sovereignty, autonomy, and equality. Popular sovereignty is the principle of 
legitimacy, according to which the will of the people is the only source of legitimate power. 
Autonomy means self-rule, according to which people have the right to participate in the 
adoption of policies and laws that bind them, and equality means that ordinary citizens should 
be able to exercise power in decision-making on an equal basis (Kloppenberg 2016: 16). 
The predominant variant of the maximalist conception is “deliberative democracy,” the notion, 
according to Joshua Cohen (2007), that the exercise of power in democracies is clearly linked 
to the conditions of social thought. In a simple and objective formulation, one can point out the 
essential aspects of deliberationist discourse as follows: "Deliberative democracy requires that 
political decisions be made by those who will be subjected to them, through free public 
reasoning among equals. Rational argumentation, publicity, lack of coercion and equality are 
the values that must guide decision-making in democratic regimes, and the absence of any of 
them compromises the legitimacy of results" (Cohen, 2007:219-20). 
Public reason, according to the above formulation, functions as the ultimate source and 
barometer of legitimacy in any democratic society. For maximalists, the legitimate use of 
coercion by agents of the democratic state requires a more substantive commitment to the core 
values of democracy that regard individual citizens as free and equal members of society. 
Deliberative democracy is premised on the “fact of reasonable pluralism,” which speaks to the 
observable reality of multiple commitments, obligations, and beliefs that condition the 
behaviour and reasoning of individuals in society (Thompson, 2008:500). 
Deliberative democracy is contrasted with minimalism in many respects. It provides a 
framework for bringing people together to achieve common goals and make public policy 
decisions through rational debate. Participants are encouraged to engage in free and equal 
deliberations. Either consensus is the preferred outcome of such discussions, or all possible 
cares are taken to bring the final decision closer to collective judgment (Bohman, 1997:210). 
Deliberative democracy can reduce the exclusionary effects of money and political power in a 
liberal democracy (Gutmann, 2009:11). Deliberative democracy is relatively effective in 
transforming individual subjective preferences into a more objective conceptualization of the 
collective good, as the unity of the participants is either discovered or constructed through open 




resource for promoting common public goods (Young 1997: 383). This means that the essence 
of democracy must be the ability to speak across differences in culture, social positions and 
needs without necessarily erasing them. Maintaining and listening to such differences in 
positions and viewpoints deepens democratic culture. 
As such, whereas in the minimalist conception the ultimate objective is the formation of 
government through democratic procedures, the maximalist view strives for the observance 
and practice of democratic values in society as a whole.  Moreover, since it is entirely possible 
that a government elected through free and fair democratic procedures could pass unjust laws 
or even violate the rights of its citizens in special circumstances (Rawls, 2009: 308-312), the 
deliberative structure provides a framework for discussing issues vital to the interests and 
expectations of all members of society reasonably in ways acceptable to all, even if some 
important disagreements inevitably remain (Karpowitz, et al., 2009: 578 & 598). This suggests 
that a broader, more substantive set of ideals and political values must guide the ideal 
procedures of deliberation. In a deliberative setting, individuals enter the domain of public 
reason with an understanding of one another as equals, endowed with the right to participate 
freely in society under the conditions of collective self-rule. For deliberative liberal democrats 
such as Cohen, these values combine to form a unique ideal of “democratic toleration” that 
touches very significantly upon the classical liberal values of toleration, but which also makes 
substantial revisions to provide a political space for fundamental moral, religious, and 
philosophical disagreement in democratic societies (Glen Newey, 2001:334-336). 
In democratic societies where this overarching value of democratic toleration is prized and 
adhered to, the public realm is characterized by inclusive modes of interaction among citizens 
of many backgrounds and beliefs. In general, the maximalist conception is the one arguing that 
elections, political freedoms, and civil liberties are necessary, but not sufficient to fulfil the 
democratic definition. There are various democratic properties that, maximalists claim, should 
be met on top of those practices, with three of them receiving the most attention: civil 
participation, representation, and political deliberation. Plus, additional variables such as 
societies’ democratic values should also be considered. 
2.2.3 Equidistant conceptions of democracy 
Although there are many different details about what really distinguishes democratic regimes, 
midway between the minimalist and maximal positions one discovers Dahl’s concept of 




Schumpeter’s work to define democracy as a "unique method of making collective and binding 
decisions" and "a process which produces desirable solutions". A fundamental characteristic of 
a democratic government is its responsiveness to the desires of its citizens and equal access to 
power in collective decision-making (Dahl, 1986:5). In other words, democracy as the rule of 
the people is what the political scientist Robert Dahl suggested, arguing that it is a system in 
which all members of a society have an equal right to participate in shaping public policies 
(Ibid).   
In his critique of minimalism, especially the liberal paradigm, Robert Dahl proposed five 
criteria that a democratic system should embody. Effective participation is the first criterion, 
which stipulates that all citizens are given an equal and effective opportunity to express their 
views on political alternatives before adoption. Voting equality is the second criterion, which 
means that all citizens should have an equal and effective opportunity to vote and that all votes 
be equal in political decisions. Enlightened understanding is the third criterion for enabling a 
political system to deliver on its democratic promises by giving citizens equal and effective 
opportunities to identify and validate policy options and their potential consequences in a 
democratic deliberation process. The fourth criterion is citizens’ control over the policy agenda 
as a condition for preventing imposition from outside or from within, giving them an exclusive 
opportunity to decide how and what issues should be included in the agenda, as well as 
changing policies if they wish. The fifth criterion is inclusion, which aims to measure the 
quality of a democratic system, combined with the first four criteria, according to which the 
political system should be as representative of citizens as possible to ensure representational 
legitimacy (Dahl, 1989:37).  
Dahl argued that each of these criteria constitutes a workable standard for measuring the 
achievement and capacity of democratic governance. He also explained that most existing 
democracies do not meet one or more of the five criteria in his definition of democracy, and 
infringement of any of the criteria can lead to a decline in the quality of democracy (Ibid: 39). 
It is for this reason that he coined the term "polyarchy" to describe liberal electoral models that 
do not merit the name "democracy" as they often fall short of his democratic criteria (Dahl, 
1971). In short, according to Dahl (1989), democracy should provide opportunities for effective 
participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, exercising final control over the 
agenda, and inclusive citizenship. These criteria form three categories of rights that become the 
markers of modern electoral democracies: participation, representation, minimum level of 




While these elements can be seen as standard categories for distinguishing democratic from 
non-democratic regimes, there are also several political systems that adopt such measures of 
democratic discourse without translating them into substantive political changes. For example, 
in many African countries, elections are held without significant impact on the quality of 
democracy or socio-economic development. A regime may include official opposition and 
therefore meet this criterion, but this opposition can be truly powerless and able to operate only 
under state consent. However, by expanding the thinking behind Schumpeter, Dahl (1989) 
offers a way to assess the democratic course of political reforms. This is to see if they expand 
the scope of participation and representation in policy deliberation with civil and political 
freedoms, providing a wide range of adequate criteria for identifying the elements that should 
be included in political reform for the successful transition to democracy. Given this advantage, 
this study used Dahl's (1989) criteria as a starting point to critically examine how and in what 
ways democracy is conceptualized in Ethiopia, as well as the possibilities for expanding its 
frontiers. This helps to reflect on the compatible elements of cultural democracy (see below, 
section 2.3.5) presented as a determinant of democratization in the theoretical framework of 
this thesis.  
However important this conceptualization of democracy is, it is not strong enough to support 
the theoretical bases of this study. As such, it is necessary to study various theoretical 
explanations of what motivates or impedes the development of democracy to determine the 
most relevant conceptualizations. Thus, the theoretical framework designed to fit the objective 
of the study provides space for critical examination of the issues of emulation and uncritical 
importation of theories from abroad, emphasizing the need to reflect on the models, institutions 
and values that best fit the complexities of Ethiopia's reality. Using this analytical tool and ideal 
criteria that measure the actual characteristics of democracy against its utopian aspirations, in 
Chapter Six, this thesis assesses the various conceptions of democracy in Ethiopia and suggests 
relevant elements that are extracted from Gadaa that may contribute to rethinking the 
functioning of democratic local governance in Oromo area.    
2.2.4 Developmental States Reconsidered 
A developmental state consists of two main components: ideological and structural. The nexus 
between these two components is important to defining a developmental state. The ideological 
characteristics of the state and its developmental goals are essential for promoting high rates of 




Pronk, 1997). Beside setting this ideological feature, a developmental state must have 
institutional characteristics that Mkandawire refers to as the ‘state-structure nexus’ that enable 
one state to be able to achieve growth and development while others cannot (Mkandawire, 
2001). This is primarily because what sets a developmental state apart from others is not only 
that it is able to clearly set its development objectives; it also establishes institutional structures 
in order to achieve the objectives. Taken this way, a developmental state can be defined as one 
whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to 
construct and deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic 
development (Ibid).  
The following salient features of the developmental state are extracted considering the nexus 
between the two components that have shaped the aspects of the above definition. Firstly, 
numerous analysts emphasize the essentiality of developmental political leadership bound 
together by a powerful economic and political ideology focused on development (Amsden, 
1989; Beeson, 2004; Woo-Cumings, 1999). Circumstances which give rise to a developmental 
political leadership can be quite diverse. But several analysts suggest that a developmental 
leadership evolves from a clear consensus within the governing elites, both administrative and 
political, over the scope and direction of development (Weis, 2016; Pempel, 1999). In the case 
of the East Asian developmental states, these political elites were able to win the trust and 
cooperation of the bureaucrats as well as the private sector to create functional state institutions 
that facilitated both political stability and economic development (Huff, et al., 2001; Fritz & 
Alina, 2006; Waldner, 1999). 
Secondly, the autonomy, capability, and effectiveness of the bureaucracy in the East Asian 
developmental states is remarkable compared to other developing regions (Wong, 2004). This 
is traced back to the presence of bureaucracy in the Weberian tradition which prioritizes 
meritocratic recruitment, provides promotion incentives, shows rationality, and guarantees 
high levels of prestige and legitimacy to bureaucratic officials (Johnson, 1999; Evans, 2012). 
Moreover, the bureaucracy was able to effectively insulate itself from unproductive political 
interference (Pempel, 1999). Not only was it able to protect itself from particularistic private 
sector interests, but it was strong enough to cooperate with the same in a productive manner 
(Beeson, 2004). 
A production oriented private sector has been at the centre of the rapid progress of 




only able to secure the survival and the ability of the private sector to compete at any level but, 
more crucially, was able to “create” and “reward” in addition to “picking” good performers as 
well as “punishing” bad ones (Wade, 1998: 30). In this way, the state was able to promote long‐
term investments among the industrial elites that resulted in sustained industrial development 
in East Asian countries.  
There are two further components worth noting regarding the governance orientation of 
developmentalism. First, the ruling elites in these countries demonstrated high levels of 
commitment to poverty reduction. They began to address equality concerns from the early 
stages of the transformation process (Hort & Stein, 2000). As a result, rapid industrial growth 
in East Asia was paralleled by a favourable pattern of income equality, low unemployment, 
and the near elimination of grinding poverty. Second, successful economic performance was 
the primary source of (claims to) political legitimacy. Political elites in these countries largely 
depended on delivering growth with equity as a means of strengthening their legitimacy and 
support base (Kim, 2007). Legitimation occurs from the state’s economic achievements, not 
from the way it came to power (Johnson, 1999).   
A discussion on developmentalism in Africa must also necessarily begin by referring to the 
initial post‐colonial experiences of African countries in the 1960ѕ and 1970ѕ because these 
were characterized by the state-led interventions and have been seen to be an expression of 
“developmentalism” (Shіvjі, 2005). At independence, the nationalist parties in many countries 
which had taken over political power from the colonial administration faced the task of nation 
building as well as pursuing economic and social development. Given the weakness of the 
indigenous private sector the new states were under pressure to assume considerable economic 
responsibilities. In fact, they became the main economic actor involved in a wide range of 
activities that included not only social and economic infrastructure but also the ownership and 
management of productive industry. Hence, for most of the first generation of African leaders, 
‘development’ was certainly a central preoccupation (Mkandawire, 2001: 295).  
Ake defends a quite different point of view. He sees post-colonial ruling parties pursuing not 
only nation‐building and socio-economic development, but first and foremost seeking to 
consolidate their own power. He explained that the ideology of development did not serve any 
purpose as a framework for economic transformation, as the interventionist policies were used 




of state power. Such politics of power in Africa were the greatest impediment to development 
no matter that the ruling elites propagated development as their aim (Ake, 1996:9).  
Mkаndаwіrе and Ake’s conflicting interpretations serve to remind us that Africa consists of 
many countries whose post-colonial experiences have differed substantially. However, some 
general characteristics can be identified. Bureaucracies in post-colonial Africa lacked the 
autonomy deemed necessary in a developmental state. Olukоѕhі (2004: 158) explained that the 
lack of autonomy made the bureaucracy vulnerable to predatory behaviour such as corruption, 
rent‐seeking, abuse of public resources and a basic lack of accountability with detrimental 
consequences for policy making and implementation. 
The private sector as well did not play a significant role in the national development process 
during the post-colonial era. This is understandable given the weakness of indigenous business 
after independence, which remained a major challenge for reorienting production to the 
interests and needs of African societies. Moreover, the state in post-colonial Africa was also 
instinctively opposed to private sector development and did not recognize the private sector as 
a crucial development player. 
Many post-colonial African states also opted for one-party systems of rule shortly after 
independence. As a result, dominant party regimes that were autocratic and intolerant of 
dissent, combined with a strong personalistic element, began to characterize the continent 
(Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010). While many African countries have institutionalized formal 
democratic institutions such as elections, parliaments or courts, these institutions rather 
perform functions other than democratic systems, such as controlling arenas of competition 
that are important to the incumbent to continue stay in power (Stuppert, 2020: 11-14). Political 
leaders in such regimes often rely on various forms of coercion to control political space and 
advance their interests through draconian laws that marginalize civil society organizations and 
regime opponents (Mac Giollabhuí, 2019; Rakner, 2019: 10). Ruling elites in such regimes 
depended on the distribution of spoils to stay in power and diverted huge amounts of public 
resources for patronage purposes, detracting from genuine development efforts in the process 
(Acemoglu & James, 2005; Acemoglu, 2005). In short, the political and economic crisis 
resulting from the postcolonial state experience in Africa can be seen as the result of states that 
lacked the essential features of a successful developmental state, as well as the entrenchment 
of authoritarian regimes that institutionalized autocratic practices to suppress opposition and 




Countries such as the United States and international agencies such as the World Bank have 
also played a role in exacerbating the problems of an already fragile continent, creating 
structural adjustment programs, pressuring regimes that relied on foreign agencies for loans, 
aid, and trade (Shivji, 1991; Saul, 1997). According to Bollen (1983), international exchange, 
including trade and investment, favours a rich international core at the expense of a poor 
periphery that has been exploited. Maintaining this system of exploitation in peripheral 
countries requires the suppression of democratic rule, in which authoritarian leaders are 
considered to be more receptive to the interests of international economic centres. Streeck 
(2011) also explained that in Africa and beyond, the economic dimensions of integration into 
the global economy have led to the decline of national democratic governance. 
There are two differing views on replicability. The first view is a notion that is used to argue 
that the East Asian development experience can serve as a model for Africa. This notion is 
supported by the ‘emulation’ thinkers who advocate that the replication of the developmental 
state is possible in Africa given the established experiences of the East Asian countries 
(Robinson & Gordon, 1998). Particularly following the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, 
which many economists considered to have been the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, this notion is increasingly propagated among global south leaders that 
have considered foundation stones of the long-dominant neoliberal ideology overturned (see 
Zenawi, 2012).    
The second view argues that the developmental state approach is not viable in Africa and 
expresses scepticism as to whether the East Asian development experiences can serve as a 
model. This view is maintained by the ‘impossibility’ theorists who have been influenced by 
several points of view. One view posits that the unique and specific circumstances which led 
to the emergence of developmental states in East Asia cannot easily be replicated due to the 
difficulty of imitating institutions that are highly contextual and time dependent, as their 
development is linked to East Asian social traditions and culture (see Hewitt, 2000; Low, 2004; 
Mkandawire, 2001: 293-4).  
Beeson (2004) further explained that given the transitional character of developmental states 
and the rapid expansion of Western influence in the post-Cold War environment, even East 
Asian countries would find it difficult to replicate their own development experience in the 
current context. These unique properties make the “strait jacket” transfer of the developmental 




development strategy in Africa would limit the replication of the developmental state model 
(Morrissey, 2001). Birdsall adds that Africa lacks the adequate political superstructures and 
leadership required to pursue developmental policies (Birdsall, 2007). As a result of these 
governance limitations there is insufficient commitment by the state elite to development 
imperatives (Fritz & Alina, 2006).  
2.3 Determinants of democratization 
Theoretical literature on the determinants of democratization offers a wide range of competing 
explanations for the process. The three main theories of democratization in question are (i) a 
modernization approach that links democracy to capitalist development, (ii) a structural 
approach that critically considers the perspectives of political change embedded in the 
architecture of social systems, and (iii) a transition approach that focuses on the agency of 
elites, emphasizing the significance of the strategic behaviour of those in the incumbent regime 
in the process of democratization. It should be noted here that there is no single ideal 
organization, standard or teleological condition that should be emulated by all nations, since 
they are not without problems. Thus, the nine conditions of democratization, outlined below, 
are aimed at overcoming such limitations of the prevailing approaches of democratization to 
better explain the current transition to democracy in African countries. The synthesis of these 
nine conditions adopted in this thesis are: economic development, management of social 
heterogeneity and polarization, the existence of robust statehood, the existence of a vibrant 
civil society, cultural democracy, freedom of the press and social media, nonviolent social 
movements, the role of diaspora and international engagement, and liberalized autocracy. 
These nine factors are discussed as follows to adequately define the democratization measures 
relevant to the research.  
2.3.1 Economic development 
The links between democracy and development have been studied for decades, but still the 
debate on their connections is controversial and inconclusive. Carothers and de Gramont 
(2013:207–208) identify at least three different theoretical perspectives in this debate. The first 
theoretical perspective is rooted in the developmental state camp, which is strong in the thesis 
of "development first, democracy later," claiming the presence of a highly significant positive 
correlation between the degree of economic development and democratization. It is rooted in 
the belief that the transition to democracy can be direct or indirect, but no matter which path 




becoming democratic. On the direct path to democracy, for the modernization theorists 
Rueschemeyer et al, economic development is a capitalist development, which is based on the 
historical path that states take towards liberal democracy (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992:243).  
In contrast to the path of direct evolution from economic development to democracy, Samuel 
Huntington (2006) offers an alternative interpretation of the indirect evolution from economic 
development to democracy. Huntington argues that undemocratic regimes indirectly evolve 
into democracy in the context of economic growth through political instability and social 
unrest, caused by the institutional failure of such regimes to meet the needs and demands of 
disaffected social groups, leading to political change that can be institutionalized. From this 
perspective, economic development enhances the resources available to ordinary people, and 
this increases the masses’ capabilities to launch and sustain collective action to achieve their 
common demands, mounting effective pressure on state authorities to respond. Consequently, 
the major effect of their collective action is that they shift the balance of power between the 
elites and the masses towards the masses (Huntington, 2006:51).   
In practice, however, not all transitions to democracy stem from economic development, as the 
examples of East Asian states, including China's economic growth, can prove that development 
does not necessarily lead to democracy. Although economic development and a free market 
may promote democratic ideas, such development can also weaken democracy or even support 
autocratic rule. This camp claims that there are strong empirical data that counter the case for 
an authoritarian state development. One such empirical evidence is that serious socio-economic 
problems arising from a morbid economic model of government play a central role in political 
instability, inhibiting the transition to democracy and the progress of democratic structures, 
especially in Africa (Bratton, 1989:35). For example, the land grab problem, where foreign 
investors acquire vast tracts of land in Africa at the expense of local farmers, is a good example 
of Africa's morbid economic model guided by international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and IMF in the name of development. The implementation of this authoritarian 
development scheme, which is founded on a policy of leasing millions of hectares of land to 
investors, includes human rights violations, forced displacement and disregard for local 
livelihoods, especially contributing to political repression under the guise of development. 
Thus, large-scale land grabbing is a real obstacle to African democracy. Rather than developing 
the necessary level of trust in their leaders to create real democratic structures, Africans feel 
frustrated and betrayed by their authorities and their power mechanisms, which perpetuate 




The second theoretical explanation, i.e., the democratic governance camp, firmly rejects the 
thesis of development-first, noting that democracy must be a precondition for development and 
that the promotion of democracy is a strategic approach to achieving prosperity, security, and 
peace (Halperin, et al., 2009). It claims that because of the unique features of democracy, such 
as accountability, checks and balances, low corruption, openness, competition, information 
flow, transparency and adaptability, democracies generally outperformed non-democracies on 
most indicators of economic and social well-being (Siegel, et al., 2004:57). For example, Van 
de Walle (2002:76) argues that in sub-Saharan Africa, countries undergoing democratic 
reforms are less likely to witness armed conflict in the region. The Legatum Prosperity Index 
(2020) uses a broader concept of human prosperity, which includes, for example, safety and 
security, entrepreneurship and opportunity, personal freedom, and economic and social aspects, 
demonstrating considerable empirical support for the fact that democratic politics, as well as 
‘desirability’ in terms of human rights and the rule of law, can ensure a more sustainable 
development than autocracies.  
The third theoretical perspective, which is the multiple path camp, argues that there is no single 
best model, so politics must be organized according to the situation, since development can be 
driven through different governance systems (Carothers & De Gramont, 2013:207–208). 
Moreover, Francis Fukuyama (2011) also argues that political institutions develop in complex 
and often random ways. Thus, this theoretical perspective encourages local processes and 
domestic problem-solving efforts, as the best path in any country will depend on their local 
conditions (Levy & Spiller, 1996).  
2.3.2 Management of social heterogeneity and polarization 
Some scholars have argued that effective management of social division and social polarization 
is an important prerequisite for a successful democratization process (Merkel and Weiffen, 
2012). The assumption here is that the prospects for democracy are diminished by a failure to 
properly manage social heterogeneity, as hostility also intensifies in a country that is deeply 
divided along religious, linguistic, and ethnic lines (Horowitz, 1998:348). Extreme social 
polarization is detrimental to democracy because it easily turns into a violent struggle to 
monopolize the state, preventing the peaceful transfer of power from one group to another, as 
required by democracy (Dahl, 1971). From this perspective, different arguments on how ethnic 
dynamics and democracy are interrelated are presented below, examining how democratization 




The ethnic variant in social heterogeneity is a controversial issue on democratization, as there 
are two distinct arguments that ethnic passions can lead, on the one hand, to violence, and on 
the other hand, to the mobilization of ethnic nationalists against authoritarian regimes. In the 
first account, the impact of ethnicity on democracy is negative in the sense that ethnic diversity 
and strong ethnic nationalism are obstacles to building a stable democracy. As per this 
argument, the introduction of open political competition in an ethnically plural society 
inevitably generates "ethnic outbidding" on the part of elites seeking maximum support from 
their ethnic groups. For example, Chandra (2005:523) recapitulates the problems of party 
competition in polarized societal cleavage structures, arguing that it can lead to a dominant 
party controlling the competition, creating a one-party system favouring a particular ethnic 
group. The outcome of such exercises has often been a slide toward the collapse of democracy 
and violence, either because elites attempt to manipulate the decision-making process, or 
because certain ethnic groups reject political decisions in which they feel they have no voice 
(Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972). Similarly, Robert Dahl also expressed concern that high levels 
of ethnic diversity reduce the likelihood of democracy, especially in countries where one ethnic 
group tends to dominate the state (Dahl, 1971: 114). These views equate strong ethnic 
sentiment with radical ideologies, instinctive anti-democratic hostility and a propensity for 
militarism, intolerance and violence, arguing that the exclusionary character of ethnic 
nationalism creates a weak foundation for building a democratic society (Berman, 1998; 
Merkel and Weiffen, 2012; Berman et al., 2004). From this viewpoint, only civic nationalism 
is compatible with democracy (Plamenatz, 1973:36). Mkandawire (2009: 150) also argues that 
democratization has the seemingly paradoxical effect of increasing interethnic tensions. 
In the second account, the impact of ethnicity on democracy is positive in the sense that 
politically mobilized ethnicity can serve to advance and strengthen democracy. Beissinger 
(2008) argues that the positive impact of ethnicity on democratization is hidden by a traditional 
and narrow view of their relationship, as many of the traditional theoretical studies focus too 
much on a specific demographic configuration to determine this relationship. The reduction of 
the topic to the question of the specific demographic composition of a country fails to recognize 
the difficulties of objectively measuring diversity, given that there are many other factors, such 
as institutional, social, historical, and economic factors that can better predict the political 
mobilization of ethnicity than demographic metrics (Beissinger, 2008:88). In Africa, there was 
little intellectual effort to understand ethnicity, as criticism of the primordialists has been 




plays into the hands of former colonial master. Authoritarian rule further occulted the ethnic 
question by simply denying its salience in African politics (Mkandawire, 2009: 156).  
However, democracy as a form of government does not require ethnic demobilization; instead, 
ethnic mobilization can provide an opportunity to address pressing problems affecting society 
by finding a path into politics. Indeed, what democracy requires is a resolution of ethnic 
conflicts without serious violence and within legal channels, so that neither conflict nor 
uncertainty about the ability of democratic institutions to resolve grievances can provide a 
foothold for a resurgent authoritarianism. Several studies suggest that the processes that 
determine the interaction of ethnicity with democratization revolve around the ways in which 
regime change interacts with the interests of people within different cultural groups (Posner, 
2007: 1304; Beissinger, 2008:91; Young, 2007). Ethnic mobilization associated with regime 
change can often escalate into ethnic violence, but it can also play a stabilizing role if satisfied 
ethnic groups demobilize or favour institutionalized forms of multi-ethnic interaction. Such 
outcomes depend on the leadership and choices politicians make during the transition process, 
by which ethnicity becomes a basis for inclusion or exclusion in the democratization process.  
There are several reasons why the process of democratization exacerbates ethnic conflicts, 
especially in the early stages. The first reason concerns the interests of authoritarian rulers and 
how they manipulate ethnicity in order to gain and retain power for themselves, playing the 
“ethnic card” where elites make nationalist appeals in their competition for popular support to 
avoid rivals or strengthen their rule (Kanyinga, 1996:66; Barkan, 1976:269). Authoritarian 
rulers have the incentive to use government leverage and control over the economy and the 
media to sell the exclusive nationalism to their political base or ethnic group as a means of 
gaining popular legitimacy instead of democratization (David, 2003: 467). The second reason 
refers primarily not to leaders and their manipulation schemes, but to a wider system of social 
relations and the interests of the broader societies, which democracy is likely to influence or 
reshape. In most authoritarian regimes, ethnically pluralistic societies are dominated by a 
particular cultural group, resulting in stakes that are often significant, including the relative 
status of groups, the division of wealth among them, educational and cultural opportunities that 
members enjoy or are denied, the chances of promotion, representation in government, etc. In 
this sense, democracy often becomes a numbers game in which the majority rules, and this may 




The democratization process in multi-ethnic societies usually faces a “minority problem” that 
needs to be addressed to prevent further division or instability, because ethnic minorities are 
always among the potential losers in the democratization process that empowers the ethnic 
majority. Thus, the main dilemma facing democratization in a multicultural society is how to 
integrate minority interests into a reconfigured system of government whose legitimacy is 
critically dependent on majority rule. 
In other words, in the situation where an authoritarian regime favours a majority ethnic group, 
the mobilization of minorities from below plays a relatively small role in initiating political 
openness. Thus, in this context, democracy is also unlikely to threaten the existing system of 
ethnic stratification. Yet, minorities often benefit from the political openness that accompanies 
democratization in that they can mobilize and put their questions on the political agenda. Such 
mobilization may contribute to the development of democracy, but the stability of the 
democratization project depends to a large extent on the ability to create mechanisms for the 
integration of minorities into the newly reconstituted political order. Under an authoritarian 
regime that favours an ethnic minority at the expense of an ethnic majority, ethnic mobilization 
of the majority is often the main driving force behind transition. Regime change here 
necessarily means a radical change in the system of ethnic stratification. The main challenge 
facing democratization in such countries is how to demobilize formerly privileged minorities 
and make them accept their changing and less privileged role in the reconstructed political 
order (Posner, 2007; Beissinger. 2008:91). These arguments indicate that the democratization 
process continues or is regressed depending to the ability of the transition process to demobilize 
and integrate disaffected ethnic groups. Thus, any attempt to explore the relationship between 
ethnicity and democratization must include factors that mobilize or demobilize ethnic 
nationalism and transform it into sources of political (in)stability in the context of regime 
change, such as economic opportunity and incentives, the collective action of disaffected ethnic 
groups, and public policies aimed at integrating these groups.    
The third reason that democratization can exacerbate ethnic conflict is explained in views that 
favour civic nationalism over ethnic nationalism for the creation of stable democracy, on the 
assumption that ethnic passions can breed extremism and instability. For example, liberalism 
has a significant aversion to the phenomenon of ethno-nationalism, as it focuses on the rights 
of individuals independent of cultural communities, with the belief that emphasizing the rights 




country is culturally neutral. Liberal democracies, even if they are based on civic rather than 
ethnic nationalism, also have deep roots in the dominant cultural idiom (Yack, 1996: 195-7).  
The above view points out that, while there is a dangerous potential for ethnic nationalism to 
escalate into chauvinism and violence, there are also ways in which ethnic nationalism can be 
functional for democracy. For example, modern nationalism and modern democracy are linked 
to the principles of popular sovereignty and self-determination. As such, there must be 
convergence of passion for self-determination in the ethno-nationalist sense and passion for 
self-rule in the sense of democracy for ethnicity to have a positive impact on democratization 
(Nodia, 1992). In this respect, the liberating spirit engendered by ethnic nationalism can be a 
driving force in countering authoritarian rule, serving as a glue to build stable political 
societies. But not all ethnic nationalisms lead to the same consequences. Nationalism directed 
against members of other ethnic groups can undermine the foundations of democratic stability 
and the rule of law, as it can escalate into chauvinism and bloodshed (Beissinger, 2008:95). 
Mkandawire (2009: 151) also noted that where nationalism sought more definite and fixed 
identities, it only fomented “ethnic cleansing,” irredentist expansionism, or genocidal 
exclusion of the other. But ethnic nationalism aimed at ending imposed authoritarianism can 
provide a social basis for successful democracy.  
Moreover, in the literature on political transition, democracy is most often seen as a product of 
confrontation between proponents of democracy and its opponents, who together chose the 
path of negotiations and, therefore, open the country to reform through mass mobilization of 
citizens against tyranny. Democratization movements that fail to mobilize large numbers of 
supporters are unlikely to put enough pressure on the state to bring about democratic change 
or counter repressive attempts by the regime (Bunce, 2003:172). Ethnic mobilization that 
focuses on liberation from authoritarian domination can provide a mass basis for democratic 
movements. The strongest mobilization in favour of democracy may come from movements 
focused on democratization, not from eschewed nationalism that have sought to turn against 
other ethnic groups. The more followers are mobilized, the less the likelihood of repression 
and / or the greater the ability to resist repression. Groups with weaker ethnic identity are less 
able to induce the mobilization needed to end or limit the tactics of a repressive regime. In this 
regard, having a strong ethnic identity mobilized in the pursuit of freedom from authoritarian 
rule can play a key role not only in bringing about regime change, but also in ensuring that it 




institutions. This indicates that robust ethnic nationalism against imposed authoritarianism can 
help, not harm, democratization.   
Finally, robust ethno-nationalist movements can also lay the foundation for the revival of civic 
life and contribute to the emergence of civil societies that can stand independent of the state 
and hold it accountable, as well as contribute to the understanding of social problems. On the 
other hand, the lack of a strong ethnic identity against a repressive regime could reinforce a 
weak civil society, creating the basis for authoritarian rulers to tie the country more firmly to 
authoritarianism. In such cases, the lack of strong ethnic activism against authoritarian 
hegemony undermines the prospects for democracy, weakens democratic institutions, and 
allows elements of the old regime to use nationalist rhetoric to reinforce the rule of strongmen. 
And, where institutions are weak and the politically dominant group has failed to accommodate 
the demands of disaffected group, democracy may lead to bloodshed and even the 
disintegration of the nation (Mkandawire, 2009: 151). This suggests that it is the lack of a 
strong ethnic identity, not its existence, that can be detrimental to the building of a successful 
democracy, denying the opportunity for democracy to thrive in multinational contexts. Hence, 
ethnicity in Africa cannot be ignored, disappeared, or suppressed, so what is more possible is 
to tame it by recognizing its power and managing it to provide guarantees against its dire side 
effects, because ethnicity can be gratifying and terrifying (Berman, 1998; Mkandawire, 2009). 
In short, while agreement can be reached on a democracy that it provides a framework within 
which ethnic groups can negotiate and live together the power of ethnicity might be recognized 
as an opportunity to build civil society and promote representation or understood as an obstacle 
to democratization.  
2.3.3 Existence of robust statehood 
In modern society, existence of a functioning statehood is one of the necessary conditions for 
achieving democracy, as such a state is able to determine the political community in which 
democracy operates. There is a long-running argument in the political science literature that a 
political decision to become democratic requires resolving the questions of statehood, 
regardless of whether this is a result of negotiations and cooperation between political elites or 
under pressure from popular protests. In other words, it is impossible to be a democracy until 
the elements of the statehood are settled (O'Donnell, 1993; Przeworski, et al., 1995; Linz & 




However, scholars differ on the elements that they consider essential to resolving the questions 
of statehood. Philip Schmitter and Terry Karl argue that citizenship is the most distinctive 
feature of democracy because democracy does not make sense if you do not know which state 
you are a citizen in, where leaders recognize you as potential constituents when they run for 
office (Schmitter and Karl, 1991). Robert Dahl (1989:207) claimed that the democratic process 
presupposes the existence of territorial boundaries and a political community, as democratic 
methods in themselves cannot solve the problem of the proper scope and domain of democratic 
units. He pointed out that the majority principle, for example, will not work if we do not know 
the boundaries of the entire political community, because only when the clear majority does 
not doubt the political community to which they belong, the majority principle allows them to 
organize their lives in a democratic way (Dahl, 1989:147).  
On the contrary, if a broad section of the population in the territorial social unit renounces the 
adaptation of the unit as an entity convenient for making legitimate decisions and there is a 
desire to create an independent state or merge with other countries, a democratic procedure 
cannot work and solve the problem of identity. Here the main challenge is to develop a strong 
identification with the territorial-social unit. In this sense, Dankwart Rustow (1970:350-352) 
argued in his classic article on the transition to democracy that “national unity” is a 
precondition for democratization based on the experience of countries that have achieved stable 
socio-economic development. These are Western European countries that have managed to 
create a common national identity and national unity by adopting a state-building process 
imposed by governments that used a wide range of tools to suppress linguistic and cultural 
pluralism to create nation-states that define political communities in which the democratization 
process took place (Linz & Stepan, 1996). As these methods are not acceptable ethical 
standards today, the lesson from past transitions to democracy is that nation building must 
precede democratization.  
In the postcolonial era, African countries continue to struggle with the pursuit of democratic 
development, since the legacy of colonialism has made both democracy and nation building 
very difficult. Post-colonial "national integration” processes were essentially imposed from 
above, which allowed differences to be subsumed or suppressed on account of diversity. 
Instead of unity in diversity, group uniformity was often imposed, even where federalism was 
espoused. It is not surprising that now, several decades after independence, these countries are 




Democratic institutions are feeble, state systems are fragile or collapsed, and people are not 
integrated into a common national identity (Dorman, 2006: 1088- 1091).   
Moreover, as Berger pointed out, in Europe, nation-building has historically preceded state-
building, while in post-colonial states, state-building has preceded nation-building, which has 
made it necessary to engage in nation-building in the post-colonial period (Berger, 2006). This 
change in historical trends has had dire consequences for state-building programs and 
democracy projects in post-colonial Africa, creating fragile relationships between democracy 
and nation-building with big questions that remain unresolved with regard to priority: Is 
democracy a necessary and sufficient condition for building a nation state, or is the building of 
a nation with a strong national identity a necessary prerequisite for democratic development?  
In many ways, this has become the Achilles heel of many African countries that have suffered 
from conflict after independence, instability, and civil war (Mukwedeya, 2016).  
In addition to the legacy of colonialism, poor leadership and bad governance and its negative 
consequences in terms of poverty, inequality, exclusion, and marginalization are important 
explanatory factors impeding the process of nation-building in African countries (Olalere, 
2015). In short, it turns out that in all of the cases mentioned above, the issue of statehood with 
the core elements of nation-building has to be resolved in the first place, as it is a roadblock to 
democratization and stable development. 
2.3.4 Existence of vibrant civil society 
The significance of a vibrant civil society in the transition to democracy is emphasized as an 
important factor in understanding "pressure from below" that could oppose authoritarian rule. 
The transition to democracy in Eastern Europe, as well as in South Korea, was inspired by 
demonstrations and strikes by students, unions, and citizens to destabilize their authoritarian 
governments (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Some scholars also pointed out that one of the reasons 
why Africa did not collapse into total absolutism was that civil society was able to survive by 
providing a way to resist authoritarianism, despite the systematic efforts of the state to destroy 
it (Anderson, 1999). Civil society in Africa was shaped by its relations not only with the state, 
but also with other public units. The recurring trend has been for civil society organizations to 
retreat to discrete arenas either through: “submerged society”, where needs are met through 
patronage networks or a “defiant society” in which dissenters openly ignore state power and 
mobilize to replace the existing state, which includes groups such as national liberation groups 




vulnerability of civil society in some African countries has left citizens with only two options, 
either to face persistent harassment from the state, which often leads to violations of their 
individual and collective rights or exile from their countries because the state is seen a hostile 
force. 
The presence of a strong civil society does not allow the state to become over powerful. And 
to the dissatisfaction of the ruling elites, a strong civil society explicitly demands political 
reform. An independent civil society, found in trade unions, professional associations, 
community development associations, social movements and other nongovernmental groups 
that put pressure on the system, is a necessary condition for democratization. For transition 
researchers such as Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), civil society emerges in economic 
development, reinforcing the ability of the lower classes to participate in changing the balance 
of class power. Bratton (1989) points to this, saying that economic development leads to a 
greater concentration of people in densely populated residential areas and at the same time 
dissipates them into diverse networks of interactions. This leads to decentralized information 
management, increasing sources of alternative information, spreading literacy, knowledge, 
income, and other organizational resources among the population, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of protests that can challenge the authoritarian system (Bratton & Mattes, 2001).  
However, a weak civil society may become an instrument of preserving the power of the ruling 
class. Thus, civil society can play the opposite role: some groups may retain authoritarian 
power to protect certain interests and counter democracy (Sørensen, 2010). Therefore, it is 
important to find a balance of power between the state apparatus and civil society, which de 
Tocqueville (2009: 372) called an "institutional bedrock" for promoting democracy by 
inspecting and maintaining a balance of power with the state. Overall, a strong civil society is 
considered as an important precondition for a successful transition to democracy. The growing 
presence of civic groups would be a good indicator of how the government relates to freedom 
of expression and assembly rights, as well as to democracy in general. 
2.4.5 Cultural Democracy 
Cultural democracy claims that only democracy consistent with the country's history and 
culture can create political conditions that facilitate successful democratic development 
(Osabu-Kle, 2019). The rationale for its use in Africa is necessarily broad since there is no 
Western theoretical approach that could adequately explain African political systems (Nyong'o, 




recognizes that no organization can best solve human problems. The results depend not only 
on the agent, but also on the compatibility of the agent with the environment and technology 
used (Donaldson, 2001). Similarly, postmodernists also argue that there is no single ideal 
organization, standard or teleological modernity that all nations, including industrialized ones, 
must emulate, since they are not without problems (Lash, 2014.). The value and reality 
judgment in any given decision-making process depend on the evaluative system of the 
decision-maker (Vickers, 1987). Since people's judgments about reality and value vary in 
different cultures, their understanding and decisions also vary regarding the objects, processes, 
and practices, including political aspects. What is acceptable in one culture may be completely 
rejected in another culture. Thus, the complete transfer of political practices from one culture 
to another can lead to disastrous consequences.  
For example, the current political and social problems in many African countries go back to 
the colonial treaties of the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, in which European colonists 
agreed to divide Africa among themselves, after which indirect rules and the colonial education 
system were introduced, which mainly serve the interests of the colonists (Gjersø, 2015). The 
period of structural transformations after gaining independence raised the issues of integration 
into the world economy, which led to the need to achieve “appropriate” political conditions, 
such as the adoption of “democracy” for this type of integration (Ake, 1991:34-36). Thus, 
African countries were forced to imitate, without appreciating the serious limitations of liberal 
democracy from the Western world (Parekh, 1992). As result, many African countries remain 
in a constant state of crisis with catastrophic consequences for political stability, economic 
growth, and overall well-being.  
Compatible cultural democracy also considers the ideas of Marxist political scholars who argue 
that social, cultural, and political phenomena are primarily determined by the mode of material 
production (Paulson et al., 2003). Although this understanding ascribes primacy to economics 
rather than the idea of explaining historical processes, the French Marxist philosopher Louis 
Althusser argued that superstructure elements of ideology and politics are conditions for the 
existence of the economy (Althusser, 2006). Consistent with this claim, compatible cultural 
democracy also accepts the central argument that each mode of production requires appropriate 
political, social, and cultural arrangements. Thus, African countries that are still pre-industrial 
cannot be expected to have the same political arrangements and practices as industrial societies. 





The concept of compatible cultural democracy in Africa can also be seen in the context of 
Abraham Maslow's theory of hierarchy of needs (McLeod, 2007). While advanced countries 
may be at the stage of satisfying self-fulfilment and the greatest achievements such as space 
exploration, poor African countries may be at the stage of satisfying the physiological needs of 
providing bread to their hungry millions, struggling to meet security needs for protection from 
dangers, threats, and hardships, as well as the social needs of nation building, including 
instilling a sense of belonging and acceptance of one ethnic group by another.  
Moreover, if we accept the definition of politics as the authoritative allocation of values by 
David Easton (1953), then compatible cultural democracy claims that African politics must be 
an authoritative distribution of African values, not an authoritative distribution of foreign 
values. The authoritative spread of African values among African peoples by Africans in the 
context of African culture and African history is important for the development of African 
democracy with the manifestation of African identity and values that are recognized throughout 
the world community. The application of compatible cultural democracy in the African context 
cannot be socialist, communist, capitalist, liberal or any other foreign "ism". However, it has 
to become a reflection of Africanism - the ideological, economic, and political practice of 
Africans according to African history and culture, which aims to free Africans from foreign 
excrescences (Osabu-Kle, 2019). 
However, the concept of compatible cultural democracy is a very general application in both 
the developing and the developed worlds. According to the contingency theory, compatible 
cultural democracy claims that there is not a single best political organization or technology 
that every country of the world can emulate. On the other hand, since politics is aimed at 
meeting human needs (Bay, 1968; Fitzgerald, 1985), it stands to reason that we find differences 
in the application of democratic theory where people also have different needs and attitudes 
towards political objects, processes, and practices. Thus, Westerners supposedly practice a 
democracy that is compatible with the attitudes, experiences, orientation, and perspectives of 
Westerners. The lesson that can be drawn from all of these differences is that the compatibility 
of a particular type of application of democratic theory with the orientation and attitude of 
people towards compatible political culture is important. 
Incompatible cultural democracy may have dangerous consequences. Indeed, all presidential, 
parliamentary, federal, and consociational democratic systems are different applications of 




different cultures (Osabu-Kle, 2019). Given this, it is also reasonable and appropriate for 
African countries to practice a kind of compatible cultural democracy suitable for their 
environment, in which incompatible alien ideologies are the main cause of political unrest and 
economic chaos. The wholesale transfer of foreign ideologies and political practices 
undermined indigenous institutions, which are prerequisites for the success of democracy and 
economic development for Africans. In the context of imitating foreign "democratic" practices 
that ignore the cultural and historical aspects of Africans, there is a potential danger of repeating 
the mistakes of the past with serious consequences.  Hence, it is time to seize the opportunity 
to understand and appreciate the value of compatible cultural democracy in Africa found in 
political languages and discourse. 
2.3.6 Press freedom and social media. 
Freedom of expression and freedom of the press are the basis of democracy. A political system 
can be defined as fully democratic only if there are independent media to disseminate political 
information adequately, monitor the performance of the government and convey a plural set of 
voices and judgments about the functioning of the political system. Traditional media provide 
citizens with useful information to monitor the results produced by their political 
representatives and allow them to make informed decisions while increasing their level of 
political awareness, responsibility, and trust in representative democracy. In fact, providing 
more information helps voters to control more politicians efficiently (Besley & Prat, 2006).  
In addition, the media can be a ‘watch-dog’ that protects against power abuse, facilitates 
political accountability and combats corruption with effects on the citizens’ confidence in 
public institutions. From this perspective, then, the media become the backbone of democracy 
and acts like an institution that improves the democratic process and promotes loyalty toward 
the political system. Despite the relevance of the media in the political process, their impact on 
democracy is disputed. The negativity of media along with the coverage of politics as horse-
race can be sources of political mistrust, ‘malaise’ and cynicism that decrease trust in 
government. On the contrary, according to Norris (2002), the availability of political 
information provided by the media increases trust in the political system among users that 
access those contents, while it has no effects on apathetic citizens that are unwilling to follow 
political news. As such, the exposure to political news will produce a virtuous circle of trust in 
democratic institutions and the media will enhance political interest, knowledge, and 




democracy, the top-down approach followed by traditional media outlets can be beneficial to 
the public when the political elite proposes a viewpoint that supports democracy. 
However, in recent years, the internet and social media have flanked the traditional media in 
the field of information and communication. Some believe that the internet can become a free 
public domain or a source of direct democracy, contributing to increased responsiveness and 
accountability in real politics (Khazaeli & Stockemer, 2013), while other social scientists have 
expressed a more sceptical view. On the one hand, some empirical analysis shows that the 
internet reinforces the demand of citizens for democracy or commitment to good governance 
(Norris, 2002). The internet and social media can have a positive impact on political 
knowledge, political participation or many other indicators of civil society participation and 
penetration into social networks. They can also increase voter turnout (Ceron & Memoli, 2016). 
On the other hand, some studies have not confirmed these results, and can show a negative 
impact on turnouts (Davis, 2003, as cited in Quintelier & Vissers, 2008:416). Finally, online 
communities can produce undesirable consequences in a democratic system if they are 
extremist (rather than moderate), so that their users become a source of ideological lock-ins 
(Downey & Fenton, 2003). Confidentiality issues and the dissemination of falsified news are 
other important determinants of the online community (Lazer et al, 2018). In conclusion, the 
potential political influence of social medias depends on their ability to transmit, retrieve, and 
disperse information more effectively, since news can be distributed at high speed, low cost 
and in a wide range. That means that social media daily produces a huge amount of information 
that also contains some alternative views that are not broadcasted by traditional media (Besley 
& Prat, 2006). 
2.3.7 Non-violent social movements  
Gene Sharp (2012) in his book From Dictatorship to Democracy identifies four mechanisms of 
nonviolent struggle that lead to the downfall of dictatorship. These are conversion, 
accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration. Conversion is least likely, but it 
occurs when members of the ruling regime are emotionally moved by the oppression imposed 
on brave nonviolent protesters or are rationally convinced that the reason for resistance is just 
and therefore, they may welcome demands of the resistance movement. Accommodation 
occurs when both sides fulfil some of their demands, but neither side achieves everything they 
wanted. This mechanism may not bring down the dictatorship. When the balance of power tilts 




protesters may not threaten its power while it improves the regime's positive image in the eyes 
of the international community. Nonviolent coercion is when mass non-cooperation and 
disobedience can change social and political situations, especially power relations, to such an 
extent that the ability of dictators to control economic, social, and political processes in 
government and society is effectively deprived. The fourth mechanism for change - the 
disintegration of the authoritarian regime - is when the regime collapses simply with a general 
phenomenon of ungovernability, not even having enough strength to surrender (Sharp, 
2012:35).  
Thus, a non-violent social movement can be broadly defined as a movement through which 
groups can actively resist the system of injustice and violence without the use of violence 
(Dudouet, 2011). However, equating nonviolence with pacifism is one of the misconceptions 
about nonviolence. Though nonviolence rejects the deliberate use of violence or armed force 
to achieve one's political goals, nonviolence should not be equated with pacifism. This is 
because limited violence against the regime and its accomplices is inevitable, as frustration and 
hatred of the regime may escalate into violence. More importantly, when the state exploits its 
right over the use of violence for illegitimate purposes, then the protesting public has the right 
to oppose the state, even using violence. Nonviolent protesters can occasionally resort to such 
things to challenge the injustice and violent government responses to reduce the strategic 
importance of what could be lost due to violence. 
In Africa, this injustice ranges from repressive governments to structures that perpetuate 
violence and exacerbate inequality between different groups. When studying the political 
history of the continent, despite the trend of violence under repressive regimes and in the 
struggle for self-determination, there are many examples of non-violent actions that can be 
identified throughout history. Africans used marches, petitions, and boycotts against taxes, land 
policies, and labour laws of the colonial powers back in the 1890s. In addition, traditional chiefs 
also used civil disobedience in their refusal to pay taxes, and an economic non-cooperation was 
used to stop the transportation of raw materials and minerals from the colonies. Educated elites 
have also formed associations in protest against repressive governance. The combined efforts 
of these and other actions enabled most African countries to gain independence, mainly through 
the use of non-violent movement (Beinart, 1987). 
Recently, despite a history of Africa that often focuses on violent armed conflicts, there have 




different parts of the continent since the “Arab Spring”, which has increased global interest in 
non-violent movements. Moreover, dissatisfaction with the state, political leadership and the 
problems of poverty and unemployment by most African citizens requires an assessment of the 
potential of non-violent movements on the continent. A case in point is political events in North 
Africa, for example Tunisia, where popular, nonviolent social movements have succeeded in 
removing repressive governments and helped promote fundamental political reforms (Howard 
and Hussain, 2011).  
The changes in the North African countries - and in the Arab world - together, seemed to 
embody a new phase in the history of democratization movements, the fourth wave of 
democratization, different from the democratization movements that mobilized against 
authoritarian regimes in the 1980s and 1990s. In this wave of democratization, the pro-
democracy forces protested not only against stricter authoritarian regimes than in the early 
phases of democratization, with the re-consolidation of authoritarian rule since the opening of 
third wave, but also received less support outside of their national setting. In these 
circumstances, the scope of competitive politics is determined not by liberal measures or strong 
civil societies, but rather the incapacity of incumbents to maintain power or establish political 
control (Pace and Cavatorta, 2012). 
In Africa, contemporary non-violent measures have included a wide range of methods. For 
example, street protests, occupying squares, television and radio discussions, marches, vigils, 
sit-ins in front of parliament, meetings with pro-democracy activists to positively transform the 
peace process, non-cooperation, boycotts, strikes, mass demonstrations, symbolic actions such 
as dancing and singing in protests, and rallies have focused on a call for an end to repressions 
(Presbey, 2018). 
The sources of non-violence in Africa are diverse. The role of spirituality in facilitating the 
non-violence movement is important because the concept of non-violence is consistent with 
concepts such as reconciliation, love, peace, and truth that are central to religions such as Islam, 
Christianity, or other traditional beliefs that many Africans share. Furthermore, the concept of 
indigenous institutions and the emphasis on social and horizontal relationships that foster the 
perception of others as brothers or sisters and as a human-being also contribute to the formation 
of non-violent actions (Ibid.).   
Strategy is also an essential component for the success of the non-violent movement in Africa. 




regime, as well as clear and thoughtful planning on how to achieve the goals of the movement. 
It also requires a clear analysis of the problems and causes of grievances to ensure clarity in 
the goals, methods of action and the desired results, otherwise a non-violent movement will 
not lead to democratic changes (Sharp, 2012:25). 
Many non-violent actions in Africa lack planning and organization. But organization and 
coordination are an integral part of the success of a non-violent movement that seeks to 
influence repressive governments to change their governance practices. It should be noted that 
a non-violent movement is more than just filing grievances and expressing them through 
protests and other non-violent actions, but it is the organization of actions in a way that leads 
to constant and constructive changes that transform the long-standing structural obstruction of 
positive social changes for democratic development. Strategic, visionary, and goal-oriented 
leadership is the basis of the success and failure of non-violent movement. Leaders must 
strongly support and embrace the principles of non-violence and charismatically guide people 
in their response (Ettang, 2014:415). 
Lack of cohesion of non-violent movements can weaken the cause. The oppressors are always 
interested in applying the principle of “divide and rule” to suppress any form of opposition, 
whether violent or non-violent. It is important to reach out to other ethnic groups and political 
parties in order to overcome differences and create a united front against a repressive 
government. The success of non-violent movements in Africa depends on popular support for 
the movement. They strengthen as their numbers increase, so it is necessary to mobilize people 
who pursue similar goals and are sufficiently disciplined to promote non-violent actions 
(Schock, 2015). 
Clear communication is also necessary for a successful peaceful struggle. Communication 
becomes important not only between the leader and supporters, but also between supporters in 
order to avoid divisions. It is a prerequisite for conveying the clear needs, public grievances 
and changes that non-violent movements have sought. Empirical evidence from Tunisia and 
Egypt showed that although their movements were unprecedented, the new forms of social 
solidarity supported by the use of social media played a crucial role in their movements. The 
success achieved during the mobilization period was the result of surprisingly rapid and 
widespread information, supported by information technology, fostering activism that helped 




transformations achieved through the political deployment of social media by democratic 
agencies (Ettang, 2014). 
Maintaining self-discipline and group discipline in non-violent movement is important, despite 
the dangers of the oppressor. When activists use non-violence, it is very likely that the 
repressive regime will use violence to suppress the non-violent movement, which includes 
beatings, injuries, imprisonment, and death of non-violent demonstrators. But it is highly 
recommended that non-violence requires self-discipline and strong personal commitment, even 
in conditions of imminent danger. The most powerful weapon of the non-violent movement is 
their self-discipline, commitment, and deep faith in non-violence, which is necessary for the 
struggle to achieve the desired democratic transformations (Ibid).  
In addition, it is important to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the context, including the 
weaknesses of the government and how they can be used to make changes, as well as 
understanding the unique cultural contexts of society and the government concerned. It is also 
important to understand the context in which the conflict arises. Despite positive factors 
conducive to a nonviolent movement, there are factors that can limit the potential and success 
of nonviolent action in achieving the necessary change. They range from the nature of the 
repressive regime, lack of resources, the emergence of violent movements and the divisions 
that make up many African countries. 
2.3.8 Role of diaspora and international engagements  
Much has been said about the practice of the diaspora in the context of democratization. Shain 
(2007) is one of the few scholars who say that diasporas are not simply careless nationalists, 
but they can help their homeland in striving for democracy. After studying the Greek, Haitian, 
Cuban and Mexican cases in the United States, among others, Shain (2007) argues that the 
struggle of diaspora to unseat authoritarian regimes is often led by political exiles who were 
involved in political activities before departure. Foreign students from the diaspora often 
participate in demonstrations against undemocratic practices (Shain, 2007). Diasporas can 
transfer funds to civil society organizations and become critical factors in running democratic 
political campaigns inside their homelands. They can challenge the home regime's attempts to 
suppress or co-opt the opposition, contest the regime's international legitimacy, expose human 
rights violations, combat the home regime's foreign propaganda, obstruct friendly relations 
with the West and USA through effective lobbies, and assist and actively participate in the 




In addition, diasporas reframe conflict issues to redefine what is politically acceptable before 
and during election campaigns. They participate in elections from abroad or try to change 
restrictive electoral laws prohibiting their participation (Gamlen, 2008). They forge links with 
civic organizations in the host-land and seek to promote democratic and liberal values in the 
homeland (Shain, 2007). In contrast, Koinova (2009) cited Anderson (1998) in her work 
“Diasporas and Democratization in the Post-Communist World”, describing diasporas as 
“long-distance nationalists” who can often act “irresponsibly” towards their homeland since 
they do not bear the consequences of their actions (Koinova, 2009:45-6). Thus, arguments 
about the democratization of authoritarian regimes concern diaspora by increasing their 
understanding of practices that they can use to promote democracy at home.  
There are also important areas in which the diaspora can play a role in the context of 
democratization by putting pressure on foreign agencies and governments. One such area is 
that they can urge host countries to influence foreign policy and have a say in aid packages, 
loans, diplomatic relations, and intergovernmental organizations such as the UN and other 
regional organizations to put pressure on their homeland to begin the process of 
democratization (Sørensen, 2002).  
Pevehouse (2005) suggests another possible international factor in democratization: regional 
organizations. Diaspora can turn to regional democratic organizations with evidence revealing 
the nature of the repressive regime, demanding pressure on authoritarian regional member 
states to accept and carry out democratic reforms (Pevehouse, 2005). Another radical form on 
which the diaspora can focus its advocacy activities include direct foreign intervention, such 
as attempts to impose economic sanctions, or foreign military intervention in an attempt to raise 
the level of democracy in another country. However, recent studies have raised more doubts 
about the overall effectiveness of these strategies, noting that such diktat from abroad is 
contrary to the basic principle of democracy, because democracy literally means rule by the 
people (De Mesquita & Downs, 2006; Pickering & Kisangani, 2006).  
Finally, the international influence of diaspora includes their role in political opposition 
movements that automatically spread through civil society as citizens jump to the democracy 
bandwagon: this raises the possibility of an international perspective of a "domino theory" of 
regime transition leading to situations in which political developments in one country influence 
others across international borders. This type of international spread occurs within the regions 




main factor in these processes is breakthrough in the field of communication technologies, 
especially social media, which increases the connections between ordinary people and 
promotes the spread of political ideas. 
2.3.9 Liberalized autocracy 
The concept of " liberalized autocracy" stems from a broader literature that discusses the 
process of political liberalization that has taken place in some parts of the Middle East. Middle 
Eastern countries have encountered what researchers like Brumberg (2002) call "liberalized 
autocracy" in that there are deliberate actions taken by authoritarian regimes to provide 
sufficient changes to meet popular or international demands while allowing ruling elites to 
retain power. Brumberg (2002:57) claimed that such types of liberalized authoritarian regimes 
allow some "political freedom and political competition not because they are committed to 
democratic change", but because they want to avoid high costs of confronting social crises of 
their people, seeing “limited reform” as "less costly". Thus, the political system of “liberalized 
autocracy” is characterized by pluralism, controlled elections, selective repression, and thus it 
provides limited liberalization and civic participation: the repressive regime is not essentially 
changed, even if it faces external pressure from the international community or internal 
pressure from its community (Brumberg, 2002).  
Liberalized autocrats tend to create a situation that allows them to partially open the political 
space. Brumberg (2002:65) claimed that such countries are "liberalized" and carry out reforms 
from above and allow parliamentary elections and political participation of their people, so that 
they freely express themselves and welcome associational life. However, they limit this power. 
Therefore, free, and fair elections, political participation and associational life are not strong 
enough to play an active political role. It should be noted that these scholars distinguish 
between political liberalization and democracy and recognize differences in both processes. 
Brynen et al. (1995) argue that the transition to democracy involves greater participation in 
political life in such a way as to provide citizens with a certain degree of collective control over 
public policy. On the other hand, political liberalization could be a process aimed at securing 
the status quo in the face of pressure for change and suggests expanding the public space by 
recognizing and protecting civil and political freedoms, especially those that affect common 
interest. O'Donnell et al. (2013) explain that political liberalization is the process of redefining 
and extending rights, such as freedom of movement, the right to fair trial and freedom to 




Individuals usually claim rights when they are no longer suppressed by the system in question, 
and this stimulates other groups and leads to the expansion of "space for the liberalized action". 
There is no "necessary or logical sequence" for this process, it depends on the response of the 
system, and if the demands do not threaten the system, the liberalized practice over time will 
become institutionalized (O'Donnell et al, 2013:6). Liberalization is necessary, but not enough 
to move from an authoritarian to a democratic system, and if there is no liberalization, 
democratization becomes a mere formalism. On the other hand, political liberalization without 
democracy can be the way to a completely different end and indicate not the beginning of the 
path to democracy, but quite the opposite: the shoring up of authoritarianism that lacks 
institutional accountability and that can allow political liberalization to be easily manipulated 
by government (O’Donnell, et al., 2013:8). 
According to Samuel Huntington (1997), liberalized authoritarian regimes can free political 
prisoners, open some issues for public debate, reduce censorship, sponsor elections for offices 
with little power, allow resumption of civil society and take other steps in a democratic 
direction, without alternation of top decision makers. Moreover, Brynen et al. (1995) suggest 
that elections are seen as a way to increase political participation in government decision-
making and can be held under partial franchise or fraud. Hence, even if elections are held, they 
are not necessarily a real democracy. Several countries have instead been able to present 
liberalized images to the outside world, while in fact they are ruled by elites who are able to 
manipulate the facades of democratic institutions to remain in power. Such governments seek 
to expand the inclusiveness of the state by institutional bodies such as parliament, which acts 
as a "safety valve" and an "institutional mechanism" to beautify the image of an authoritarian 
regime and promote authoritarian elites, allowing the state to respond to threats. At the same 
time, social actors in these countries are marginalized and repressed if they threaten the regime 
and thus civil society is weakened (Diamond, et al., 2003).    
Diamond (2015) points out that regimes manipulate political institutions through elections to 
ensure that they do not actually perform democratic functions, but instead strengthen control 
over the state and political domination. This suggests that authoritarian rulers can often 
manipulate elections in Africa, which seem to promote political liberalization to create a loyal 
parliament. These elections can also be an instrument for transferring legitimacy to the system 
and gaining popularity and can be a strategy used by the system to ensure their survival, rather 
than to promote democracy, which means that they do not meet the standards of modern 




judicial branches are weaker and more manageable. Although there are opposition parties, their 
access to the media is limited and does not extend to the activities of their campaigns, voting 
for certain groups can be forced or interfered with, in favour of the executive, and 
gerrymandering can occur. Thus, Volpi (2004) describes those states that conduct elections, 
albeit limited, as "pseudo democracies".  
However, prolonged periods of “controlled contestation” carry hope for progress towards 
democratization, as in Mexico and Senegal. In the beginning the process seems weak, but it 
begins to challenge the authoritarian rulers: through the electoral process, moderate opposition 
movements can gradually abolish the power of the ruling elite (Volpi, 2004). On the other hand, 
Nathan (2003) explains the resilience of the authoritarian regime by its readiness to respond 
violently to opposition groups that might threaten its rule (Nathan, 2003). The regime creates 
"coercive organizations" to protect itself. Brownlee (2002:35) considered four cases in which 
the regime’s coercive apparatus and violent actions against the opposition ensured the survival 
of the regime: Syria (1982), Iraq (1991), Tunisia (1987) and Libya (1993). Whether these 
autocratic regimes persisted as a result of the manipulation of the system by political 
institutions (such as elections) to ensure that they do not serve democratic functions but 
promote political hegemony; or control through coercive means, the end result is the same: 
limited progress in creating democracy (Brownlee, 2002:49). It must be noted that a 
commitment to a coercive political apparatus, backed by Western security concerns, makes the 
transition to democracy more difficult. This understanding is important for this study, 
especially in terms of identifying and separating two processes of the current political 
liberalization, which leads either to the transition to democracy or to the survival of the regime.  
In general, the above discussions showed that the nine explanatory factors can be defined as 
factors impeding or advancing democratic change, i.e., the change in the country's political 
system with respect to Dahl's (1989) criteria that forms the broader rights of participation, 
representation, and civil and political rights. However, these nine factors are not necessarily 
sufficient to strengthen democracy. There is also no formula that determines the degree to 
which each factor on its own is required, or that each factor should be in any particular context.  
2.4 Conclusion  
The reviews of literature in this chapter indicated the divergent definitions of democracy and 
the lack of consensus among scholars of what constitutes democracy. One of the most 




primarily a substantive way of life or rather a set of procedural rules. In this regard, the 
“maximalist and minimalist” variants of conceptualization of democracy could be gathered. 
The “maximalist” definitions stipulate “substantive” or comprehensive concepts encompassing 
social and economic aspects as defining criteria, and the “minimalist” or procedural definitions 
are mostly concerned with the process of institutional arrangements. However, Dahl (1989) 
offers a mid-way to assess the meaning of political reforms, whereby this study has objective 
of testing whether they are expanding the realms of participation, representation, and 
deliberation in Ethiopia. Thus, democracy should be understood in this study to mean a political 
system that encompasses participation, representation, and democratic deliberation that aim to 
ensure civil and political rights, so that democratization becomes a trajectory of political reform 
towards those objectives.   
This chapter also showed that there is no agreement among scholars about the environment that 
creates the conditions for democratic transition, as there is not any condition sufficient for 
democracy to take root. Nevertheless, I propose a synthesis of nine conditions for the 
democratization process by analysing modernization, structural and transition approaches to 
democratization theories. The prerequisites provide a useful set of conditions, which can be 
used to assess whether a country is democratizing, but they are not without shortcoming. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to examine the extent to which any or all of these prerequisites have 
been existent in Ethiopia or a result of the political reforms in the period under investigation, 
thereby examining the outcomes of the reforms and identifying reasons for these outcomes.  
This chapter also explored the strategies for regime survival, which deliberately inhibit 
democracy through manipulation of political institutions such as parties, elections, or civil 
society organizations. Regimes seek to bolster their legitimacy, to co-opt allies, to counter 
transnational or external pressures for political reforms, and disempower potential competitors 
for power by implementing political reforms which liberalize the political system without 
surrendering to any of the criteria for democracy – greater participation, representation, 
democratic deliberation, or significant civil and political rights. With the synthesis of this 
theoretical guide, this study has assessed the progress made in deepening democracy in 
Ethiopia, using the nine conditions, as required by the topics discussed in the individual 
chapters of this thesis. For example, factors of economic development, along with the 
developmental state are applied in the third chapter to address the issues of development and 
democracy vis-à vis the causes of the popular protests that have dragged the country into a 




Chapter Three: Development, crisis, and resurgence in the 
EPRDF's Ethiopia 
3.1 Introduction 
The ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power, 
defeating the Marxist military regime, in May 1991 (Young, 1996; Abbink, 1995; Clapham, 
2009). The EPRDF had introduced several measures: both economic and political. After the 
seizure of state power, it promised a multi-party democracy, a federal system of government 
and an end to the command economy (Gudina, 2011; Vestal, 1997; Clapham, 2004). Thus, the 
Transitional Charter was introduced, which included some principles of liberal democracy: it 
recognizes freedom of expression, freedom of association, the right to self-determination and 
a market economy (Aalen, 2002). Moreover, the centralized system of governance was 
dismantled, and a new administrative map was introduced, based on four criteria: language, 
settlement pattern, identity and consent of the people concerned. The newly introduced policies 
have been enshrined in the federal constitution of 1994 (FDRE Constitution, 1995).   
Along the way, the economic sector has been reformed by modelling after East Asian countries. 
As a result, Ethiopia declared that it was taking the course of the developmental state since 
2005. Several sources published news about Ethiopia's economic transformation over the past 
two decades. On March 13, 2014, Time magazine published an article entitled “Forget BRIC; 
Meet the PINEs,” an acronym for emerging economies of the Philippines, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
and Ethiopia, in which it reports Ethiopia’s social and economic progress in the fight against 
poverty (Time Magazine, 2014). Similarly, other news sources and development institutions 
reported that Ethiopia is leading the African continent as a model of economic transformation 
(The Bloomberg, 2018; World Economic Forum, 2018).  
Ethiopia has shown sustained economic growth over the decade up to the COVID-19 
pandemic, including increased access to education, expansion of roads and railway 
infrastructure. It has reportedly achieved six of the eight Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs): it has reduced the prevalence of extreme poverty by half; HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases amongst the adult population has dropped; it has achieved universal primary 
education; reduced child mortality; improved environmental sustainability and developed a 
global partnership for development. On the other two lagging MDGs, namely gender equality 
and the empowerment of women, and improving maternal health, significant progress was 




purpose of which is to stimulate the economy and become an energy giant in the region, which 
exports electricity to neighbouring countries.  
Ethiopia is also striving to achieve the goals that make the country a middle-income country 
by 2025 (National Planning Commission, 2016). This appears to have prompted the 
government to view the developmental state as one of the two pillars of national renaissance. 
It was hoped that, in combination with another pillar, democratic governance, the creation and 
strengthening of an effective developmental state was supposed to lead to national 
transformation (Zenawi, 2006; Lefort, 2013; Alex de Waal, 2018). However, the desire to build 
a democratic developmentalist state was not without challenges.   
Accordingly, political promises made after the transition in 1991 remained either unfulfilled or 
highly contested. The main problem was the political ideology of revolutionary democracy 
pursued by the ruling party. This wartime ideology of rebel groups had fundamental 
implications for peacetime politics, allowing the party and the state to merge, eliminating the 
separation of powers, checks and balances (see Aalen, 2019). The practices eventually resulted 
in the closure of political space and the emergence of the EPRDF as the dominant party, 
especially after the 2005 elections, trying to create a developmentalist state that claims 
legitimacy on the delivery of developmental outputs, abandoning the constitutional pledges of 
multi-party democracy. From this viewpoint, the chapter presents an empirical analysis of 
Ethiopian experiments of democracy within the developmental state framework. It explains 
why economic development, which is one of the determinants of democratization, not only 
failed to ensure democratic development, but also led to country-wide political unrest, 
organized mainly as Oromo protests and Amhara uprising, reflecting deep-rooted grievances 
in the country. 
Ethiopia was ruled by an ethnic minority that imposed its will on the majority, a crucial factor 
in understanding the deep-rooted grievances that caused the protests: between 1991 and 2018, 
the EPRDF was a de facto coalition dominated by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). 
Frustrated by their leaders, who were subservient to the TPLF, anger over the lack of benefits 
from economic growth, the closure of political space, the horrific human rights abuses, and the 
publication of the Addis Ababa Master Plan, all became causes for the protesters to single out 
the TPLF for their problems, accusing them of controlling key political, military and security 




Also, from this perspective, the chapter presents an analysis of TPLF / EPRDF dominant party 
regime in Ethiopia, as well as the resulting political crisis and power dynamics among the four 
EPRDF members. It explains the factors that led to the resurgence of the Oromo Democratic 
Party (ODP) and Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) within the EPRDF, which ultimately eroded 
the dominance of the TPLF in the country.  
In light of the themes highlighted above, the topics in this chapter are divided into six sections. 
Having introduced the chapter, the second section discusses the theoretical explanation of the 
drivers of Ethiopia’s developmental state. The third section presents the analysis of the 
contradictions of the doctrine of the developmental state with the federal structure of the 
country in place since 1991. The fourth section presents an analysis of Ethiopia’s quest for 
development compared to the reasons for the Oromo protests to understand the links between 
development and public protests. The fifth section presents an analysis of the factors that led 
to the restructuring of power within the EPRDF, and how that recently mutated into a new 
merger party named the Prosperity Party. Concluding remarks are presented on the basis of the 
theoretical framework adopted for this thesis in the sixth section.  
3.2 The Political Drivers of Ethiopia’s Developmental State  
More than two decades have elapsed since the concept and some elements of a developmental 
state paradigm had begun to emerge in Ethiopia's various policies. However, it is after the 2005 
elections that the Ethiopian government openly announced it and it became the subject of 
intense debate in academic and political forums (Lefort, 2012).  
The emergence of the developmental state in Ethiopia could be seen in three contexts: (i) as a 
consistent attempt to emulate the development paths of different countries, (ii) as part of the 
global phenomena that responded to the shortcomings of the neoliberal paradigm in Africa, 
and (iii) as the political project of the TPLF/EPRDF to create one-party dominance under the 
pretext of development projects.  
The policy of emulation in Ethiopia began in the mid-19th century taking Imperial Russia as 
the first model of modernization and development. This was followed by an attempt to copy 
the Meiji period from the Japanese Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The process 
discontinued during the war with fascist Italy. After the Second World War, the British 
monarchy became a model for emulation (Clapham, 2006). And the 1974 revolution brought 




1995). The overthrow of the socialist regime in 1991 due to armed struggle led to a 
distinctiveness and a modified Marxist model, with particular adherence to the Stalinist theory 
of “national questions”, which advocates the right to self-determination as an approach to the 
problem of ethnic diversity in Ethiopia (Clapham, 2006:148). Over the past decade, Ethiopia 
has been attempting to emulate the development success of East Asian countries, Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan and, most recently, China, which show the fact that the search for a 
developmental model is still an ongoing process (De Waal, 2012; Planel, 2014).   
On the other hand, the emergence of the developmental state model was part of the widespread 
global response to the failure of neo-liberalism in the developing world, particularly in Africa. 
Following the collapse of the socialist camp, the ideology of neo-liberalism was promoted by 
Western countries and the international financial institutions as a panacea for Africa’s problems 
(Ferguson, 2006).  
However, the structural adjustment programmes imposed on developing countries failed to 
achieve the expected development and transformation (Heidhues and Obare, 2011: 55-64). The 
economic policies that underpin liberal ideas such as limited government, free market and 
individualism have failed to reflect the social and economic realities of developing societies. 
Thus, the developmental state proved to be a successful model in East Asian countries and 
appeared the most promising option for African countries. However, it is difficult to trace the 
exact timing of Ethiopia's formal adoption of the developmental state model. In fact, there 
seems to be a difference in the political and economic discourse of the country, both in terms 
of time and its cause. One reason is that, just as some policies reflected the characteristics of 
developmentalism during the transition period between 1991 and 1994, some elements of the 
developmental state were also observed in the 1995 Constitution, for example, in Articles 41 
and 89, which formulate the national economic objectives and the role of the state in the 
economy, and the preamble, which envisions the creation of one economic community.  
For others, the promotion of the developmental state as the best model for Ethiopia began in 
the beginning of the 2000s whilst the government introduced a campaign depicting poverty as 
an existential threat to the country’s survival. This was further reinforced following a split in 
the TPLF central committee in 2001 caused by disagreements over the war with Eritrea 
(Tadesse & Young, 2003; Aalen & Tronvoll, 2009). The winning group in this split embarked 




Moreover, the post Eritrean war period has paved the way for a more ambitious policy in many 
ways. First, it led to a deep rift within the TPLF itself, in which the late Prime Minister Meles 
Zenawi barely appeared as victor but was able to marginalize his rivals in the party and direct 
development policy in a much more personal way (Bach, 2011:643). Second, there was 
attention to implementing a national project in which the country's internal and external 
security depended on the securitization of the development process. This last factor contributed 
significantly to the 2005 electoral crisis, when the regime reinforced its efforts to achieve 
"performance legitimacy” through the benefits derived from development success, designating 
its critics as anti-development and anti-peace (Hagmann & Abbink, 2011:585). 
This implies that a coherent development strategy came in the early years of the new 
millennium. Ethiopia has implemented Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), guided by 
the international financial institutions (the IMF and World Bank). It developed the Sustainable 
Development and Poverty Reduction Policy (SDPRP), spanning the three-year period (2002/03 
– 2004/05), “A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP)” 
covered from 2005/06-2009/10, the first “Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP)”, 2009/10-
2014/15 and the second “Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP)”, 2015/16-2019/20 to play 
strategic roles in achieving the national vision of the country.   
The implementations of these development programs have caused serious disagreements and 
problems at the local levels. This situation was mainly noticeable in the Oromia region, and 
Gambella regions bordering South Sudan, where large tracts of land were allocated at low 
prices to foreign companies from Saudi Arabia, India, Japan, and other countries (Pearce, 
2012). Other points out that the contentious 2005 elections, which left the ruling party at risk, 
were a defining moment for the developmental state paradigm to emerge as a national agenda 
(Kefale, 2011).  
It should be noted that the speeches of former prime Minister Meles Zenawi, which underscore 
the need for rapid economic growth to ensure Ethiopia's survival as a country, represent the 
most important impacts. And the 2006 version of his master's dissertation titled, "African 
Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings," argued that the liberal paradigm has 
come to a dead end as an alternative to African development, and the new-approach 
developmental state is the most viable alternative to advancing. He rejected the 
"Washington Consensus" model, saying that it simply made developing countries adopt 




break a reliance on the western modernization path (Zenawi, 2006). He repeated the same thing 
in his speech on the new year of the Ethiopian Millennium in 2007, in which he proclaimed the 
"Ethiopian Renaissance", establishing developmental state and democratic federalism the two 
pillars of Ethiopian Renaissance (The Finfinne Times, 2007).  
Later in 2010, Zenawi stressed the failure of the neoliberal model, describing the last three 
decades as a lost decade for Africa, and thus presented Africa's commitment to the 
developmental state model as an alternative in his speech1 at the World Leaders Forum at 
Columbia University, indicating that this could be seen as Africa's second liberation. Zenawi 
strongly advocated the developmental state model for the whole of Africa until his death in 
2012. Ethiopia's growing advocacy for development has led to the long-term goal of becoming 
a middle-income country in 2025, part of which incorporates the five-year growth and 
transformation plans (GTP1 and GTP2), which were laid out in 2010 and 2015 respectively 
(National Planning Commission, 2016). Two conflicting views explain the rationale behind 
Ethiopia's move to adopt the developmental state model.  
One view is that a reassessment of the country’s development approaches was led by the 
conviction of the ruling elites about the eminent national danger of continuing conditions of 
chronic poverty (Di Nunzio, 2015). This understanding of the country’s risky situation along 
with the international momentum created by the Millennium Development Goals paved ways 
to choose a developmental state as the model for the country.  
However, according to dissenting opinions, the real reason for adopting the model in Ethiopia 
is the strong political determination of the ruling party to create one-party dominance under the 
pretext of development projects (See Vaughan, 2011; Lavers, 2012). This view also confirms 
that the electoral crisis of 2005 was an important event for the ruling party to realize that it lost 
its political legitimacy, leading to a quick change of strategy, strongly pushing towards 
developmentalism to enable the party to retain not only power, but also heavy hands on the 
economy (Vaughan, 2011: 620). It is also important to note that these debates are mainly rooted 
in the tense relationship between the government and the opposition, in chronic disagreement 
over political and ideological positions of multinational federalism and revolutionary 
democracy advocated by the ruling party.  
 
1 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vWoEPK9njWY ;Speech of Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi 




Hence, the EPRDF's interest in building a developmental state and deepening democracy was 
not without problems. Despite sustained economic growth averaging 10% between 2005 and 
2015, studies confirmed that the EPRDF regime has not progressed in creating democratic 
structures that would facilitate meaningful political participation (Bach, 2011; Hagmann & 
Reyntjens, 2016). Multiple flawed elections, including most recently in 2015, showed the 
government’s willingness to brutally repress the oppositions and their supporters, journalists, 
civil societies, and activists (See Abbink & Hagmann, 2016; Abbink, 2017).  
In fact, what was largely missing from the Ethiopia's development narrative was that the 
EPRDF’s “development” strategy went together with widespread human rights violations, land 
grabbing under the guise of ‘development projects’, the suppression of dissent and closure of 
democratic spaces (See Allo, 2017; Horne, 2016; Lavers, 2012, Mittal & Frederic, 2011).   
As a result, the country was still in a difficult situation, and, in fact, the last four years leading 
up to the appointment of Abiy Ahmed to the post of prime minister in April 2018 were marked 
by protests that have not been seen since the EPDRF took power. This revealed the fragility of 
the social contract governing Ethiopia’s political life since 1991. The outbreak of mass protests 
in 2014/15 had demonstrated the EPRDF's inability to achieve legitimacy derived from 
economic growth, putting the developmental state model under pressure, and leading to 
demands for more civil and political rights, which led to political changes in the spring of 2018.  
The change indicates a departure from the East Asian emulated governing ideology previously 
adopted by the EPRDF. As such, the EPRDF’s recent moves to sell large state-owned 
enterprises in part seems to be measures aiming to put the nail in the coffin of the 
developmental state. Similarly, the recent decision to join the African Continental Free Trade 
Area (AfCFTA) is also contrary to the previous strategy of protecting key sectors and 
strengthening infrastructure-based integration as envisaged by the East Asia model. Several 
factors might have triggered the shift in ideology under the new administration that has turned 
its face away from east to west. For example, despite encouraging economic growth over a 
decade, recent years have been characterized by serious inefficiencies and corruption, rampant 
unemployment, and massive democratic deficits. Large government projects and institutions, 
including sugar factories, and the military-run metal and Engineering Company (METEC) 
were unproductive, resulting in a rapid accumulation of debt and neither has it provided enough 
jobs (The Reporter Ethiopia English, 2018). The party's loyalty also took the driver's seat to 




government offices diverted state resources to their own pockets (Araia, 2013, as cited in 
Hassan, 2018: 386).  
Moreover, unlike Asian countries that have successfully adopted the developmental state 
model, part of the reason that the model remains unlikely for Ethiopia is the presence of an 
ineffective framework for guiding private sector inputs into the economy where rent seeking 
behaviour becomes pervasive among the ruling elites; non-existence of a competent and 
autonomous bureaucracy (See next section); and the problem of state and nation building, as 
there is no shared sense of national identity, which is a precondition for democratic 
development (See chapter four). 
3.3 Incompatibility of the developmental state with the federal system 
Ethiopia's developmental state model is largely dependent on East Asian countries, drawing on 
the experiences of China, South Korea, and Taiwan, which have a largely homogeneous 
population. There are, however, peculiar national conditions that affect its implementation in 
the context of the multinational federal system that was adopted in 1991 as an antidote to the 
pervasive historical mismanagement of the country's cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity. 
The centralized system of government was forced into federal restructuring, which 
decentralized power to regional states, formed on the basis of language, settlement patterns, 
ethnicity and consent of the people concerned.  
The paradoxical models of multinational federalism, which has decentralized authority for 
regional states, and the subsequent adoption of the developmental state, which calls for 
centralization as the correct path to overcoming poverty, remain the most important pillar of 
the country's political and economic restructuring. According to one academic who is a 
constitutional expert, Ethiopia's efforts to achieve a developmental state in the context of a 
multinational federal government system not only deviate from the prevailing model in East 
Asia but are also inherently incompatible due to the competing approaches that define the two 
systems2. She further noted that the centralized and top-down approach in decision-making is 
further entrenched by the party’s long-held ideological principle of ‘democratic centralism,’ 
pushing it to the extreme. EPRDF decision-making was primarily in the hands of the TPLF, 
and the TPLF's modus operandi was to hold a protracted internal debate – completely 
inscrutable to outsiders, – and then issue the "correct" party line that was not up for debate. The 
 




norm of plural democracy was reduced to bounded debate, conducted by a small political 
establishment behind closed doors, and other citizens were reduced to the role of consumers 
who had no right to ask questions (De Waal, 2021). As a result, the way the developmental 
state was practiced caused grievances and disenfranchisement among the population, eroding 
the values and positive strides that the multinational federal arrangement aspires to achieve.  
The ideology of democratic centralism has its root in Marxism-Leninism. It tries to combine 
‘democracy with strict hierarchical methods of execution of party decisions’ where free 
discussion within the top leadership of the party is the primary means of consensus building 
and decision-making (Waller, 1981:89). All other cadres and state machinery should remain 
subservient to the decisions made at the centre. For example, the EPRDF’s executive 
committee, whose 36 members are equally divided among the four-member parties of the 
ruling coalition, remained its central decision-making body. Key decisions are therefore made 
by this body and then passed on to rank-and-file party members at all levels of government for 
strict implementation. Consequently, regional, and local governments are virtually hamstrung 
by the centralized and top-down approach of the party and remain subordinated to the central 
authorities. The relapse of a centralized state structure has intensified the hitherto ethnic 
marginalization and economic exploitation. Hence, it appears that the highly decentralized 
government structures involved in devolution of authority to regions are in sharp contrast with 
centralised administrative structures that characterize successful developmental states. 
Moreover, the last decade has witnessed the growing intervention of the federal executive on 
matters regarded as inherently regional and even local. A case in point is the large-scale land 
deals for foreign and domestic investors. Empirical studies suggest that the central government 
allocated large tracts of land to foreign investors under the guise of facilitating investment, in 
clear disregard of the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of regional states (Mittal & 
Mousseau, 2011). The federal government designated a federal agency with a mandate to 
transfer and manage large scale land in a blatant encroachment on the regional jurisdiction (See 
Section 3.4.1). The allocation of huge tracts of land without adequate consultation with 
regional, local government and communities engendered disenfranchisement and agitation 
(Lavers, 2012). Violence and attacks against farm companies were witnessed in the Gambella 
regional states where the practice of large-scale land acquisition is pervasive. One of the 
interviewees, an academic, explained that land grabbing problems were also one of the main 




protesters: ‘Oromia is not for sale’, ‘stop the land grab!3’ Moreover, foreign-owned companies 
were primary targets of protesters across Oromia and Amhara as they were perceived to 
accumulate wealth backed by the central government at the expense of the local community. 
The second feature of the developmental state is its elitist nature, a defining feature of the 
classical developmental state model. According to Leftwich, the model is built around 
‘developmental elites’ who comprise small groups of senior politicians and bureaucrats with 
critical roles and authority in the making of developmental policy (Leftwich, 1995:405). They 
work closely together with the top executive figure who often embodies a charismatic or heroic 
leadership style. State- society relations in this model are also narrowly constructed around 
political elites, technocrats, and industrial elites while the broader citizenry is kept at the 
periphery of this relationship.  
However, although the EPRDF tried to emulate the developmental state where a few elites 
assigned at the centre are tasked with making decisions on behalf of the general public, this 
lacked broad coalition commitment to achieve the desired development goals, as there was no 
clear consensus among the governing elites of the four constituent parties of the EPRDF, both 
administrative and political, over the size and direction of development. The lack of broad 
coalition commitment among the administrative and political elite was reflected in its inability 
to mobilize public support to achieve the desired development results. It is also captivating to 
see how some of the ideals of developmental state model work in tandem with the Marxist-
Leninist oriented ideologies of the ruling party. One can pinpoint the convergence of the elitist 
approach of the model with the party’s ‘revolutionary democracy’ doctrine. This doctrine is 
grounded on Lenin’s conviction that ‘the enlightened elites should lead the unconscious masses 
to a social revolution’. The EPRDF’s venture to marry the developmental state model with the 
notion of ‘revolutionary democracy’ can be captured from the party’s document stating that: 
the mass is ‘backward, uneducated, and unorganized’ and hence would easily fall into ‘the nets 
of rent seekers’ (Quotes from internal EPRDF document, as cited in Lefort, 2013: 461). Based 
on this premise, the logical conclusion is that the masses should be ‘mobilized, organized and 
coordinated’ by the ‘omniscient’ vanguard political leaders towards the desired goal. 
Accordingly, as Toni Weis (2016) correctly pointed out, the ruling elite has assumed the role 
of interpreting the needs and aspirations of the masses. Ayenew (2014) also noted, particularly 
while referring to the positive lessons from the preparation of earlier national development 
 




plans, that the positive traditions that were observed in the SDPRP such as extensive 
consultations by the private sector, professional associations and the wider public did not 
continue with the same vigour in the preparation of subsequent development plans.   
As such, the elitist vanguard system expounds a vision that neither connects the state and 
society nor builds institutional channels and regulatory frameworks for public participation. In 
the absence of strong state-society relations, the political leaders cannot forge mutuality with 
the people they govern, inevitably leading to misunderstanding and tension. Public policies and 
projects, which are supposed to be the outcomes of negotiation and re-negotiation between the 
state and society, merely reflect the needs and priorities of the people as speciously understood 
and framed by the elites, which ultimately leads to political unrest. The diverging narratives of 
the Master Plan that set off the Oromo protests (see Chapter 5) is an important example in this 
respect. 
Another aspect of the Ethiopian developmental state model is its authoritarianism. The classic 
Asian prototype of the developmental state is often associated with an authoritarian nature of 
governance. Scholars also arguably view the autocratic nature of the developmental state in 
East Asia as a factor contributing to impressive performance (Yeung, 2014:82). As mentioned 
before, one explanation is that the state must ease itself from the procedural hurdles of 
democracy to deliver fast economic growth. The other explanation is that governments need to 
stay in power for a longer period so as to ensure continuity of policy that would transform the 
country. Meles Zenawi, the architect of the Ethiopian developmental state, in his draft 
manuscript ‘African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings’ summarized the latter 
explanation as follows while presenting these arguments of others: 
‘Developmental policy is unlikely to transform a poor country into a developed 
one within the time frame of the typical election cycle. There has to be continuity of 
policy if there is to be sustained and accelerated economic growth. In a democratic 
polity uncertainty about the continuity of policy is unavoidable. More damagingly for 
development, politicians will be unable to think beyond the next election etc. It is argued 
therefore that the developmental state will have to be undemocratic in order to stay in 
power long enough to carry out successful development’. _____ 




In theory, Meles himself seemed to advocate a democratic developmental state as a viable 
project for an ethnically diverse continent of Africa. However, the praxis contrasts sharply with 
his theoretical conviction. The road towards a developmental state in the aftermath of the 2005 
contentious election was accompanied by a regression of democracy and a reversion to a 
complete authoritarianism. Since then, opposition parties have been weakened and the 
infamous laws were issued that successfully hamstrung the activities of civil societies and the 
free press. The result of such strict control and purges of political parties, civil society and 
media was the emergence of the EPRDF as a dominant party controlling all levers of political 
power from national to the lowest local unit. This pushed the country to the edge of total closure 
of political space for any dissenting voice and firmly returned to the camp of authoritarian 
regimes. 
In a nutshell, the experiment of the developmental state in a federated Ethiopia has brought fast 
economic growth. On the flip side, it has also caused discontent among the wider public. It 
appears clear for any observer of Ethiopian politics that social unrest has been brewing given 
the stifling political climate that the brutal execution of the developmental state unleashed. 
Mass protests that roiled the country, mainly Oromia and Amhara regional states, from 2014 
to 2018 are a case in point. Since the early 1990s, Ethiopia's reform programs have been 
designed with the key objectives of addressing public sector quality problems, improving 
equity and efficiency by providing “the right incentives” for allocating public sector resources 
(Ayenew, 2014:11). These measures were dictated by the policies of the international financial 
institutions, based on the view that improvement in the allocation of public sector resources 
can underpin and encourage dynamism in the private sector. 
As a result, the state is heavily involved in most economic sectors and parastatal and ruling-
party affiliated companies continue to dominate trade and industry, while the private sector 
was under excessive pressure to tow the government policy line. From a theoretical viewpoint, 
regardless of their contrasting position, one element that both neoliberalism and developmental 
states have tried to foster is the private sector. In both paradigms, private sector development 
is seen as a key driver of sustainable economic growth and technological transformation. Their 
main difference is that neoliberalism transfers economic control from the state to the private 
sector. Yet the developmental state is autonomous from the private sector, but it also guides 
and uses the private sector to foster economic development and technological transformation 
to balance economic growth and social development, which is intended to overcome market 




As the developmental state view is that the state should play an active role in promoting 
economic development, this requires a professional bureaucracy. Scholars such as Edigheji 
(2005) have argued that the bureaucracy should be staffed with “principled agents,” with a 
professional commitment based on the ethos of public service, a strong sense of mission, and 
esprit de corps, as such a bureaucracy is critical to deliver development outcomes. However, 
evidence shows that the transition to a developmental state model of public administration in 
Ethiopia has more deprived bureaucrats of their "autonomy" and eroded the meritocratic 
foundation of the civil service. The already weak civil service systems in Ethiopia were not 
only ill-equipped to fulfil the required roles, but they were manipulated by ruling elites who 
used public administration as a source of patronage and a basis to build their networks or punish 
their opponents. As one civil servant recounted, the most egregious example was the practice 
of using public servants to “bring in votes” during elections through the 1 to 5 bondage, in 
which one person is assigned to ‘control’ or monitor the other five, organized by the regime at 
all levels of public service institutions4. Thus, politics-administration interference in Ethiopia 
sharply contradicts the core principle of a professional and depoliticized civil service system 
as the state expands its political control over the bureaucracy. In the country's history, the 
bureaucracy has never been neutral in its service to the public and has remained a 
demonstration of a deviation from established norms as loyalties to the political executive 
became the only criterion for individuals to get employment and be promoted in the hierarchy 
of public office. According to an opposition politician, the EPRDF had a huge number of civil 
servants being paid from taxpayer money, but their duties are purely political and that includes 
recruiting new members of the cadres that unquestionably and uncritically serve the regime in 
public institutions5. Indoctrination is mainly carried out by forcing civil servants to attend the 
political party meeting and to purchase the infamous party magazine: Addis Ray magazine, 
which was centrally distributed under the editor in chief of the late Prime Minister Meles 
Zenawi. The new administration, which came to power in early 2018, faces severe obstacles 
due to this legacy of the EPRDF regime, making the progress on reform a difficult undertaking. 
3.4 The EPRDF's developmental state and Oromo protests 
From the early 2000s to 2018, the EPRDF actively followed a self-proclaimed model of a 
“democratic developmental state,” which mimics the development policies of Asian countries. 
Its essence is that development and democracy were equally important and indispensable 
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values and choices for the survival of Ethiopia as a country (Zenawi, 2006). Eradicating 
poverty and deepening democracy in Ethiopia called for the implementation of these equally 
important values as a matter of priority. However, the practical implementation has brought its 
own dynamics, which often contrast with the constitutional pledges of multi-party democracy 
and the federal structure, leading to political unrest in the country since the spring of 2014.  
This section analyzes the practical implementation of development and democracy in Ethiopia, 
which has revealed several contradictions between economic growth and a virtually non-
existent democratic space. These include deep-rooted economic grievances, discontent over 
land grabbing, the closure of the political sphere and the growth of electoral authoritarianism. 
Ultimately, the combination of these factors with the publication of the Addis Ababa Master 
Plan led to the 2014-2018 protest movements that paved the way for the political changes that 
have been taking place in the country since April 2018, as explained below.  
3.4.1 Land grabs and development 
One way to explain the paradox between the impressive economic performance and the recent 
political turmoil in the country is as the clash of two issues: development and land grabbing. 
Land grabbing problems and mass unemployment are the main and direct sources of youth’s 
grievance, which also explains why the impressive economic growth could not ensure 
democratic development and political stability in the country. The issue of land has always 
been central to the Ethiopian people. Under the imperial regime, the conquest and southward 
expansion led to a highly exploitative system of relations between the landlord and the tenant, 
the legacy of this controversial history of dominance is still today one of the main aspects of 
what the historiography defines as the Ethiopian "national question" being centred on the 
question of land redistribution. This question to some extent had been answered with the 1974 
revolution, when the military regime came to power through the political slogan “land to the 
tiller" (Markakis, 2011:169). The military regime abolished the Imperial landed class by 
nationalizing land, and redistribution was carried out through the newly formed peasant 
associations (Young, 2006:60). By a decree of March 1975, the land was declared state 
property (Meret mengist) and seized without compensation (Markakis, 2011:170).  
In the post-military regime, land policy in Ethiopia is restructured in accordance with the 
decentralized architecture of the Federal Republic. According to the EPRDF constitution, land 




(FDRE Constitution, 1995). In Ethiopia's recent history and certainly throughout its past, land 
has not been the property of the farmers. Even after the famous 1974 revolution that dethroned 
the last king, Emperor Haile Selassie, the land was redistributed through the formation of the 
Peasant Association, rather than directly to the farmers. This means that the land issue has 
remained virtually unchanged, as farmers have been denied free access to land. This not only 
makes the land issue intact under the condition of development, but also keeps the farmers in 
conditions of dependence on the government (Lefort, 2010). As heard from the slogan of 
demonstrators across the country during Oromo protests, the current situation can be best 
explained as a change from “Land to the Tiller", a slogan used during the Ethiopian student 
movement of 1970s, to “Land of the Investor" as individual farmers are not part of the process 
of decision making and have been evicted in the name of development policy.    
Therefore, at the centre of youth’s land grabbing grievances was a government project that 
would expand Addis Ababa to the surrounding areas of the Oromia region. It was an attempt 
by the government to seize land from the Oromo farmers against their will and without proper 
compensation. The Addis Ababa Master Plan announced by the government in 2014 aimed to 
substantially expand Addis Ababa, which would have incorporated around 30 towns and 
villages in the Oromia region and displaced thousands of farmers from their land without 
adequate compensation. It was first introduced to OPDO cadres in Adama in early 2014 by the 
TPLF officials. However, unlike the previous practice of toadying the official TPLF line, 
opposition to the Master Plan was initially provoked by the OPDO’s nationalists and was aired 
on regional television after the workshop. This triggered protests in April 2014, which were 
suppressed before the May 2015 elections, but later resumed in the town of Ginchi in November 
2015, becoming a mass protest that swept the entire region and spread to other parts of the 
country. “No to the Addis Ababa Master plan,” Oromo youth chanted from city to city. 
Activists often use words and phrases such as "land grabbing", "confiscation" and "annexation" 
to describe the plan and its intended consequences6. According to one opposition politician, it 
was a land grabbing scheme disguised as a development plan and a plan for political control of 
Addis Ababa along with its resources by EPRDF leaders7. An academic also explained that for 
the Oromo people, the master plan was a plan for annexation8. 
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Government officials initially denied that the master plan was aimed at expanding Addis Ababa 
into Oromia, presenting it as a mutually beneficial project for both Addis Ababa and the 
neighbouring Oromia region. They presented it as a sign of modernity and as a development 
plan aimed at creating an infrastructure that connects Addis Ababa with the surrounding region 
of Oromia to promote mutual benefits in trade and investment, explaining that it was prepared 
by professionals from France and used the experience of the city of Lyon. However, in January 
2016, the government was forced to cancel it, acknowledging that plan was the main reason 
for the Oromo protests. 
The protesters from the very beginning feared that the master plan would evict farmers without 
alternative livelihoods, with little compensation, considering its intention to divert resources 
from Oromo farmers to investors affiliated to the ruling party to use it for everything from 
industrial development to luxury housing. One athlete explained that in the past, the 
government evicted farmers who were her relatives from their land for sale to foreign investors 
without compensation9, while a veteran politician claims that the master plan was also thought 
to rob Oromo farmers of their rights and land10. Oromo politicians and activists argue that the 
lives of Oromo people who have lost their land in the past also justify their fears of the master 
plan. An activist claim that many farmers who were evicted from their land live in poverty, 
with their women being forced into prostitution and their children being street beggars11. An 
academic further explained that the evicted were also forced to work as security guards or daily 
labourers for those who had displaced them12. A civil engineering graduate claimed he was 
denied equal employment opportunities in a factory built on land from which his families had 
been evicted after an employer learned he was the child of a former landowner.13 In short, "land 
is everything, and loss of land is loss of everything else," said one farmer who lost his land 
without compensation for labuu condominium development14.   
Overall, the Addis Ababa Master Plan came under the pretext of development. The flashpoint 
that ignited public protests across Ethiopia’s vast Oromia state was the displacement caused by 
the rapid expansion of Addis Ababa, at the expense of adjacent Oromo towns and farmland. 
Hence, Oromo protests were a protest against the confiscation of land from farmers. This led 
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to a series of protests because farmers on the outskirts of Addis Ababa were already suffering 
a large number of real estate expansions, which quickly spurred Oromos in the country and 
abroad under the slogan: “Lafti Kenya - Lafe Kenya”, which literally means that “our land is 
our bone”. It became a rallying point throughout Oromia and abroad. As indicated above, this 
led to the birth of Oromo protests in 2014.  
The Master Plan case is a microcosm of pervasive serious flaws in the design and preparation 
of development projects in Ethiopia. Resistance and distrust of the project was mainly the result 
of a top-down approach, a secretive planning process and a lack of public consultation and 
participation regarding the benefits, impacts and consequences of its implementation. This top-
down approach, where policies or projects are rarely the result of consultation and negotiation 
with the general public in general or with interested and affected communities in particular, is 
pervasive throughout the country. For example, until recently, in the name of development, 
local communities were forcefully evicted from their lands to clear land for sugarcane and 
cotton plantations in several parts of the country, especially in the southern Omo valley and the 
Gambella region (Makki & Geisler, 2011; Abbink, 2011). In a nutshell, anti-government 
protests that threaten the country's political stability are strong evidence that Ethiopia's 
development paradigm needs to be addressed immediately and represents local manifestations 
of long-standing grievances among the population with the country's political and economic 
trajectory. 
Several factors led to the development of flawed expropriation policies and facilitated the 
massive land grabs in the present Ethiopia. The first factor was the securitization of 
development, which contributed to the flawed relationship between economic growth, land 
grabbing and political instability in Ethiopia. Because the EPRDF saw poverty as an existential 
threat to Ethiopia’s survival, it often tried to rationalize its desire to aggressively extract and 
mobilize resources and consolidate power in violation of basic conventions to counter the 
alleged existential threat: poverty (Gebresenbet, 2014). In this regard, the 2016 Oakland 
Institute report showed how government drafted the anti-terrorism law and used it as a tool of 
repression to deter resistance against forced evictions and massive land grabs by domestic and 
foreign investors (Oakland Institute, 2016). 
The other factor is the development and implementation of land policies based on partisan 
politics and authoritarian practices. The state ownership of land gives the ruling party excessive 




ownership of land for the protection of tenure security and social justice, the practice has been 
criticized for violating protection against arbitrary expropriation (See Crewett, et al., 2008; 
Ambaye, 2015; Tura, 2017). For example, the Constitution separates the legislative and 
administrative aspects of the use of land and natural resources between federal government and 
regional states. The establishment of policies for the use and conservation of land and other 
natural resources is a mandate of the federal government, whereas the mandates to implement 
these policies are granted to the states. For example, article 52 (d) states that one of the powers 
and functions of States is to administer land and other natural resources in accordance with 
federal laws. And Article 55 (2.a) stipulates that the House of People's Representatives has 
legislative power and enact specific laws on the utilization of land and other natural resources, 
rivers and lakes that cross the boundaries of national territorial jurisdiction or connect two or 
more states. As shown here, the law unambiguously divides the mandate to legislate and 
administer land and other natural resources between the federal and regional states.  
Contrary to this clear constitutional provision, there has been a substantial move to extend the 
mandate of the federal government to include the power to manage and implement land policy 
that falls within the jurisdiction of the states. By a simple decision of the party’s top leadership, 
the regional states were forced to delegate their land administration mandate to the federal 
government without any legal grounds, on the assumption that the regional states could not 
administer it (Tura, 2017:98). The land is thus leased centrally to commercial agricultural 
investors. But the Constitution only provides for the delegation of powers from the federal 
government to regional states downward, not upward. For example, Article 50 (9) states that 
the Federal Government may, when necessary, delegate to the States powers and functions 
granted to it by Article 51 of this Constitution (FDRE Constitution, 1995). These measures 
have had disastrous consequences for local communities, resulting in the forcible eviction of 
tens of thousands of farmers from fertile land to free up for investors (Horne, 2012:2-5; Keeley, 
2014). Despite the rhetoric that land is the common property of Ethiopia's nations, their role in 
governance remains marginal, and all rights linked to land became disposable for the sake of 
development.  
However, following the changes that took place in 2018, the balance of power between the 
regions and the centre changed, so the regional investment bureaus became more influential in 
the decision-making process, especially regarding the administration of land that they had 




bank (Addis Fortune, 2017). A particularly striking example of such dynamics occurred in 
August 2017 in the Oromia region, during the presidency of Lemma Megersa, according to a 
respondent with close knowledge of the issue, President Lemma refused to provide land after 
the federal investment commission signed an agreement with a Chinese manufacturer15.  
More recently, the decision that previously forced states to delegate their land administration 
mandate to the federal government is reversed with the belief that a more balanced distribution 
of investments could also help defuse political tensions. One of the core grievances of Oromo 
protests was the demand for greater regional autonomy in economic policymaking and to allow 
states to develop strategies that are more adapted to local needs.   
3.4.2 Economic grievances 
There are also other factors that explain the economic grievances of young protesters who 
staged demonstrations against the regime. First, despite some progress in terms of economic 
growth, Ethiopia remains a very poor country. More than a third of the population lives in 
extreme poverty and around another 40 per cent of the population is clustered just above this 
poverty line. According to 2014 data from Oxford University’s Poverty and Human 
Development Initiative, 90 percent of Oromos live in severe poverty and destitution, more than 
80 percent of Oromo households do not have access to electricity or sanitation, and more than 
75 percent do not have access to potable drinking water (Oxford University, 2014). Yet the 
region is endowed with large agricultural land, abundant surface and groundwater that can be 
used for irrigation and covers over 36% and 34% of the national population and land size, 
respectively.  
A consultant at international development agency explained that more than 60 percent of 
national coffee exports come from Oromia and similarly, the region covers more than 45 
percent of national crop production16. Thus, the protesters raised questions about the morbid 
government economic model that left Oromo people living in extreme poverty despite their 
huge contribution to the country's GDP growth. According to a veteran politician, the economic 
growth of the government has not improved public life, but it has helped to attract billions of 
dollars of foreign investment that has been used to benefit politicians and oligarchs with ties to 
the ruling party17. Hence, the anger at not benefiting from economic growth was a factor behind 
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the protests, which explains the failure of the government-led development paradigm. There 
was also popular disgust with the ethnic economy created by the regime, increasing the feeling 
that a segment of the population was receiving economic benefits at the expense of other 
groups. For example, according to one academic-activist, the TPLF used its power to corner 
the national market to make way for its economic dominance18. As such, the conviction that in 
order to control politics it is necessary to control the economy has doubled their drive for 
resources, while complicating the problem facing the regime.  
One of the specific TPLF elite-based economic ventures that the regime created was METEC, 
a corporate military wing established in 2010 as an agency to oversee the establishment of an 
industrial base for the economy. METEC was supposed to be a vehicle of transferring 
technology to the country, but it was practically involved in all sectors of the economy. As 
such, the military became a powerful economic actor and took part in ethnic patronage 
practices, as it was heavily influenced by Tigray military generals. This, in turn, led to 
competition as one of the TPLF's strategies was to use the military to negotiate with other 
ethnic groups. A trade expert interviewed explains that some METEC generals used their 
military ranks to influence decisions and ensure their networks benefit in the competition for 
resources, leading to massive emblements against a contract signed for the implementation of 
megaprojects19. In a nutshell, the desire to transform the economy into an industrial power was 
hijacked by military generals, who fell into ethnic patronage to create and redistribute wealth, 
which became another source of frustration for young people, who viewed the Addis Ababa 
Master Plan as a grand plan for economic control. 
Moreover, party business owned by the ruling EPRDF was another source of youth’s economic 
grievance. The ruling EPRDF coalition runs multi-billion-dollar party’s conglomerates. Owned 
by the TPLF, the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT) is a major 
player in the party business. Figures are hard to establish, but it is estimated that EFFORT has 
66 companies’ worth more than $ 3 billion and is involved in all sectors of the economy 
(Techanie, 2017; Aklilu, 2007).  
The other junior members of the governing coalition also own profitable companies registered 
as Endowments: Amhara Endowment commonly known as TIRET owned by ANDM, the 
TUMSA Endowment owned by OPDO and the WONDO group controlled by SEPDM. These 
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enterprises are holding companies that operate in several sectors of the economy. Given their 
involvement in all sectors, the economic strength of the business owned by the ruling party 
points to the dominant position of the EPRDF in the economy. This contributed to the rise of 
upstart millionaires overnight, although the source of their investment is unknown, but there is 
evidence of their enormous influence. Some of them are former senior government minsters 
and retired generals who became incredibly wealthy after leaving public service. Others are 
politically linked investors who have benefited from political patronage. One of them is the 
MIDROC business group, owned by Mohamed Hussein Amoudi, with assets totalling about 
US $ 10 billion and with over US $ 2 billion in investments in all sectors of the economy in 
Ethiopia (Gebregziabher, 2018; Abegaz, 2011).  
The overall effect of these enterprises was the strangulation of private initiatives, since the 
EPRDF business acted as a replacement for the market and had access to all profitable 
enterprises before anyone else. This made it impossible to compete in the market for others as 
access to the most profitable sectors was blocked for private entrepreneurs, a trade expert 
recounted20. According to another respondent from the same office, the ability of politically 
affiliated companies to distort the market is too high, as they can freely win government bids, 
limiting competition and artificially inflating the cost of important materials and services21. 
This in effect corrupts the emerging democratic system by blurring the boundaries between the 
state and the party, rigging electoral votes and political financing. In short, the developmental 
state became the ideology and mechanism that legitimized the capture of the state with the aim 
of establishing one-party sovereignty of the country's political economy, which was strongly 
opposed by the demonstrators in Oromia and Amhara regions.  
The frustration over economic growth that was not trickling down to youth was another main 
area of economic grievance, as Oromo protest was also an expression of frustration over "unmet 
expectations" regarding employment. Discontent was growing in this segment of society, 
which could not get decent jobs even after receiving the first and second degrees. Young people 
were increasingly feeling left out of key economic decisions that would affect their future. 
These feelings spread all over the country among disaffected youth in many regions. Although 
critics view this statement with doubt, one government official claimed that youth frustration 
was the result of the very success that the EPRDF unleashed as a result of progressive economic 
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policies, making the party the victim of its own successes. He explained that the economic 
success of the EPRDF raised high expectations among the youth who have been skilfully 
manipulated by the rent-seeking elite in Oromia and Amhara, fuelling resentment against the 
TPLF for control of the party and state22.   
Nevertheless, youth unemployment was not only acute, but also employment in the public 
sector, the leading employer in the country after agriculture, requires party membership or close 
ties with the ruling elite. Membership in the ruling EPRDF coalition was often a condition for 
employment, making it difficult to work in government, even if you have a good resume, as 
one opposition politician recounted23. Oromos were arbitrarily denied commercial licenses in 
Addis Ababa, and teachers were often dismissed if they belonged to opposition political parties, 
according to a senior trade expert24. In rural areas, the loyalty to the ruling party was required 
to ensure access to seeds, fertilizers, agricultural resources, food assistance and other aspects 
of development. The regime unreservedly violated constitutionally protected rights because it 
prioritized party loyalty in order to stimulate growth that would ensure its economic 
dominance. 
3.5 Splits, resurgence and restructuring of power in the ruling elites. 
Post-1991 Ethiopia is essentially the creation of the EPRDF and can most accurately be 
described as a dominant-coalition party state. The core elite consisted primarily of the TPLF. 
In the interests of expanding its support base and strengthening its influence across the country, 
in the early 1990s, under the auspices of the EPRDF, the TPLF moulded alliances with several 
ethnic parties rooted in different regions (Vaughan, 2011). This marked the period when the 
TPLF planted the seeds for a future political crisis because, as one politician explained, these 
satellite parties became the Trojan horse of the TPLF, representing the TPLF in the federation 
member states, rather than representing their constituents in the governing body25. These 
regional parties in the ruling EPRDF had no equal powers or participation in the coalition. For 
decades, coalition partners demanded for their elevation to an "equal" party status, under 
pressure from their constituents, regime opponents and mass protests, but the failure to correct 
this imbalance was the regime's Achilles heel, an ODP politician said26. The EPRDF, therefore, 
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was essentially a TPLF in power and until recently remained influential and controlled key 
sectors, as none of the other coalition members command in their regions or in the capital 
(Lyons, 2019). Such unequal power relations within the ruling coalition had often been a source 
of political crisis and rifts among party leaders until recently, when the front dissolved in late 
2019 and replaced by a new merger party, the Prosperity Party.  
 
During the nearly 30-year reign of the EPRDF, there were several rifts in the ruling party, but 
two of them were grand splits: the first was a split in the TPLF Central Committee in 2001, and 
the second split occurred after the appointment of Abiy Ahmed as the country's prime minister, 
which subsequently led to the dissolution of the party in late 2019. While the first split was 
mainly within the TPLF, the second split is between the TPLF and EPRDF, the junior members 
of the coalition that it created to hold them in compliance with its hardlines policies in the 
country. EPRDF authoritarian practices contributed significantly to the current crisis, 
multiplying grievances both within and outside the party over the TPLF's control of the 
military, politics, and the economy. Discontent among coalition partners intensified following 
the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in 2012, the party and coalition architect. Oromo 
leaders in the EPRDF protested vigorously within the party, demanding more autonomy and 
power, especially after the outbreak of the mass movement in 2014. Unrest in parts of the 
country left the federal government weaker than ever, leading to rivalry among regional 
leaders, allowing activists to grow stronger and create fertile ground for mass movements, and 
paved the way to the deliverance of the ANDM and OPDO. Encouraged by popular protests, a 
group that needed change pushed the party towards further major reforms, creating a general 
climate of ungovernability that helped ANDM and OPDO beat the TPLF in the selection 
process that saw the appointment of Abiy Ahmed as party chairman and prime minister.  
 
Although Ethiopia is in a political transition after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office in 
April 2018, the EPRDF continued to dominate the country. The shift in power has so far been 
primarily a shift within the EPRDF bloc regional parties: the previously dominant TPLF has 
lost its influence on its former junior partners, in particular to the OPDO and ANDM. In 
September 2018, in a triumphal celebration, OPDO rebranded itself by changing its name to 
the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), and similarly, the ANDM also renamed as the Amhara 
Democratic Party (ADP). The rebranding measures involved strategically distancing oneself 




of the EPRDF. So quickly and unexpectedly, on December 1, 2019, the EPRDF quietly 
disappeared, leaving the scene for the Prosperity Party created by Abiy. Up to that point, 
according to one political analyst, the EPRDF seemed indomitable, and its doctrine would 
guide the country for years to come27. Given that the EPRDF brand is too damaging for a 
successful campaign, Abiy had to get rid of it and create something new before the forthcoming 
Ethiopia's sixth round election. An academic activist also explains that Abiy appears to have 
quickly pushed the merger through the party machines, making organized opposition virtually 
impossible28.   
The Prosperity Party comprises three of the four parties to the long-standing governing 
coalition EPRDF: ADP, ODP and the SEPDM, plus the five parties that control the Afar, 
Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harari and Somali regions. Not included is the TPLF, the 
party that dominated the country until Abiy took office in early 2018. But it has since joined 
the opposition, accusing Abiy of plotting to replace the multinational federal system with a 
unitary state, an opposition politician said29. While the TPLF’s claim of this threat is hypocrisy, 
given the fact that it resisted true regional autonomy throughout the time it ruled the country, 
there is an element of truth in its version of political developments that have been unfolding 
since Abiy came to power. The TPLF caused these anomalies, abandoning a multinational 
political settlement in which former strongman Meles Zenawi created the mess that others had 
to inherit after his death in an attempt to create a dominant party regime. As for the TPLF, part 
of the objection is that the new party abandoned the EPRDF members’ equal voting model in 
favour of a proportional system, which certainly favours much larger groups such as Amhara 
and Oromo. The rapid dissolution of the EPRDF coalition, the formation of Prosperity Party, 
and the crackdown on the opposition leaders are seen as a behind-the-scenes attempt to subvert 
the federal structure.  
Then an important question arises: is the EPRDF certainly dead? On the one hand, yes, it is 
dead as a bloc of four ethnic parties that were entrenched in the political thought of 
revolutionary democracy. With the creation of the Prosperity Party, the ODP, ADP, SEPDM, 
and the five affiliates no longer exist: they are replaced by 'regional prosperity party branches' 
open to people of all ethnicities.  
 
27 Interviewee Nr. 19, Political Analyst, May 9, 2019, Addis Ababa.   
28 Interviewee Nr. 7, Academic, April 8, 2019, Addis Ababa.    




On the other hand, it is not dead yet, but it has simply mutated from a dominant coalition into 
a more centralized party, changing its shapes and name. In many ways, like the EPRDF, the 
Prosperity Party remains dominant. First, despite a sharp change of leadership at the top, there 
is considerable continuity within the party structure. An opposition leader explains that the 
party's offices are still the same, only with a new logo. Not only Abiy and his reform teams are 
children of the EPRDF, but they have inherited millions of EPRDF members and its 
resources30. Second, apart from TPLF officials, many of the cadres that have been purged over 
the past two years are reinstalled as the sixth-round election approaches. Third, Abiy still has 
strong incentives for members to comply with his policies, given the party’s access to resources 
that remain centred. Fourth, as one scholar explained, nothing has changed with respect to 
party-owned companies that operate across a range of industries, as the endowments inherited 
by the Prosperity Party continue to dominate the economy31. Fifth, as usual, the prosperity party 
continues to engage in extortion of the business community. For instance, as unveiled on March 
14, 2020, it amassed over 1.5 billion birrs in a campaign led by members of the ruling party’s 
Executive Committee serving as ministers32. Hence, it remains to be seen whether delivery will 
emerge from the sudden disappearance of the party closely intertwined with the state. 
3.6 Conclusion  
Several conclusions can be drawn considering the theoretical framework of the developmental 
state used in this chapter. Ethiopia pursued the developmental state thesis, which claims 
“development first, democracy later,” subscribing to the argument that most countries that 
succeeded in creating stable democracies achieved high economic development before they 
transitioned to democracy.    
However, the Ethiopian experience provides evidence that economic development does not 
necessarily lead to democracy. In contrast, it seems to support the consolidation of authoritarian 
rule by creating a dominant party regime that controls security, military, politics, and the 
economy, in line with the ideological guise of revolutionary democracy, which remained an 
anti-thesis of democratic development in the country. Moreover, Ethiopia's attempts to pursue 
a developmental state in the context of a multinational federal system of government not only 
deviate from the prevailing centralised pattern in East Asian models but are also inherently 
 
30 Interviewee Nr. 32, Politician, April 29, 2019, Adama. 
31 Interviewee Nr. 35, Academic, March 24, 2019, Mekelle.  
32 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ag_WapqT0sU የብልፅግና ፓርቲ ከደጋፊዎቹ 1.5 ቢሊዮን ብር ገቢ ሰበሰበ 




inconsistent due to the competing characteristics that define the two models. As a result, the 
way the developmental state is practiced in Ethiopia caused disenfranchisement among the 
population, eroding the values and positive strides that the multinational federal arrangement 
aspires to achieve: the predatory and uneven economic development strategy pursued by the 
EPRDF caused discontent among the population, leading to political instability and social 
unrest, which led to a change in the leadership of the ruling party in April 2018.  
However, the claims of Samuel Huntington that undemocratic regimes indirectly grow into 
democracy in the context of economic growth, due to political instability and unrest, cannot be 
substantiated at this stage, as Abiy’s Ethiopia has yet to organize credible and free elections 
that guarantee democratic transition.  
The results of this study illustrate Slater and Fenner's (2011) assertion that authoritarian 
regimes create dominant parties as the main strategies for political survival to increase their 
chances of staying in power. In line with this claim, the hallmark of political development in 
Ethiopia under the EPRDF was the attempt to create a dominant party system in which the 
ruling party controls state institutions down to the local level through its members or affiliates. 
In particular, the TPLF controlled state power, occupying key positions in government and 
party structures that subordinated government institutions to the interests of the party. This has 
greatly diminished hope for a democratic transition, as ruling elites consolidate their power and 
control over resources through overlapping roles in state administration and party structure, 
carried out in accordance with the principles of revolutionary democracy and democratic 
centralism effectively avoiding potential competitors.   
Also, in line with Stuppert’s (2020:11) claims, under the EPRDF, authoritarianism was 
consolidated by systematically twisting incentives for democratic reform to centralize power 
and control. As the result, the reform process illustrated the contradictions in economic growth, 
the desire for dominance in the political and economic spheres, and the limited participation 
and violation of civil and political rights of citizens. Moreover, the overwhelming electoral 
victories were presented by the EPRDF as a reward for the party's economic growth, so such 
narratives were put forward to try to convince the public to remain loyal to the EPRDF because 
the opposition cannot provide a viable alternative. 
Such narrative was also accompanied by a process of depoliticization, which effectively 
reduces the areas of political competition and thus helps to strengthen the regime to justify 




as argued by Slater and Fenner (2011), this study noted that party-run companies, cooperatives, 
and party-affiliated business dominate the economy and play a role in generating income 
streams for the ruling party, as well as strengthening party membership and structures, which 
allow the EPRDF to restrict political space through a series of new draconian laws.  
Mac Giollabhuí (2019) also argued that political leaders in a dominant party regime often rely 
on various forms of coercion to control political space, to reduce opposition threats, and 
strengthen their hold on power. From this perspective, the results of this study showed that the 
EPRDF regime relied on low-intensity and high-intensity coercions to restrict the ability of 
dissenting party members and other opponents to mobilize public support. In particular, since 
the 2005 electoral crisis, the regime increasingly relied on high-intensity coercion to counter 
opposition to electoral fraud, which appears to be the last resort available to the regime to 
maintain power through coercion as a survival strategy in the face of widespread opposition 
from the general public and opposition parties.  
As the mass protests were engulfing the country from all sides, power struggles and infighting 
within the front became an open secret and the ANDM and OPDO were empowered to say 
"enough is enough" to counter and expropriate power from the TPLF, the former hegemon.  
Such unequal power relations within the ruling coalition had often been a source of political 
crisis and rifts among party leaders until recently, when the front dissolved in late 2019 and 
was replaced by a new merger party, the Prosperity Party. Therefore, from this perspective, the 
recent youth-led movements, namely the Oromo protests and the Amhara uprising, to be 
explored in the fifth chapter, were the logical culmination of resistance by the public and 
factions within the ruling front against the long-standing grievances regarding the deepening 
authoritarianism in the country, which led to the end of a de facto one-party dominant rule of 









Chapter Four: State Building and Political Contradictions in Ethiopia  
4.1 Introduction:  
Ethiopia's modern history has always been marked by a struggle to build national identity and 
the subsequent centre-periphery question, in which the absence of a robust political settlement 
for managing diversity has become a major obstacle to nation building since the state took its 
current form in the late 19th century. As a result, the state-building process was accompanied 
by interethnic tensions, squabbles, and conflicts, mainly revolving around a war of visions 
between two sides: those who demand more regionalization and those who want to maintain a 
more centralized system (Khorrami, 2021). The complex nature of this development has given 
rise to fundamental questions about the nature of the state as a political institution, as well as 
about the cultural and political content of the nation as a national community.  
As such, reconstructing Ethiopia in response to a profoundly changing landscape, both 
domestically and regionally, has been the centrepiece of political struggle in the country. The 
question of what Ethiopia is and what it wants to be became so important that it gave rise to 
conflicting narratives that are used in intellectual and political debate, as well as in the 
increasingly organized and violent political and ideological struggle in the country, especially 
since the 1960s.  
Moreover, these debates about the cultural and political identity of Ethiopia are often 
constrained by the use of concepts and frameworks that are theoretically sterile and politically 
limiting. One of the main questions, which has long occupied much of the political and 
intellectual debate in Ethiopia, is whether Ethiopia is an empire of completely different and 
subjugated societies, or a nation that, despite the many differences among its national groups, 
enjoyed essential unity. There are two main different perspectives to explain this dynamic that 
has shaped the development of Ethiopia's complicated identity. The first perspective comes 
from those groups that take pride in Ethiopia as a country with more than three thousand years 
of history and see Menelik as one of the greatest leaders in Ethiopian history, the hero of Adwa 
and the man who presided over the “reunification” of Ethiopia in the late 19th century (Kebede, 
2003). For this group, Ethiopia is one nation, not in terms of a common language, culture, 
ethnicity, or psychological makeup as such, but in terms of sharing the heritage of history, 




The second perspective claims that the empire reflects the political character of the Ethiopian 
state since the late nineteenth century and views Menelik as a black colonizer who participated 
in the European scramble for Africa, conquering independent territories and peoples by brute 
force (Holcom and Ibsaa, 1990). This view is shared by a significant portion of the Oromo, 
Eritrea, Tigre, Somali and Sidama elites etc. These groups demand(ed) either the creation of 
their independent state, or the simultaneous destruction of the old order, which was believed to 
be essentially the empire of unequal nations, and its transformation into a modern, inclusive, 
and multinational state.  
In order to overcome this ideological and theoretical deadlock, Gulema (2020) puts forward 
the thesis that Ethiopia, which materialized after and as a result of the development of the 19th 
century, was not an empire or a nation-state per se, but something in between, simultaneously 
possessing the qualities and elements of both structures (Gulema, 2020:364). The analysis 
presented in this chapter also advances this third perspective, breaking the analytical deadlock 
that limits the political imagination to capture the complexities embedded in the construction 
of the Ethiopian state both from the colonial and modernization perspectives. This thesis noted 
that the underlying question of political struggles in Ethiopia, now or in the past, is related to 
the cultural and political identity of Ethiopia as a nation and its place in the world. The answers 
to this question are rooted in the often-disputed process of state and nation-building, especially 
in the political economy that shaped its development. With this view in mind, this chapter 
focuses on critiquing the existence of robust statehood, the politics and ideologies of 
state/nation building and their implications for democracy, as outlined in the theoretical 
framework.  
To synthesize this analysis in this perspective, the chapter is divided into four sections. Having 
introduced the chapter in the first section, the second section discusses Ethiopia's controversial 
state and nation-building endeavours. The discussions in this section focus on examining the 
creation of modern Ethiopia and the structural crisis inherent in the process that have shaped 
the emergence of colonial and modernization/nation-building theses to explain Ethiopia's 19th 
century conquest and expansion. The third section discusses Ethiopia's current predicaments 
for achieving democracy, which are deeply rooted in the creation of the modern state. This is 
the most important section of the chapter, analysing four major historical paradoxes and the 
legacy of nation-building efforts relevant to the quest for democracy in Ethiopia. It tries to 
answer an important question: how divergent and contrasting views of the state and nation-




concluding remark based on findings from the critique of various views on state / nation-
building policies and ideologies and their implications for democracy, as outlined in the 
theoretical guidance of this thesis. 
4.2 Ethiopia's controversial state and nation-building  
Ethiopia is a polarized country born in contradictions. Historical and political discourses are 
filled with conflicting narratives and have long been widespread among scholars, historians, 
anthropologists, the general public, and more recently among political activists. They tend to 
reinforce various frameworks that idealize, sanitize, and disparage national history, erasing or 
justifying human suffering as collateral damage in the pursuit of progress or nation-building. I 
discuss the contradictory discourses regarding state and nation-building in Ethiopia in two 
groups based on their importance in informing the country's current politics: i) the colonial 
thesis and ii) the modernization/nation-building thesis. Both colonial and modernization claims 
are supported by theory, and their implications are also discussed in relation to democratic 
aspirations, shedding light on the significance of contemporary Oromo politics in the quest for 
democracy. 
Ethiopia went through three historical stages - imperial, socialist and federal - that have 
generated many opposing views that define the current political interactions. Debated 
throughout this morphological process, especially among the Oromo elite and political forces, 
over and over but still unresolved, is whether the Oromo question should be viewed from a 
colonial or nation-building perspective. In hindsight, I bring up this very important question in 
reverse order: was Ethiopia really a colonial empire, as opposed to the rest of African states 
that survived colonialism? To answer these questions, it is necessary to place Ethiopia, as well 
as Oromo's aspirations for self-determination and democracy, in a broader global and African 
context, analysing the implication of both theses on contemporary political development. 
However, it should be noted from the outset that discussion of this often-contested topic does 
not aim to provide a definitive answer to irreconcilable narratives. Rather, it only seeks a clear 
understanding of the essence of the political dilemma facing Ethiopian statehood and nation-
building, both from colonial and modernization/nation-building perspectives. It should also be 
noted here that even if the chapter deals with different perspectives of historical accounts, it 
largely focuses on understanding the implications of those complex and divergent viewpoints 
of historical accounts, how they are reflected in the current transition and, therefore, their 




4.2.1 Reflections on the colonial thesis 
The colonial perspective is one of the perspectives that emerged in the political and intellectual 
discourses of the 1970s and continued through the 1990s to explain the making of the modern 
Ethiopian state. It represents the colonial conquest of the Amharic-speaking groups against the 
Oromo, Somalis and other southern peoples who were independent peoples until the late 19th 
century. The arguments in the colonial thesis can be divided into four main categories. The first 
one is that European weapons of destruction were supplied exclusively to the Abyssinian forces 
for strategic purposes to conquer Oromo and neighbouring territories, rendering Oromo's 
spears useless in battle (Hassan, 1999: 128-134). The second argument is that European 
technical skills were also offered to the Abyssinian elites, which helped them create a state 
apparatus designed to occupy the conquered Oromo and other southern territories (Ibid). The 
third argument of the colonial thesis is that the newly built Ethiopian colonial empire was a 
dependent colonial state that required constant support from Western powers, mainly France, 
Britain, Italy, Soviet Union, and the United States to survive (Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990). 
Holcomb and Ibssa (1990) argued that Ethiopia was a good example of dependent colonialism 
and functioned as a dependent colonial state not only when it was created in the late 19th 
century, but throughout its modern history. The fourth argument is that Menelik II played an 
active role in the "scramble for Africa" as a regional warlord to save imperial Ethiopia from 
falling prey to European colonialism, allowing him to triple the traditional kingdom of 
Abyssinia with the support and understanding of European colonial powers because of their 
vested geopolitical interests (Toynbee 1965: 44; Schwab 1985: 5).  
Other scholars also further cemented that the forcible incorporation of several independent 
territories inhabited by different societies into the modern Ethiopian Empire led to subjugation 
and deculturation (Hassen, 2002, Kumsa, 2009; Benti, 2009). Although Ethiopia has constantly 
tried to evolve into a multi-ethnic political system, participation in national political life usually 
required assimilation with the cultural values of the core of Amhara: Amhara language, 
Orthodox Christianity, and the ability to operate within the structure and assumptions of the 
court administration (Clapham, 2017).  
There are many historical records and arguments that have tried to demonstrate the dependent 
nature of the Ethiopian colonial state. The reflections in this section try to shed light on some 




analyse the global and continental dynamics that have shaped the emergence of colonial theses 
and their impact on the struggle for self-determination and democracy in Ethiopia. 
The Horn of Africa came into existence as bridgeheads of grand imperial ambitions to control 
the region in the second half of the 19th century, becoming the site of fierce expansionist 
competition that involved both internal and external forces (Iyob, 2001; Yasin, 2010; Niane, 
1984). Markakis (1999: 65) argued that the Ethiopian Empire was the main actor in the tension 
and rivalry between and within states that became the hallmark of the Horn of Africa. 
According to Abbas Gnamo (2014), two forces from Christian Abyssinia (i.e., Tigre and 
Amhara) also engaged in this bitter rivalry with each other, seeking to control much of the same 
territory in which Menelik II later succeeded in creating the Ethiopian Empire (Gnamo, 2014: 
116). Holcomb and Ibssa (1990) also argue that the creation of the modern Ethiopian empire 
was the result of an alliance between the major European powers and Abyssinian princes. For 
example, such interaction between European powers and the Abyssinians in the Horn's 
expansionist projects was also demonstrated through Ras Mekonnen's visit to London in 1902 
to attend the coronation of King Edward VII as a representative of Emperor Menelik II (Green, 
1998: 23) and employment of foreigners to perform operations for which the Abyssinians 
lacked the necessary skills, especially in the fields of palace building, medicine and imports, 
and the production of firearms (Pankhurst, 1967: 29).  
Thus, a closer look at political interactions in the Horn of Africa demonstrates that Abyssinians 
had expansionist ambitions based on religious, political, economic, and cultural domination in 
the Horn of Africa region. Unlike other unsuccessful attempts in the region, Abyssinia's 
aspiration for empire building was successful, giving birth to the modern Ethiopian state that 
had international recognition from the European powers operating in the Horn region 
(Clapham, 2000: 4).   
Many scholars argued that the self-created attitude of the Abyssinians towards themselves and 
their neighbours was the main sources of violent conflicts with neighbouring communities. In 
this narrative, Abyssinians considered themselves entitled to enslave and subjugate their 
neighbouring nations (Käufeler, 1988: 197). Christopher Clapham explained that the existence 
of written language, and a long-established set of historical myths of statehood compounded 
with the teaching of Orthodox Christianity gave Abyssinians a sense of seeing themselves as a 
more civilized nation, destined to govern the territories around them (Clapham, 2002: 10). 




neighbours, seem to aggrandize their status as the only true bearers of Christianity and an 
"exceptional nation." Incorporated into the teachings of the Orthodox Church, the myths were 
drummed into the minds of ordinary people until the supremacist thinking was taken for 
granted (Lencho, 2006: 98). The same sentiment, depicting Ethiopia as a Christian Island 
besieged by Islamist states, persists until early 2018 under the guise of regional security 
concerns, until prime minister Abiy Ahmed reconfigured his government's foreign policy. The 
was often touted as a justification for Ethiopia's encroachments on neighbouring countries, 
such as the US-backed global war on terrorism in Somalia in 2006 (Hussein, 2006).  
The neighbouring communities might have viewed the Abyssinians' self-created belief with 
benign curiosity before they acquired modern firearms in the second half of the 19th century. 
With the acquisition of the firearms, this supremacist belief subsequently turned into a total 
disaster, cementing a centuries-old obsession for dominance over numerous adjacent societies 
(Leta, 2006: 98). This was accompanied by the brutal conquest of several sovereign nations 
and territories with the ensuing consequences of the economic, political, cultural, and religious 
oppression of the conquered communities, including the Oromo, thus being conquered for the 
first time in recorded history (Marcus, 1975: 44). The colonial mechanism of exploitation and 
dispossession was carried out in the north and south of the empire. It is important to note, 
however, that ordinary people from conquered as well as the conquering societies, whose 
leaders emerged as local imperialists, suffered greatly, although there were differences in 
degree. Lencho Leta (2006: 102) argued that Abyssinians were favoured in three ways. First, 
they were the owners of the land they cultivated, while the conquered societies became the 
landless tenants of the conquerors. Second, almost all northerners who lived on their land as 
farmers became a gun-owning society with ubiquitous possession of modern firearms such as 
breech-loaders and plenty of cartridges (Pankhurst, 1967: 121). Thus, all that was required of 
these armed men was to migrate to the conquered areas and become a landowner to benefit 
from the sweat of the conquered people. Harold Marcus (1975: 139-140) further argued that 
the conquered territories were raided for grain and livestock by armed men, which were used 
to create granaries in many Abyssinian provinces to feed victims of famine. Third, King 
Menelik exploited the wealth he had amassed in the southern and southwestern territories to 
buy weapons, support the north's sagging economy, and ensure the continuation of the Amhara-
Tigrean political and cultural hegemony built largely on a religious alliance (ibid.).  
However, despite these features, which are more or less similar to the characteristics of colonial 




that gave rise to the colonial thesis in Ethiopia, which remains very contested. This is found in 
the emergence of the student revolutions in Ethiopia which coincided with the rise of Marxism 
and the development of nationalist movements with socialist orientation in other parts of 
Africa. The period of the 1950s and 1960s were the heyday of the Marxist, anti-colonial, and 
leftist ideologies of the former colonial countries of Africa and Asia. Many revolutionaries 
viewed Marxism as a logical response to European colonialism as it incorporated people of 
African descent, emphasizing human solidarity and equality (Agozino, 2020: 182).   
Moreover, the era of decolonization was the golden age of associational life and the emergence 
of civil society such as trade unions and student associations, as well as the growth of 
government bureaucracy and private business, which brought many changes in many parts of 
Africa (Crawford, 1994: 36). Deeply influenced by such global and continental dynamics in 
the early 1960s, trade unions, student and teacher associations started to emerge in Ethiopia. 
Ethiopian intellectuals who were influenced by anti-colonial movements and Marxist 
ideologies, largely Oromo, Somali, and Eritrean elites embraced nationalism that saw the 
making of Ethiopian statehood as a colonial enterprise. With the aspiration to become the seat 
of the African integration process that led to the creation of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), Ethiopian intellectuals and students of the time emphasized the African part of 
Ethiopian history (Gebrekidan, 2012). This helped them to learn not only about the foreign 
ideologies and challenges that other African societies were facing, but also to become 
acquainted with some radical Marxist thinkers such as Kwame Nkrumah (Gebrekidan, 2012: 
82).   
However, the conditions under which the colonial ideologies developed in Ethiopia were very 
peculiar and different from other African countries. This was mainly due to two factors: the 
absence of European colonization in Ethiopia, and the scholarship that mythologized Ethiopia 
as an independent empire living in peace, unity, and civilization. In particular, the victory of 
the Battle of Adwa in 1896 over invading Italian forces is often used as a tool to reaffirm 
Ethiopia's unique image as an African power that was able to defeat the European army, which 
served as an inspiration for the Pan-African movement (Paulos, and Metaferia, 2005: 181).  
However, despite this difference between Ethiopia and the rest of Africa, there were some 
similarities between them in terms of nationalist movements and the ensuing social 
transformation. For example, like all other African states, socialism, and Marxism, as one 




2014; Donham 1999). The Marxist-Leninist elite, who viewed Marxism as an unchallengeable 
truth, plucked up courage and reconstructed their experience of alienation, exploitation, and 
oppression as internal colonialism, formulating an ideology against the archaic feudal-capitalist 
system (Jalata, 1996; Virtanen, 2009). Beside such external influences, the historical and 
cultural justifications used for Ethiopia's annexation of Eritrea in 1962 actually further 
exacerbated the alienation of other communities and provided additional impetus, especially 
for Oromo resistance (Keller, 1995). As a result, an alliance was formed with disaffected 
elements of Eritrean society who felt alienated by the annexation. This alliance of struggle 
against the imperial regime took up arms to undo the annexation as well as end other forms of 
oppression elsewhere in the country, such as grievances over agricultural taxes and land 
expropriation. It began to acquire improved interdependence since the 1970s and continued 
even after Eritrea gained independence in 1991 (Iyob, 1997). 
Thus, the exposure of Marxism and anti-colonial movements was the main continental dynamic 
that shaped the emergence of the colonial thesis in Ethiopia. It provided these intellectual and 
students with a framework for interpreting their alienation experiences through the notion of 
colonization, an idea that portrays Ethiopia as a black colonialist, akin to European white 
colonialists in other African countries. This was like a double-edged sword that allowed them 
to reject the Ethiopian Empire, as well as the West that was conquering other African states, 
while supporting Emperor Haile Selassie, the last king of the empire, who crystallized the 
creation of the Ethiopian state begun by Menelik II.   
Meanwhile, two dominant narratives, in which the question of land was central, began to take 
shape in the Ethiopian student movements against the oppression of the imperial system. The 
first was the colonial thesis, which demanded the dismantling of the Ethiopian empire in order 
to end internal colonialism (Záhořík, 2017). The second was the question of “class and national 
oppression” (Keller, 1981:540), the root causes of which were attributed to the failure of the 
nation-building project and of modernization and progress, the resolution of which should not 
necessarily lead to the disintegration of the Ethiopian state. Haile Selassie's regime, once hailed 
as a modernizer, was perceived as either backward or "colonialist." The differences in 
perspectives led the groups to seek the fulfilment of the demands of democracy, self-
determination, equality, and human rights, either within the framework of the Ethiopian state 




In short, as the period coincided with the era of decolonization and the emergence of Marxism 
as an inspirational revolutionary ideology of student revolutions, the impact of such changes 
was profound. This led to a series of uprisings that resulted in the downfall of the Imperial 
regime in 1974, only to be replaced by the military regime that devastated the country for the 
next 17 years. Hence, Oromo's struggle for democracy and self-determination must be seen as 
part of this broader continental and regional dynamic process of ending oppression.    
However, as the Oromo struggle was deeply influenced by external dynamics such as Marxism, 
it was also negatively impacted by events in the region that perpetuated the suffering arising 
from the interaction of widespread struggles for justice and democracy. As Oromia stretches 
from the edges of the Ogaden Lowlands in the east to Ethiopia's border with Sudan in the west, 
the Somalis sought to realize the Greater Somalia project by annexing much of the adjacent 
eastern Oromia, while the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) frequently invaded the 
Oromo Liberation Front's operational areas in the west (Jalata, 2000: 58; Lata, 2006: 2-3). This 
forced the OLF to fight simultaneously with these regional movements and the Ethiopian 
regime, which significantly reduced their combat effectiveness and had a deterrent effect on 
the strict pursuit of anti-colonial perspectives.  
Furthermore, this crucial moment in the struggle of the Oromo people was also of negative 
importance because the chronic divisions between Oromo elites and political forces, which 
continue today, began with the student revolution, utterly divided into two main positions on 
the way forward (Østebø and Tronvoll, 2020: 614; Jalata, 2020: 160). The first is the separatist 
stance that emerged in the 1970s and is represented by the OLF. This separatist stance strongly 
defies the nature of the Ethiopian state, viewing Menelik's expansionist war in the late 
nineteenth century as internal colonization and enslavement, arguing that the only recourse is 
to secede from Ethiopia and create an independent Oromo republic33. The second stance in 
Oromo politics can be characterized as a federalist position, which also emerged in the 1970s 
but took hold in the 1990s after the formation of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia 
(TGE).  
Thus, in 1991, the military regime was defeated by the Marxist-Leninist nationalists, who 
formed the liberation front that created a "multinational state" that considers the country's 
ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity. Post-1991 politics also provided the conditions for a 
resurgence of the colonial and national oppression discourse, leading nationalists to exercise 
 




the right to self-determination in different ways. While the Eritreans were allowed to create an 
independent state, with the intervention of the United States and the West, Oromo, Somali, and 
other nationalist movements sought to satisfy the demands of democracy and self-
determination within the Ethiopian state (Gudina, 2011: 667; Cohen, 1991).   
Ethiopia, after a unitary state system had existed since the state took its current form at the turn 
of the 20th century, adopted a multinational federal system in 1991 to address the long-standing 
questions of national oppression and democracy. In an effort to soften the demands of 
separatists as well, the political forces that assumed state power adopted a self-determination 
clause in the federal constitution that aimed at achieving a higher level of self-government.  
However, if we take stock of the past 27 years (1991–2018), the practice of federalism was 
often violated by the very party that enacted it and pledged to defend it. The ruling EPRDF 
party ruled the country with democratic centralism, and centralized state rule practically 
snatched ethnic groups of the right to self-determination and other constitutional rights, 
triggering a series of protests and resistance from the ethnic groups. The 2014 Addis Ababa 
Master Plan, which sparked strong and sustained Oromo protests, was the straw that broke the 
camel's back. The protesters originally demanded respect for the autonomy of the Oromia 
regional state over development and urban planning decisions, but quickly turned to a broader 
demand for regime change and rectification of historical injustices that have perpetuated since 
state formation, such as redefining national identity and rewriting national history. Thus, the 
crisis of legitimacy that the Ethiopian state is experiencing today, and its failure to create an 
enabling environment for democracy is associated with political development that has root in 
the formation of the empire which continues to this day (see section 4.3). 
4.2.2 Reflections on the modernization thesis  
The second discourse on the making of the Ethiopian state concerns modernization, which 
some view as a nation-building project, yet its failure has led to oppression that spawned long-
standing "national questions". Hence, according to this thesis, the search for modernization or 
development was Ethiopia's most important political project in the twentieth century. The 
imperial expansion of the nineteenth century was driven by derivative modernization of the 
West that Ethiopia sought to implement as a result of its marginal position in the global 
economy (Makki, 2011).  Zewde (2002) argued that the idea of “modern” Ethiopia was widely 
developed by a remarkable group of Ethiopian intellectuals of the early twentieth century. 




reformists, and intellectuals of the early twentieth century viewed modernity as a pressing need, 
seeing the lack of material progress more than anything else as Ethiopia's existential challenge 
(Gulema, 2020). These early intellectuals were driven by a cognitive dissonance between an 
inherited sense of cultural superiority and an acute awareness of Ethiopian "backwardness", in 
contrast not only to European states, where many of them studied, but also from colonized 
African peoples (Zewde, 2002: 100). 
Quoting Gebrehiwot Baykedagn, a prominent intellectual of the early Ethiopians, Gulema 
(2020: 366) further argues that acquaintance with the West was seen not only as the key to 
resolving the challenges of development in the country, but also believed as a revelatory 
teleology that would return Ethiopia back to history as a member of the civilized world. 
Although their analysis concerns the acquisition of arms, Holcomb and Ibssa (1990: 83) cite 
that Sahle Selassie was the first king to have direct contact with European powers, in particular 
the British and French, believing that acquaintance with Europe was the solution to the 
problems with his imaginary empire, only to be realized decades later by his grandson Menelik 
II. Ras Mekonnen's visits to England, Italy, France, Turkey, and Germany in 1902 were 
probably influenced by the modernization zeal of his grandfather, King Sahle Selassie, and his 
cousin, Emperor Menelik II (Monin, 20113: 383).  
Menelik also initiated several modernization projects, such as the establishment of the first 
Western-style school in Ethiopia, the creation of government ministries, hiring of several 
European advisers, and the construction of a railway from the coast to Addis Ababa that was 
completed after his death (Shinn and Ofcanski, 2004: 219). All the same, there is much 
evidence in the historical records showing that Ras Tafari Mekonnen, the future emperor Haile 
Selassie (1930-1974), visited Europe in 1924 with the conviction that modernization was the 
key to building a modern country, as well as to overcome its lagging behind the West (Monin, 
2013: 389). Clapham argued that, unlike African intellectuals in the colonized regions of the 
continent who viewed colonialism as exploitative, some early Ethiopian intellectuals often 
regretted that Ethiopia was unable to obtain the "benefits" of colonialism (Clapham, 2006: 
141). 
Progressive forces of this period emphasized the urgency of changes as long as the changes 
strengthened monarchy without undermining the empire's material and ideological basis. As a 
result, the modernization process began with state-led projects that attempted to reorganize 




system. Levine (2007: 6) argued that the vision of modernization began to prevail in 1957, over 
half a century ago, when the emperor put into practice various measures that he believed would 
benefit Ethiopia in the future. Ethiopia adopted a five-year plan as early as in 1957 to set 
economic goals, but as a predominantly agrarian country, it was unable to reform the land 
tenure structure on which the power of the state elite was based (Clapham, 2006: 143). Other 
measures included the centralization of governance, the creation of a modern bureaucracy, the 
creation of a national army, the emergence of a national school system, and the construction of 
national symbols (Gulema, 2020: 366). French schools opened in Ethiopia, and French served 
as the language of instruction before 1941. Many of Ethiopia's early intellectuals and 
revolutionaries also studied in France (Záhořík, 2017: 6; Zewdie, 2000: 114; Bishaw and 
Lasser, 2012: 55). Urban centres became the place where the nation met modernity, especially 
in Addis Ababa, which emerged as an essential space that produced and reproduced a vision 
of modernity, often statist and authoritarian, imposed on the nation.  
However, the modernization experiment in Ethiopia was largely unsuccessful, as the need for 
modernization faced an internal shortage of economic resources. Gulema (2020) argues that 
the country's traditional political economy could not avoid a fundamental crisis in the broader 
political modernization project. Violence that was embedded in the modernization project 
elsewhere also accompanied Ethiopia's vision, ultimately leading to large-scale exploitation, 
dispossession, and disenfranchisement of the newly incorporated territories. However, 
supporters of the imperial order continue to believe that the imperial Ethiopia represents a time 
of progress, that could set Ethiopia on the path of peaceful and democratic development if it 
were not cruelly halted by the 1974 revolution (Clapham, 2006: 144). Emperor Haile Selassie 
is portrayed as the modernizer of Ethiopia, which was true during the early years of his reign 
until the first constitution was adopted in 1931. After that, “true” modernization was 
constrained by colossal centralization, bureaucracy, poverty, lack of infrastructure and urban 
plutocracy (Zewde, 2002).   
4.3 Ethiopia's state and nation-building legacy in the quest for democracy 
The current crisis in Ethiopia is essentially a crisis of state/nation building. Most of the crises 
were created and have a genealogy dating back to the making of modern Ethiopia when the 
nation expanded southward because of its economic centrality for the new state. But also, the 
systemic marginality of the incorporated nations into the emerging Ethiopian state gave rise to 




state were not only political and economic, but deeply cultural. Gulema (2020) explained that 
the cultural is not just an extension of political economy, as identity politics is more often used 
as a means of expressing fundamental economic struggles in Ethiopia.  
As detailed above, Ethiopian intellectuals and political forces have also interpreted the 
country's malaise and prescribed political alternatives to address it, based on different 
ideological predispositions. This ranges from those who described the country's 
underdevelopment as the main problems in the early twentieth century, to those who identified 
the lack of freedom and equality as the main structural problems, including the colonial thesis, 
discussed since the 1960s in the context of political and social changes taking place in the 
country. However, despite some radical raptures and revolutions, the changes do not meet the 
basic demands of progress, democracy, freedom, justice, and equality in Ethiopia. Below, I 
take a deeper look at some of the historical paradoxes and legacies of state and nation-building 
endeavours that are relevant to the quest for democracy in Ethiopia.  
Hence, the important question that this section tries to answer is how the divergent views on 
the Ethiopian state and nation-building endeavours have affected the quest for democracy. 
Accordingly, the major legacies of Ethiopia’s state/nation-building endeavours are identified 
to analyse their implications for the development of democracy. This struggle has been based 
on its basic constituent elements such as freedom and equality over the past fifty years, shaping 
political interactions, especially since the 1960s. 
4.3.1 Political contradictions and polarization  
Political contradictions and polarization are one of the legacies of the making of the modern 
Ethiopian state, which still remain the challenges for transformative politics. In post-imperial 
Ethiopia, there are two main distinguishing features that stand out as the achievements of the 
revolutionaries who turned into nationalist liberation fronts. First, the 1974 revolution not only 
dethroned the imperial regime and gave birth to the first Ethiopian republicanism, but also led 
to the redistribution of land among farmers, which dismantled the economic foundation of the 
imperial regime. Second, the liberation fronts, which came to power in 1991, restructured the 
state on a new foundation, replacing the old, centralized structure with a multinational federal 
system that created a second republic (Abbink, 2009). However, the inconsistent 
implementation of these changes has led to the persistence of poverty, inequality, oppression, 
and authoritarianism, threatening the country's stability and the emergence of stable democracy 




The contradictory experience in the sphere of freedom and equality has become a hallmark of 
post-imperial Ethiopia, in which citizens are empowered and legally recognized, but constantly 
circumscribed through political action. For example, ethnicity has become the most important 
foundation of Ethiopian politics and political participation since 1991. The rise of ethnicity as 
the organizing principle of the state during the EPRDF regime expanded the political space, 
empowering previously marginalized communities. The elevation of ethnicity to such a 
privileged position is not the problem in and of itself, but rather its politicization and the 
centralized structure of the ruling EPRDF party, which has stripped ethnic groups of the rights 
recognized in the federal constitution. The federal system has given rise to opposing views of 
ethnic rights and empowerment. The protection of linguistic rights and self-governance of 
ethnic groups at the local level have generated a sense of ethnic satisfaction among historically 
marginalized groups in the country. But the centralized party structure with TPLF seats at the 
top has generated a strong sense of Tigrean dominance over some of the country's major ethnic 
groups. The politicization of ethnicity has disenfranchised people of mixed ethnicity, largely 
privileging ethnic homogeneity at the expense of diversity and rich social fabric at the 
household level. The ethnicization of politics, especially of the father as the sole marker of 
identity, also entrenches patriarchy, masking the oppression and gender-based struggles that 
are integral to building democratic societies (Razavi, 2001:214).  
Furthermore, the conception of nation remains primordial in post-imperial Ethiopia, 
embodying the same elements of cultural and religious construction that it had at birth. Despite 
the fact that the revolutions forced the state through a morphological process from empire to 
socialist, from socialist to federal, what has been perpetuated since the creation of Ethiopia as 
an empire is the inability to transform Ethiopia into a civic nation with an overarching national 
identity, which is a precondition for democracy.  
The contradiction and polarization in contemporary Ethiopian politics creates a narrative of 
struggle that recognizes the histories, memories, and truths of one group, but elide or erase the 
rest of their memories, truths, and histories. Such narratives of national history are forced upon 
others through deeply authoritarian political exercises, which have always been destructive for 
the country, as its peoples are left without the possibility of moral reckoning. Groups that have 
dominated the state in Ethiopia have treated others as peoples devoid of valuable history, 
culture, or political structure (Baxter et al, 1996: 90). Hence, such practice has not only limited 




national politics, blocking the path to a more transformative politics that overcome divisions 
to create a stable democracy. 
More than ever, Ethiopians need critical reflection, understanding and political compromise to 
overcome the destructive forces of polarization and contradictions in the current political 
transition, which began in early 2018. The revolutionary protest movements that have 
contributed to the arrival of a new group of leaders in the country inspired a sense of optimism 
and confidence in the possibility of a democratic transition. It is too early to draw conclusions, 
but the way the political transition has taken place over the past three years has signalled the 
same consequences of citizen empowerment and disempowerment, arguably replicating the 
past. This vicious circle of expansion and contraction of democracy, from which the country 
seems unable to emerge, has become a permanent feature of the Ethiopian state that often failed 
to create a lasting democratic order in which freedom, equality and socio-economic justice 
prevail.  
4.3.2 Eurocentrism/uncritical emulation of foreign models, theories, and ideas of progress 
Eurocentrism has significant epistemological dominance in the non-Western world (Alcoff, 
2017). Regarding the influence of Eurocentric thought on Ethiopian history, Messay Kebede 
argues that there is no better illustration of the external seal of Ethiopian history than the 
designation of expatriate scholars as the founders of Ethiopian studies. He goes on to name 
some of these scholars who were designated as the founders of Ethiopian studies: Job Ludolf, 
James Bruce, August Dillmann, Edward Ullendorff, Donald Donham, Donald Levine etc 
(Kebede, 2003:1). The prominent historian Teshale Tibebu also provided a more 
comprehensive critique of Eurocentrism, arguing that the Eurocentric construction of Ethiopian 
identity began in the sixteenth century with the Portuguese presence in Ethiopia (Tibebu, 
2008:359). According to Messay Kebede, this promotion to the rank of founders of European 
scholars who perfectly establishes what is called Ethiopian history and culture is largely a 
representation of Western scholarship, which means what we call Ethiopian studies is Ethiopia 
viewed from the West as the centre (kebede, 2003:2). Ethiopian historians also followed the 
same tradition rather than challenging it, succumbing to the Eurocentric paradigm. For 
example, citing the works of historians Taddesse Tamrat (1972) and Sergew Hable Selassie 
(1972), Messay Kebede further argued that Ethiopian scholars themselves admit that they owe 




Suffice it to say about Eurocentric dominance, let it not be misunderstood that the arguments 
presented in the thesis are not intended to reject the entire contribution of Western scholars as 
useless. Whether it is research, methodology, or theory, Western scholarship set high and 
relevant standards, from which this thesis has enormously benefited. What is rejected in the 
thesis is the arrangement and ranking of different social and cultural formations only from the 
viewpoint of the West. For example, since the Eurocentric construction of Ethiopia’s history is 
very strong, this connection is so important that the Abyssinians were distinguished from other 
national groups as the carriers of the historical civilization of Ethiopia. This civilization is 
considered to be Semitic civilization. In the words Donald N. Levine, "Ethiopian Empire of the 
twentieth century consists of a number of previously autonomous and distinct African tribes 
subordinate to an [alien] Semitic minority. This view is a natural consequence of the beginning 
of Ethiopia's history, as scholarly convention has had it, with the supposed Semitic 
immigrations of the first millennium B.C " (Levine, 1974: 26). This Semitic theme, be it myth 
or reality, is so important that it commands the organization and meaning of Ethiopian events 
and culture.  
In effort to deconstruct this Semitic heritage so that it could be considered as indigenous, 
Messay Kebede argues that the total absence of “great achievements” among southern 
Ethiopians as an excuse for foreign scholars to regard northern civilization as Semitic (Kebede, 
2003). Here his criticism of Eurocentrism begins to generate flaws. Although he deconstructs 
the Eurocentric assumption of what is considered a Semitic civilization and presents it as 
indigenous, he does not challenge the Eurocentric paradigm of the superiority of the Abyssinian 
civilization. Instead of facing head on, he tried to sanitize what he called the problem, 
presenting it as if it were only the views of the West. His criticism of Eurocentrism is more 
directed at agents rather than at the assumptions. This appears to be the reason that he placed 
almost all the blame on foreign scholars for the Ethiopian state to become immune from 
criticism, despite the fact that Ethiopian scholars have fallen for Eurocentrism, that the state 
developed a curriculum and distributed their scholarships as official textbooks. Thus, Ethiopian 
studies are not only Ethiopia as viewed from the West, but also the official historical record of 
the Ethiopian state, in which the north was seen as the bearer of an advanced civilization, and 
the south as backward. This is another legacy attributed to state building in Ethiopia that has 
serious implications for alternative intellectual practices, leaving unanswered the question of 
how to create a democratic and inclusive Ethiopia in which every citizen and group has a stake 




One of these implications is that the convergence of a Eurocentric drive for modernization and 
long-established myths of statehood place the country on the plinth of exceptionalism, 
distinctively presenting Ethiopians as "black Caucasians" with a separate civilizational space 
better than the rest of Africa, if not Europe. But this narrative of Ethiopia's exceptionalism was 
essentially that of Abyssinia, Christianity, Judaism, Semitic Ethiopia, constructed as the 
foundation of Ethiopian civilization. Such a religious and cultural construction of Ethiopia led 
to the division of the country into a civilized north and a backward south (Ullendorff, 1960). It 
localized the global cultural divide between the West and the rest, legitimizing and informing 
imperial politics, which divided the people into locals and outsiders, the former being 
northerners, and the latter mostly referred to as Oromo (Baxter et al, 1996).   
The division also became the foundation upon which the homogenization policy was built to 
create a "nation" in imperial Ethiopia, privileging Orthodox Christianity and the Amharic 
language as the standard for membership. For example, in imperial Ethiopia, Ethiopian 
Muslims were called “Muslims in Ethiopia,” which is the idea of Muslims as “outsiders” to 
Ethiopia (Østebø, 2013). Islam was seen as the antithesis of "Ethiopianism" (Markakis, 1987: 
74), while Christianity has always been the profound expression of Ethiopian national existence 
(Ullendorff, 1965: 97). Such division has important implications for contemporary Ethiopian 
politics. For example, as noted above, the failure to create a broad and inclusive political and 
social space has led to increased polarization and disputes over political and historical 
narratives. This has become a serious obstacle to the country's transition to democracy, 
replacing the old grouping of the country's population as “modern and backward” with 
“indigenous and immigrant”. Abyssinians used to consider themselves alone local to Ethiopia, 
while others, mostly Oromo, were outsiders. This traditional assumption is overturned through 
historical, political, and epistemological reconstructions of the narrative in which non-
Abyssinians now become indigenous to Ethiopia. This, however, has led to the emergence of 
nativist discourses, exacerbating division and violence that make the possibility of democratic 
transition a nightmare in the current political transition.  
Despite the aforementioned problems, Oromo scholars over the past 30 years, under the 
auspices of the Oromo Study Association (OSA), have challenged the idea that Oromo are 
incapable of great achievement, which Ethiopian historians have replicated from the global 
Eurocentric assumption. Oromo intellectual response to Eurocentric epistemological violence 
has made history writing and interpretation central to the struggle for self-determination, both 




Ethiopian episteme, divorcing it from its Eurocentric and Semitic heritage and linking it to a 
critical subaltern and postcolonial studies. Overcoming these birthmarks of Ethiopian studies 
was thought to be necessary by providing alternative scholarship that removes the germ of the 
predicament and shapes its current and future trajectory (Jalata, 1996).    
The uncritical emulation of the Western model, its theory of history and ideas of progress is 
the main legacy of state-building that negatively influenced the emergence and development 
of democracy in Ethiopia. Gulema (2020) argued that Ethiopia's main problem in imitating 
modernity is its narrow approach to achieving material progress without critically considering 
fundamental problems of democracy such as popular sovereignty, social equality, freedom, and 
secularism. Moreover, Lencho Leta (2006) also argued that part of the contemporary crisis in 
Ethiopia may rest on the political elites who do not often critically evaluate Western ideas of 
progress. He further explained that, unlike Ethiopia's state-building experience, which was 
entirely based on a traditional agrarian economy built on the labour and land of poor peasants, 
the success of European state-building projects was due to the fact that industrialization 
eventually made the process less painful. Teshale (2008) also explained that uncritical belief 
in the transformative power of radical political experiments and revolutionary ideas such as 
Marxism-Leninism aiming to end injustice ended up creating new injustices. He also noted that 
identifying positive cultural and political values and practices from Ethiopia's past will 
continue to be a challenge that Ethiopians will have to confront in order to build peace and 
social justice. In fact, building a just, democratic, and equitable country requires a sincere 
attempt to confront the past and correct mistakes. 
In a nutshell, it should be noted that shaping Ethiopia's future requires a critical reflection on 
what went wrong in the past and a deeper understanding of its complex history, traditions, 
indigenous knowledge system, and practices. Uncritical emulation has always been one of 
Ethiopia's biggest challenges, regardless of the type of regime - imperial, socialist or federalist. 
Under the imperial regime, Ethiopia's early educated class adopted modernity as the universal 
norm, but Ethiopia and its people inherited only the foundations of a failed state and a failed 
modernity that became the hallmark of the country along with a deeply entrenched autocratic 
political culture. Instead of critically appropriating cultural values and traditions as a 
prerequisite for modernity, political elites have resorted to the destruction, alienation, and 




The forces that toppled the emperor in 1974, like their predecessors, quickly adopted foreign 
forms of Marxism and socialism as solutions to the country's problems. This experience also 
has either destroyed or overlooked indigenous institutions and traditions in an attempt to 
replace them with those that were recreated on the basis of the imported radical socialist and 
Marxist ideology. As a result, not only has the repressive state persisted, depriving people of 
the freedom to exercise their rights, but poverty and inequality remain entrenched. The same 
practice continued under the EPRDF, but with only slight flexibility in switching the policy of 
emulation between West and East depending on the circumstances. 
The other biggest challenges for Ethiopia's transition to a democracy has been the uncritical 
imitation of the notion of nationalism from the European experience of nation-building that 
identified homogeneity as a precondition for political, economic, and social citizenship 
(Gellner, 1997: 29), often leading to the imposition of the Amharic language on Oromo and 
other southern Ethiopian peoples, which has proven to be counterproductive for the emergence 
of inclusive democratic societies.  
Despite the broader conception of self-determination rights, equating the expression of 
nationalism and self-determination with secession is the main legacy of the decolonization 
movement in Africa, in which Ethiopian elites emulated their African counterparts who 
committed the first mistake, strikingly equating such rights with independence (Halperin et al. 
1992: 20). The reason why the Ethiopian state violently opposes the right to self-determination 
of its national groups is partly due to the contradictions and inconsistencies with which this 
right is exercised in Africa. The fact that the right to self-determination was equated with 
decolonization in post-colonial African states made the recognition of this right a very difficult 
exercise for the defenders. Respect for these rights fundamentally contradicts the claims of the 
Ethiopian rulers about Ethiopia's “exceptionalism”, based on centuries-old myths of statehood, 
as the only black African country not conquered by white colonial rule. The recognition of 
these rights was always seen in part as a concession to the colonial thesis, according to which 
the Ethiopian state subjugated the Oromo and southern peoples.  
A careful analysis of the struggles of the Oromo people in Ethiopia now and in the past shows 
that the original goal was never to secede and achieve an independent state. Oromo nationalism 
was originally a demand for equality. However, intransigence and denial of the right to self-
determination on the part of Ethiopian rulers have always been more responsible for the 




groups to accept secession as an alternative to securing freedom and peace. For example, one 
of the defining moments in modern Oromo struggles is associated with the Bale peasant 
uprising and the formation of the Macha and Tulama Association (MTA) in the 1960s, which 
marked the birth of Oromo nationalism. The Bale Peasant Revolt was a historic act of tax 
resistance and an uprising against land confiscation by the feudal system that existed in the 
Ethiopian Empire (Østebø, 2020). The creation of the MTA also aimed to promote Oromo 
identity and provide basic infrastructure such as schools, medical facilities, roads, and water.  
However, the intransigence of imperial rule to properly cater to peasant demands, as well as 
the imperial regime's ban on the self-help association, led to the creation of Oromo's first 
political party, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Oromo nationalists, who founded the OLF 
in 1974, constituted the majority of the former MTA members. The Bale revolt on the 
periphery, the creation of the MTA and then OLF informed the Oromo about the importance 
of their culture and the oppression inherent in the imperial socio-economic and political system. 
With the intransigence of the imperial regimes, Oromo nationalists put forward a variety of 
demands - from secession to achieving regional autonomy and reconstructing Ethiopia's 
national identity.   
4.3.3 The absolutist state, domination, and hegemony 
The enduring tradition of the absolutist state, its institutions of hegemony and domination, is 
another legacy of Ethiopia's contested state and nation-building that continues to pose serious 
structural problems for democracy. Charles Tilly (1985) argued that in European countries, 
democracy was a by-product of state making. It emerged out of the contentious and conciliatory 
relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie, the aristocracy, and the peasantry, which 
over time forced the state to reconstruct itself in a more inclusive way. Such concession by the 
state to represent and recognize the rights of citizens was an important consequence of the 
existence of a strong capitalist class that emerged from the urbanization and commercialization 
of agriculture. As a result, democratization coincided with the development of capitalism and 
the transformation of the bourgeoisie into a strong independent class capable of seeking 
concessions from the state and sharing political privileges.  
However, the 19th century imperial expansion in Ethiopia saw marked deviations from Europe's 
imperial past in terms of state formation. While Charles Tilly's axiom "War made the state, the 
state made war" is most relevant in explaining the intense and continuous warfare that led to 




dispensation in Ethiopia. One of the reasons is that in Ethiopia, as in other African colonized 
countries, the process of state formation precedes the creation of a “nation”, which is contrary 
to European experience. It is believed that this has become the Achilles heel of many African 
countries for democratization projects (Mazzuca, 2014).  
On the other hand, Yusuf (2020: 61) argues that another reason democracy could not take root 
in Ethiopia is that there were no strong contenders against the state demanding representation 
or limited government. He went on to explain that three factors contributed to this. First, in 
Ethiopia, the conditions for the emergence of capitalism were unfavourable, so that the 
bourgeoisie either did not break away from feudalism, or practically did not exist. Second, the 
highly parasitic aristocrats were uninterested in technological progress and relied on the hard 
labour and fertile lands of the conquered people as the source of their wealth. Third, the 
constraints associated with the state's tradition of levying high tribute on peasants in imperial 
Ethiopia also impeded technological progress in agriculture. Holcomb and Ibssa (1990) also 
argued that because the newly created state was designed and assembled under the auspices of 
superpowers with their own strategic expansionist agendas in the region, it focused not on 
investment for internal economic progress, but on plunder and consumption with no long-term 
perspective for advancement. 
The Ethiopian Empire, which was born with Amharic as the only state language, was another 
obstacle to socio-economic development as the insistent use of a single language prevented 
vital information from reaching the majority of the population (Sarah & Kjetil, 2003). Radio 
Ethiopia, for example, broadcasts all information about health, agriculture, and education only 
in the Amharic language. Imperial language policies marginalized parts of the population, for 
example, impeding Oromo education for decades, which in turn fed struggles for self-
determination, and since 2014, it has become a key grievance factor for the Oromo youth 
movement. 
Against the modernisation perspective, there was no discernible step towards 
commercialization and urbanization that would have contributed to the growth of a strong 
bourgeoisie. Urbanization was very weak, and the emerged garrison urban centres simply 
served as places for the local nobility to skim off rural produce from poor farmers in imperial 
Ethiopia (Hassen, 1999). Holcomb and Ibssa (1990: 110) also explained that the creation of 
various fortified garrison towns was mainly aimed at protecting settlers from the resistance of 




were used largely as a springboard for expansion into the south, the political and economic 
powerhouse of the imperial regime. The commercialization of agriculture began in the 1950s 
largely with the ownership of the aristocracy (Lavers, 2012), but this too did not live long to 
create a strong, independent bourgeois class. Moreover, as the manufacturing sector and 
international trade were dominated by foreigners in the early period of modernization, an 
indigenous bourgeoisie did not emerge (Markakis and Ayele, 1978).  
As a result, the traditional agrarian economy and production process did not give way to 
domestic capital accumulation. The cumulative result of these developments was that the 
emperor amassed immense power and became an absolutist and hegemon, since there were no 
strong contenders who could force the state to make concessions in favour of political 
liberalization, a precondition for democratization (Yusuf, 2020). As a result, the foundations 
of post-imperial autocratic rule were firmly established, in which the military regime inherited 
the structures of a centralized absolutist state (Clapham, 1990). Under the military regime, state 
power became even more reinvigorated, as its mechanisms of suppression and control were 
unprecedentedly enhanced thanks to access to modern technologies of coercion and control 
(Markakis, 1981). Besides, the long-standing and widespread armed clashes contributed to the 
destruction of the country's emerging civil societies and trade/labour unions, shattering hopes 
of a democratic transition (de Waal, 1991: 7).   
Ethno-nationalist liberation fronts also inherited a country devastated by civil wars when they 
toppled the military regime in 1991. Ethiopia has once again proved to be an unfavourable 
environment for democratization, as the organized opposition, independent civil society and 
the middle class were extremely weak as a result of the seventeen years of civil wars. As armed 
struggle had already weakened independent centres of power, the political environment helped 
perpetuate authoritarianism, allowing the victors of wars to use their military power to capture 
the state, thereby increasing the state's repressive capacity over the next three decades. Despite 
the creation of some nominal democratic institutions, the EPRDF remained committed to a 
legacy of authoritarian practices until it was dissolved and replaced by the Prosperity Party, 
created by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in late 2019. In short, Ethiopians have inherited the 
authoritarian and absolutist state as a result of the nation-building failure of the previous era, 






4.3.4 Emergence of contending nationalisms.  
Ethiopia's contested state-building efforts have ultimately allowed contending nationalisms to 
flourish, which has several implications for the struggle for democracy. The relationship 
between nationalism and democracy is the subject of various debates. The debates range from 
viewing nationalism as a force "allergic" to democracy (Diamond and Plattner, 1994), as an 
inherently anti-democratic force (Fukuyama, 1994: 23-28) and to another view that sees their 
marriage as necessary. For example, Nodia (1994: 4) argued that the idea of nationalism is 
impossible and even unthinkable without the idea of democracy, and that democracy also never 
exists without nationalism.  
With this theoretical debate in mind, the discussion in this section reflects on the ways that 
various forms of nationalism have influenced the democratic aspirations of the Ethiopian 
people. It demonstrates that the struggle for democracy has long been a prisoner of the political 
and cultural construction of Ethiopia's past, generating various competing ideas of the state and 
contested national identity.  
I argue that the first phase of the rise of nationalism in Ethiopia was associated with Menelik's 
conquest of Oromo and the southern communities. This is a nationalism which emerged from 
the feeling of seeing oneself as superior and more civilized than others, but, despite this, 
constructed all the basic signs and symbols of the nation and imposed a certain identity as the 
identity of the state as a result of certain historical and cultural experiences (see section 4.2.1 
for detail). This state-framed nationalism has undergone several permutations over the years. 
First, it morphed into pan-Ethiopian nationalism after Adwa's 1896 victory over Italian forces, 
creating Ethiopia's image as a unique African power that was able to defeat European forces. 
Adwa's victory provided the conquerors with a blank check for recreating their supremacist 
thinking as an integral part of the state ideology. It reproduced and imposed Ethiopia's 
narratives of ‘exceptionalism’ to justify the imperial conquests of the 19th century and the 
affliction that followed, from which the country still suffers. Second, a pro-Marxist and 
socialist progressive tradition of the 1960s and 1970s, rooted in the Ethiopian student 
movement, attempted to redefine Ethiopia's national identity on ideas of equality, solidarity, 
and freedom. But these efforts were largely unsuccessful due to the military takeover of the 
student revolution, and as a result, the old nationalism continued, only with the recognition of 
certain religious rights of Muslims, but ingrained pan-Ethiopian rhetoric even deep into the 




system in 1974 did not abandon the imperial doctrine of homogenization, as the new military 
regime continued to adhere to the same policy to some extent. Only with the fall of the latter 
at the end of 1991 was this policy mitigated with the emergence of the second Republican. 
Cementing this reality, Gulema (2020) argues that reasoning in the name of nation building or 
national survival, pan-Ethiopian nationalism extols Ethiopia's achievements, and sacrifices in 
defence against foreign aggression, while glossing over the agony of the nation or members of 
ethnic groups, women, and religious communities, which allows the state to compose and 
impose a one-dimensional narrative obtained in the process of its creation. Hence, the reality 
is civic Ethiopia, which is liberal and inclusive, never emerged, as its protagonists could not 
divorce from its fundamental cultural and religious roots.  
With the EPRDF coming to power in 1991, pan-Ethiopian nationalism lost its privilege in 
national discourses as a new multinational, secular and federalist Ethiopia emerged. But the 
contestation continued, while now pan-Ethiopian nationalism went underground and became 
an anti-establishment opposition for much of the EPRDF’s rule, until it resurfaced in national 
discourses with a political opening enacted in early 2018. Over the 27 years of EPRDF rule, 
pan-Ethiopian nationalists resented the ethnic-friendly rhetoric of the EPRDF regime and 
emphasised its perceived negative impact on the country's unity, viewing the federal system as 
a step towards Ethiopia's disintegration. They often accused the TPLF of conspiring with the 
EPLF to violate Ethiopia's territorial integrity by allowing Eritrea to form its own state, leaving 
the country landlocked. Over the past two years, under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy 
Ahmed, pan-Ethiopian nationalism has morphed into populist nationalism. Populist 
nationalism is a variant of nationalism that combines features of nationalist politics and populist 
rhetoric (Blokker, 2005). Abiy views Ethiopia as a magnificent political project, a "land of 
origin" with a long and uninterrupted history of greatness. His vision of the future also feeds 
off these mythologized notions of the past and exaggerated perceived greatness of its 
controversial emperors. The prime minister, as the embodiment of populist nationalism, often 
claims to be the only person who can restore the “nation” to its ancient “greatness” and lead 
the “nation” to prosperity and “Medemer” democracy (see chapter six).  
The second phase of the rise of nationalism in Ethiopia was associated with three organized 
revolts against Emperor Haile Selassie’s regime in the northern and southern edges of the 
Empire. The revolt in the north began with the annexation of Eritrea to the Ethiopian Empire 
in 1962, which angered some sections of Eritrean society. In the southern part of the empire, 




Christian empire (Tibebu, 2008: 345-6). All three of these revolts were started by Muslims, 
who were treated as second-class subjects of the empire, so religious elements were among 
other forms of grievances.   
This second phase of nationalism also eventually morphed into ethno-nationalism as non-
Muslims later joined the struggles through civil unrests and protests against the centralized rule 
of Imperial Ethiopia, as well as the emergence of Marxist and socialist-oriented student 
movements and various associations in the 1960s and 1970s. The entrenchment of ethno-
nationalism was spearheaded by the many rebel liberation movements that mushroomed 
throughout the country. More than a dozen rebel groups fought the military regime between 
1974 and 1991. In the process, they raised ethno-nationalist consciousness among their 
constituents, leading to the downfall of the military regime in 1991, assisted by shifts in 
international political economy and regional politics. Thus, ethno-nationalism took various 
ethnic names during the armed and liberation struggle against the military regime, which 
triumphed in the post-1991 period.  
Repression, marginalization, and authoritarianism laid the foundation for the emergence of 
ethno-nationalist movements in Ethiopia. For example, the Oromo nationalists, who began the 
struggle against the Ethiopian state in the 1960s, demanded a radical restructuring of the state 
and society through revolution, exposing Ethiopia's structural crisis, such as lack of progress, 
a highly authoritarian state and deeply unequal nations. Moreover, the fact that decades of 
Ethiopia's encounter with imperial state-building and modernity have increased the 
inconsistency and contradictions of Ethiopia's political economy. One such crisis manifests 
itself in appalling inequality between city and country, with the city, in particular Addis Ababa, 
representing the greatest concentration of wealth, power and resources. The struggle over 
Addis Ababa by the Oromo nationalists is the epitome of the current national political 
discourse. Two periods are of particular importance in shaping the historical memory of Oromo 
and its contemporary political claims; one of them is the late sixteenth century, marking the 
beginning of a continuous and effective Oromo presence in the area of present-day Addis 
Ababa and its environs. The second is the nineteenth century, which includes episodes when 
the city’s expansion began in the areas inhabited by Oromo, and King Menelik completed the 
process by occupying the lands and conquering their inhabitants. Oromo, along with other 
subjects of the empire, were subjected to various forms of violent state practice, including mass 
evictions that occurred after the founding of Addis Ababa. The dispossession and eviction of 




manifestation of this phenomenon was the eviction of Oromo peasants following the physical 
expansion of Addis Ababa, especially in the years leading up to the announcement of the city's 
master plan in 2014, which sparked the 2014-2018 Oromo protests (see chapter five).  
Overall, the past three decades under the EPRDF represent a continuation of the struggle for 
the cultural and political remaking of Ethiopia, framing political interactions and discourses 
according to either pan-Ethiopian or ethnic nationalisms by their respective advocates. The 
difference is that ethnicity has become a privileged organizing principle of the state, competing 
among groups and with a retreating pan-Ethiopian nationalism. One of the legacies of the post-
1991 state building project is the creation and development of a peculiar brand of Amhara 
nationalism. This is a relatively recent development as it has long been subsumed under broader 
pan-Ethiopian nationalism. What has been constructed as an Ethiopian identity is more or less 
the identity of the historically ruling groups that is usually associated with ethnic Amhara. 
Hence, extracting Amhara nationalism from pan-Ethiopianism was difficult, as there was also 
lack of clarity in the definition of who Amhara was, which impeded the growth of ethnic 
nationalism rooted in this identity. People living in today's Amhara region used to describe 
themselves using intra-Amharic identities such as Shewa, Gojjam, Gonder, Wollo and Menze, 
rather than using the general rubric of Amhara. Clapham (1990: 24) argued that being Amhara, 
especially in the past, was more a matter of how a person behaves than who their parents were, 
in accordance with the core culture, which can be regarded national. Hence, the difficulty in 
distinguishing it from pan-Ethiopianism prevented the growth of explicit group identity of 
Amhara nationalism until recent protests that, following to the political model installed by the 
TPLF-EPRDF, contributed to the emergence of political liberalization in early 2018 and led to 
more pronounced ‘ethnic politics.’  
Nevertheless, the problem is not that there are opposing ideas or competing nationalist views 
of Ethiopia, but that nationalists often re-impose exclusive interpretations of the past to inform 
the present, which often become sources of violence as the past is always viewed with 
escapism. This currently happens from all sides. For example, pan-Ethiopian nationalists often 
focus on a national history that excludes or erases origins, reality, and persistent inequalities, 
while ethno-nationalists often focus on a history of dissensus to reconstruct past realities. For 
pan-Ethiopian nationalists, politics aimed at uplifting ethnic identity is tantamount to 
destroying a perceived sense of unity, while for ethno-nationalists, politics advocating ethnic 
emancipation is the only way to save the country from disintegration. Pan-Ethiopian 




people. The exclusivism and brutality of the state-building and nation-building process in 
Ethiopia, as well as the persisting structural inequality in the country, are underlined by ethno-
nationalism. For ethno-nationalism, rewriting the past is mostly the result of the presentism of 
the past, since the current struggle to re-define Ethiopian national identity is never really about 
the past, but is about the present and the future. The consequences of such production and 
reproduction of Ethiopia's past to inform the present led to deep-seated divisions and 
complicated the sense of shared national identity as a precondition for establishing stable 
democracy in Ethiopia.  
Obstacles to political liberalization in Ethiopia also have persisted over the past two years. One 
of the main problems is the growing polarization of political elites. As discussed above, 
Ethiopia's political landscape has always been full of competing nationalisms with different 
and conflicting views of the state and its ideological underpinnings. The ethnic mobilization 
that has propelled the current transition process remains significant, as the main issues 
regarding the current multinational federalism and its ideological foundations remain largely 
unresolved. The debate around the constitution is an elephant in the room, directly or indirectly 
fuelling political violence and instability in the country as the opinions of the population and 
the elite differ sharply along ethnic lines. One group, which includes the majority of Oromo 
and southern nations, sees the current constitution as the tool for managing cultural and 
ethnolinguistic diversity and protecting both group and individual rights. This group believes 
that it is necessary to implement the various provisions of the Federal Constitution "in their 
true letter and spirit." For example, one activist explained that if any amendments are needed, 
now is not the right time, but after a fair and credible election, elected representatives can 
present the issues to the Ethiopian public and make the necessary amendment in accordance 
with the article stipulated in a constitution which in itself is open to amendment34. However, 
others support fundamental and unconditional constitutional changes, in particular the 
elimination of Article 39, which is an article on the right of nations and nationalities to self-
determination up to secession. Many Amhara scholars, politicians and government officials are 
now openly advocating the latter view.   
In short, Abiy's failure to forge a dialogue on shared values and national identity of the country 
has caused further confusion and frustration among the public due to his failure to tame these 
fiery and contending nationalisms. Abiy came to power riding on a youth movement stirred by 
 




Oromo nationalism, but to be inclusive, he also wanted to acknowledge a form of Amhara 
nationalism to consolidate his legitimacy as the prime minster of the country. What held these 
nationalisms together was their shared rejection of the TPLF, which later rooted out the TPLF 
from the centre. This change in power quickly signalled a short-lived harmony between the 
Amhara and Oromo nationalisms, since there was no clear package regarding the future of the 
country, with failure to organize dialogue and negotiations. This prompted nationalists and 
their affiliates to use opposition and cooperation as tactics to increase their influence. The 
National Movement of Amhara (NAMA), urban based parties such as Ethiopian Citizens for 
Social Justice (EZeMa), and ADP nationalists infiltrated party members and some formally 
joined the ruling party to push their ideas within the government structure, while Oromo 
nationalists lost time entering into an altercation with the government over the disarmament 
and demobilization of the OLF army35.   
As a result, the Amhara regional ruling party, the ADP, became hostage to the “Amhara first” 
nationalist movement promoted by the newly created rival National Movement of Amhara 
(NAMA) and EzeMa, gaining ground in the region and urban centre. Similarly, the fate of the 
ODP in Oromia became hostage to the Oromo nationalist movements such as the OLF and 
Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). As the two nationalisms intensified in the two largest 
regions, their impacts soon began to be widely reflected, significantly diminishing the influence 
of the EPRDF. With growing fragmentation and confrontation, Prime Minister Abiy quickly 
grabbed the opportunity to dissolve the long-standing ruling coalition, paving the way for the 
creation of the new centralized party. The reason Abiy hastened the creation of the Prosperity 
Party was not only the inability to tame rival nationalism, but he wanted to combat the 
dominance of ethnic nationalists as preventive measures since they threatened his power in 
future elections. This is detrimental to Abiy’s ability to provide effective leadership, make 
change and deliver on his promises.   
4.4 Conclusion  
Ethiopia's state-building process is full of claims and accusations of historical atrocities and 
injustices. From the time of Emperor Menelik's expansion to the south in the late nineteenth 
century to the more recent “Medemer” discourse of Abiy, it is common to find different 
perspectives of major historical landmarks believed to have influenced cultural identity, 
livelihoods and rights of citizens and communities. During imperial periods, the archaic form 
 




of state-building promoted by autocratic monarchs and the unitary state sparked, among other 
things, many ethnic nationalist movements against the state itself, as well as the 1974 student 
revolution that ended monarchical rule in Ethiopia. Under the military leadership, the 
revolution succeeded in destroying the old regimes and their economic basis, but it was unable 
to provide the democratic ideals of freedom and equality, which became the main factors in the 
proliferation of ethno-nationalist liberation fronts that overthrew the military regime in 1991.  
In the post-1991 period, the new ruling party, the EPRDF, remapped the Ethiopian state along 
ethnic lines, without shedding the authoritarian tendencies of the past. The outcome is the 
further intensification of not only ethnic mobilisation, but also contending nationalisms within 
a tightly controlled state through a hierarchically organised party structure, which has 
undermined the foundations of the regime, especially since early 2014. These demonstrate 
deeper connections between historical trajectories and current political situations that inform 
the youth social movement that has erupted in opposition to the Addis Ababa Master Plan. 
Disputes over such issues are not merely historical, as they persist in current political discourse, 
contributing to political polarization that undermines national cohesion. Political elites are 
sharply divided over the interpretation of the country's past, the current constitution and federal 
structure, as well as by national history and symbols. In short, the current crisis in Ethiopia can 
be largely seen as a crisis of the state and its incompetence in creating a genuine multinational 
structure. The highly controversial and unsettled historical legacy of state-building has 
perpetuated divisions and animosities between various ethnic groups, undermining efforts to 
create a common national identity, a prerequisite for successful democratization. Thus, 
reassessing the relationship between the state and society through mutual negotiation is 
essential for democracy to succeed in Ethiopia by developing a new set of legitimate and 
predictable institutional relationships that allow organic democracy to grow out of the multiple 
identities of the diverse national groups. Against this backdrop, the next chapter explores the 
paths linking protest to democratization through an empirical study of the recent revolutionary 
protest movements in Ethiopia, whose root causes lie in the often-contested 19th century state-







Chapter Five: Protests, Repression, and Political Change in 
Ethiopia, 2014-2018  
5.1 Introduction 
Youth have always played a decisive role in Ethiopian politics. In the most recent political 
events that garnered so much international attention to Ethiopia, youth have been, as always, 
at the centre. While they were always at forefront of change, from the student movement of the 
1960s and 1970s to the brief relaxed moment around the 2005 elections; the bloodiest red terror 
of the Marxist regime in the late 1970s, and the massive repression that the EPRDF government 
followed with, especially after 2005, made activism so passive that youth turned away from 
politics (Gebremariam and Herrer, 2016: 149). Almost five decades later, the methods of 
suppressing youth political activism remain. However, despite obstacles, the recent social 
movements that erupted in Oromia and Amhara regions has challenged the status quo, using 
social media to offer new platforms for political engagement and collective action. 
As such, one of the most remarkable features of the protest movements that took place mainly 
in Amhara and Oromia regions was the absence of political parties and formally organized 
groups from the ranks of those who brought down one of Africa's most powerful authoritarian 
regimes, with the exception of the tipping point provided by nationalist members of the ruling 
EPRDF. The early stages of protest against the publication of Addis Ababa's controversial 
Master Plan sparked a wave of protests first in Jimma University on 12th of April 2014 and 
then spread to Ambo, Mendi, Bale, Awoday, Chinaksan and elsewhere in Oromia. The 
movements had no formal organizational structures and remained clandestine, amorphous, and 
horizontal, led by youth with little or no experience in formal politics. They relied on social 
media to mobilize and convey their messages that rejected the EPRDF regime's grip on power 
and the ensuing repressions.   
Another important feature of these movements was the speed with which they expanded to 
encompass a wide range of demands, actors, and movements in the country, especially in the 
two largest regions - first Oromia and then Amhara - which became the centre of popular 
protests, creating a broad base of support for the movement. To the surprise of many observers 
who had previously viewed Ethiopia's quiescent populace as a sign of stability secured by the 
regime’s rhetoric of developmental success, the Amhara and Oromo youth protests brought 
together social forces and social groups that were rival and fragmented in the interest of 




deeply entrenched authoritarian regime. Particularly, the convergence between the two regional 
grievances played an important role in fuelling the crisis in the EPRDF. In November 2017, 
the Oromo People’s Democratic Party (OPDO) reached out to the Amhara National 
Democratic Movement (ANDM) in a spirit of solidarity and cooperation. The resulting 
alliances played a central role in the downfall of the TPLF-led regime in Ethiopia, which also 
prompted the arrival of Abiy Ahmed at the helm of state power on April 2, 2018.  
Thus, based largely on the views of protesters and activists, as well as several informal 
conversations with individuals accidentally met while traveling to different places in Ethiopia, 
this chapter provides a chronological overview of the protest movements in Oromia and 
Amhara regions, the role played by the nationalist members of the ruling EPRDF coalition, and 
also analyses the main demands of the protesters and strategies for mobilization, the role of 
other groups and the government's reaction to the protest movement. This helps put the protests 
in perspective in terms of Ethiopia’s democratic trajectory, documenting the social and political 
processes that led to the creation of the social movements that contributed to the recent major 
political changes. 
The chapter draws on theories of nonviolent social movements, political defiance, and the 
transition approach of democratization in analysing the links between the various nonviolent 
actions that were implemented during the protests along with the role of mainstream and social 
media, including diaspora and the international community role in the political process that led 
to political changes in early 2018. With an emphasis on individual agency, the transition 
approach stresses that democratization is often determined by the strategic behaviour of the 
incumbent regime's elites. Unlike other theories of democratization, which often focus on 
causality between structural factors, elite-based theories emphasize the importance of the split 
between hardliners and soft-liners in the ruling elite in defining the path to democratization 
(O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Przeworski (1991) also argues that the rifts within an 
authoritarian regime increase the chances of successful negotiations between the regime and 
the moderate opposition, as the popular mobilization plays an important role in increasing the 
bargaining power of the moderate opposition for bringing about democratization.  
However, as the empirical analysis in this chapter demonstrates, these theories fail to fully 
explain the youth protest movements in Ethiopia for two reasons. The first was the absence of 
organized opposition groups that played a significant role in the protests and forced the regime 




party were given the opportunity to play an important role alongside protesting communities 
to bring about political liberalization and a change of leadership in early 2018. The second 
reason is that such elite-based transition theory rarely explains the specific pathways linking 
social movements to democratic transitions, such as cases of violent and non-violent anti-
regime protests. The latter is especially important in the context of Ethiopia, which has 
frequently faced violent ethnic and civil strife over the decades.   
Thus, building on this debate of the transition approach and social movements, this chapter 
explores the pathways linking protests to democratization through an empirical study of the 
Amhara uprising and Oromo protests, and the role played by the reformist elements of the 
ruling party. From this perspective, scholars on democratization and social movements such as 
della Porta and Teorell have found that nonviolent anti-regime protests systematically increase 
the likelihood of democratic transitions, often leading to political liberalization and the 
establishment of democracy (della Porta, 2014: 32; Teorell, 2010: 104). Accordingly, the 
chapter claims that the youth protesters employed one of the rare types of nonviolent 
mechanisms that Gene Sharp (2012), in his book “From Dictatorship to Democracy”, referred 
to as conversion in order to bring about change in Ethiopia.  
As will be detailed below, the categorical achievement of the Amhara and Oromo protest 
movements was the mobilization of the youth in defiance of authoritarianism, whereby the 
empowered elites, especially the Oromo and Amhara factions within the EPRDF were 
convinced of the just cause of the movement to end the repression and allow Abiy to rise to 
power with the promise of political reform. With this in mind, this chapter is divided into five 
sections. Following this introduction, the second section discusses issues around the Addis 
Ababa Master Plan and other related political developments that initially sparked protests in 
Oromia region. The third section presents an analysis of the six phases of the youth protest 
movements. The first two phases of protests analysed in this section focus on Oromo protests. 
The third and fourth phases of the protests focus on the Amhara uprising and Oromo protests, 
while the fifth and sixth phases of the protest analysis focus on the role played by the reformist 
elements of the ruling party. Discussions in this section also include an analysis of the strategies 
and mobilization factors that shaped the dynamism of the protesters' demands, the impetus for 
the protest movements in the face of brutal repression by the security forces, the reactions of 
other groups to the protests, and how the protests managed to contribute to bringing about 




developments in relation to democratization. The final, section five section concludes on the 
implications of the nonviolent social movement for democratization in Ethiopia. 
5.2 The Addis Ababa master plan  
The Addis Ababa Master Plan was a 25-year long-term project of the Ethiopian government 
aiming to expand the territory of the capital city (Addis Ababa City, 2014). The first 
preparations for the plan, which date back to 2009, reportedly began by establishing a project 
office, named the Addis Ababa City Planning Project Office, with a mandate to prepare a ten-
year master plan for the city, which aimed to include basic infrastructure to attract investors 
into newly created industrial zones. Then, in 2012, the city administration modified the 
mandate of the project office to prepare a metropolitan master plan, which would expand the 
capital's jurisdiction to include the surrounding towns and villages of the Oromia region.  
According to one activist, the Plan was formally published in 2014 without meaningful 
consultations with the affected communities36. The plan aimed to expand Addis Ababa by 1.1 
million hectares deep into the neighbouring Oromia region, which raised concerns among many 
Oromos about compensation and adequate protection for families who could face evictions. 
Similar forceful evictions had already been occurring in the past in Oromia, particularly linked 
to the government's promotion of private sector agricultural investment since 2005 (Lavers, 
2012: 126). The Oromo protests soon began when students across Oromia protested against 
this plan. Ethiopia was then rocked by an unprecedented wave of popular protests in the years 
preceding Abiy's appointment as the country's prime minister in April 2018. 
However, the waves of protest movements that rocked Ethiopia between 2014-2018 did not 
come out of the blue, as there were several indicators pointing to a social explosion in the 
country. There were three other movements in the early years preceding the outbreak of the 
protests, which fed into the 2014-2018 political events. The first was the Dimtsachin Yisema 
(“Let Our Voices Be Heard”) movement of Ethiopian Muslims, which introduced an innovative 
mode of resistance rejecting violence on the Ethiopian political scene between 2011 and 2014, 
while protesting against government interference in religious affairs (Allo and Ibrahim, 2012). 
The second was the #BoycottBedele campaign launched by Oromo activists online in 2013, 
continuing into early 2014. They urged beer drinkers in Ethiopia to abandon Bedele products, 
as well as pressure the company to stop sponsoring the musical tour of Ethiopian pop singer 
 




Teddy Afro for his eulogies of past Ethiopian rulers such as emperor Menelik II and Haile 
Sellasie (van Beemen, 2019: 1-8). The third was the #OromoFirst campaign, which erupted 
with a question on Al-Jazeera’s ‘The Stream’ to Jawar Mohammed, a prominent activist and 
political analyst: whether he identifies himself as an Oromo or Ethiopian first, to which Jawar 
replied: “I am an Oromo first”, and “Ethiopia is imposed on me"37. An activist38 claimed that 
the version of Ethiopian identity that the activist distance himself was a metaphor for power 
for Amharic-speaking groups, making non-Amharic speakers subordinate.  
His comment on Al-Jazeera sparked a political tsunami, but the unbalanced condemnation of 
Oromo nationalism prompted Oromo activists to turn this opportunity into the hashtag 
#OromoFirst. After the success of this campaign, Oromo activists were able to raise money 
from the diaspora community and launch the Oromo Media Network (OMN) in early 2014. 
Rooted in the “I Am Oromo First” movement, the OMN served as resistance media during the 
2014-2018 protests, its mission was to disarticulate the dominant Ethiopian discourse by 
rearticulating the Oromo struggle. There was also Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT), 
which was founded in 2010 by a group of journalists in exile and became the source of 
alternative voices sharply criticizing the Ethiopian government and covering anti-government 
protests that swept across the country from 2014 to 2018. 
These three preceding movements provided activists with a rich experience of employing social 
media and nonviolent social movements to challenge the status quo as they fed into the 2014-
2018 protest movements. As such, despite the rift between political parties, the campaign 
proved how determined youth can confront the brick wall of injustice, so that the widespread 
public assumption of political divisions between the country’s national groups, instead saw its 
self-healing, which laid the foundation for mass mobilization.   
Thus, the #Oromoprotests campaign took place against the backdrop of these social tensions 
fuelled by multi-layered grievances, so the publication of the Master Plan in April 2014 became 
a rallying point for protesters against the expansion of Addis Ababa. Building on this growing 
discontent, Oromo activists in the diaspora began reuniting with young people at home, 
expanded their networks and translated Gene Sharp's famous book on nonviolent movements 
into Oromo language, promoting nonviolent methods that have inspired engagement in 
advocacy and anti-authoritarian resistance (Siraj et al, 2011).  Gene Sharp was a significant 
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theorist of nonviolent action following Mohandas K. Gandhi and is known to have founded the 
field of academic research on the theory and strategic practice of nonviolent action, based on 
his tenacious analysis of Gandhi (King, 2011). In short, as this book on the nonviolent 
movement had already been secretly circulated to Oromo students at various universities, the 
announcement of the Master Plan in April 2014 marked a decisive turning point in the struggle 
of the Oromo people, making it relatively easy to mobilize youth as concerns about the fate of 
farmers on the land that the government wanted to transfer to Addis Ababa was clearly 
articulated. 
5.3 Phases of the recent youth protest movements. 
When protests broke out in Oromia in early 2014, they were largely against the imposition of 
Addis Ababa's controversial Master Plan, but the government's failure to properly address the 
concerns raised by the protesters and its continuation of repression pushed the protesters to 
rediscover past grievances and expand their support bases to demand for eventual regime 
change. Hence, based on the demands made by the demonstrators, the protester mobilization 
strategy, the reactions of other groups such as the international community and the 
government's response to the protests, the discussion in this section puts major political events 
during the Amhara uprising and Oromo protests in perspective, dividing it into phases. The 
analysis in the next two phases focuses more on the Oromo protests, because it was this protest 
that erupted before the Amhara uprising, while the remaining analysis in the chapter covers the 
roles that all actors played in the protest movements, including the Oromo protests, Amhara 
uprising, and the reformers faction of the ruling party. 
5.3.1 First round protests 
The first round of the protests erupted on April 12, 2014, when students of Jimma University 
staged a demonstration on campus demanding the scrapping of the Master Plan that Addis 
Ababa announced in early January, an academic said39. The ways in which public discussion 
took place during the workshop on the plan in Adama on 13 April played an important role in 
spreading and mobilizing the public protests. In response to workshop participants who 
complained that the Master Plan was superimposed without consulting the Oromo people, the 
TPLF authorities emphasized the irreversibility of its implementation, a government official 
 




from Oromia explained40. Oromo activists followed this refusal of TPLF officials with 
mobilization of the wider public.  
Thus, protest against the project quickly spread to universities and schools throughout Oromia. 
On April 25, students at Ambo University staged a protest and put popular indignation into 
action. Students from other universities and schools have taken similar steps. The main issue 
and demands of the protests in the first round were the cancellation of the proposed Master 
Plan. One activist claimed that protesters chanted: “Finfinneen handhura Oromiyaati41”, which 
can be translated as “Addis Ababa, the navel of Oromia”, demanding the historical claim of 
the Oromo people to their capital, as well as sending a protest message that the Master Plan 
violates the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of the region.  
The first round of protests was mainly concentrated in the western and south-eastern parts of 
the region. The main feature of this round of protest was its concentration in educational 
institutions, in which mainly schoolchildren and university students participated. Another 
feature of this protest is the silence of non-Oromo groups and international communities over 
the government's brutal reaction to Oromo youths who had staged protests against entrenched 
authoritarianism in the country. In response to this silence, according to the activist, the Oromo 
youths chanted: "Oromoo walmalee fira hin qabnu42”, which means "Oromo, we just have 
ourselves!" This kind of emotion among the demonstrators helped to create internal solidarity 
and collective action among the youth to overcome their predicament, emphasizing the 
importance of self-reliance and aggressive engagement in diplomacies.   
Despite the widespread Oromo opposition, both at home and in the diaspora, the regime did 
not abandon the Master Plan. Instead of entertaining peacefully the protesters' questions, the 
EPRDF government opted for violent mechanisms, blaming them as anti-peace elements, and 
accusing the students under the anti-terrorism proclamation 652/2009. The regular army was 
also deployed in schools and small towns, killing over 47 people, injuring, and detaining many 
more and most of the killings occurred in Ambo town, the epicentre of the Oromo protests 
(BBC News Africa, 2014).  
However, as recounted by another activist, the atrocities against Oromo’s youth had 
unexpected consequences in changing the attitude of those Oromos who were indifferent to the 
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ongoing struggle, prompting them to join the movement43. This not only created a reaction that 
reflects the disgust caused by atrocities committed against students, but also national solidarity 
among the Oromo. It could be said that this was the moment when the attitude of many Oromo 
towards the Ethiopian state began to take on a negative turn, making it clear that regaining 
control over the region was a condition for the exercise of their human rights. Thus, this was a 
fundamental change to the demands of the protesters, whose initial complaint was against the 
publication of the Addis Ababa Master Plan. 
5.3.2 Second round protests 
The second round of the protests, which ran from November 12, 2015 to the end of December 
2015, was not only stronger, but the demands of the protesters expanded, taking advantage of 
a surge of new discontents and rediscovering past grievances of the Oromo people over land 
grabbing, constitutional Oromia’s special interests in Addis Ababa, marginalization, impunity 
of the security forces, and authoritarianism. 
As the EPRDF regime did not respond to the legitimate demands of the demonstrators in the 
first round, a new round of protests was inevitably expected, which resumed a few months after 
the government declared its 100% victory in the 2015 elections. The pre-election period in May 
2015 prompted the government to temporarily suspend the city expansion project, fearing that 
continued implementation of the Master Plan would entail significant risks for the OPDO, the 
ruling regional party of the EPRDF coalition, in the 2015 elections. As expected, the 
government began to implement the Master Plan immediately in the post-election period.  
On November 12, 2015, in the small town of Ginchi, about 80 km west of Addis Ababa, the 
decision of the local authorities to remove the forest and football field for the investment project 
reignited massive protests that continued into early 2018. The Ginchi event was linked to the 
various historical grievances of the Oromo community against the successive Ethiopian 
regimes, so it sparked protests that dragged the surrounding areas into a wider wave of action 
in the next weeks and months and spread to several other parts of the region. In this round, the 
news sparked protest, first in Ambo, then in Mendi, towns west of Addis Ababa, and 
immediately spread throughout Oromia. Oromo people responded in unison to the nationwide 
call of Oromo youth, which, among other things, according to one activist, chanted that “we 
 




were supressed together, so we have to stand together to regain the rights and freedoms that 
God had given us44”. 
Like the protests of the first round, the second round of protests was aimed primarily at 
cancelling the Addis Ababa Master Plan. However, unlike its precursors, the second round of 
protests was widespread throughout the region. This time, the protests affected not only the 
towns and their suburbs, but also the rural areas of the region, allowing farmers to play a 
decisive role in organizing and conducting the rallies, which forced concessions to the demand 
of the protesters.  
Consequently, as of January 2016, after the failure of intense crackdowns and a 100% electoral 
victory, faced with tens of thousands of mostly peaceful Oromo protesters across the region, 
the regime was forced to make concessions. An interviewee, who is a member of the Oromia 
regional council, claimed that at the three-day emergency meeting held in Adama, the OPDO 
Central Committee announced the government's decision to pursue the “special interests” of 
the state of Oromia in Addis Ababa that were recognized in article 49 of the federal 
constitution, abandoning the proposed Master Plan and recognized the protesters' demands as 
fair and legitimate45. The fact that the regime, which had rejected the legitimate demands as 
agendas of anti-peace elements and declared Oromo activists and demonstrators as terrorists, 
was forced to make this concession, was a great victory for the protesters.   
Protesters hailed the concession as a hard-fought victory, but by this time, the demands of the 
protesters had grown much wider. A veteran politician said cancelling the Master Plan was too 
little and too late to stop the protests46. By that time, the protesters were talking not only about 
the plan, but about the brutal response of the security forces to the protests, the jailing of 
students and women, and the decades of discrimination that Oromo experienced. Its 
cancellation had little effect on the protesters as they lost confidence in the government, so 
protests continued, building on a surge of new discontent and rediscovering past grievances. 
The government’s reaction to the protests of the second round was worse than the reaction to 
the first round. From the very beginning, the protest movement was accused of being infiltrated 
by rebel groups such as the OLF, which the government called a terrorist organization 
supported by outside forces, such as Eritrea and Egypt. These kinds of labels were actively 
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used to discredit the protesters and to justify the deployment of the Anti-Terrorism Task Force 
in the region, which was eventually deployed on December 15, 2015. Added to this were the 
arrests of several opposition figures and their members, such as the prominent human rights 
activist Bekele Gerba of the Oromo-Federalist Congress, said an opposition politician47.    
Despite threats from the government, Oromo youth continued their struggle to defend the 
autonomy of their region and the rights of the Oromo people. Even with the brutal violence in 
which the regime tried to quell the protests, hardly a day had passed without mass 
demonstrations, often occurring simultaneously in several cities, towns, and districts of 
Oromia. In the diaspora, media such as the Oromo Media Network (OMN) has played an 
important role in connecting remote parts of Oromia with diaspora communities around the 
world. Relying on this source and through other networks such as Facebook and Twitter, 
Oromo youth actively participated in online campaigns that attracted the attention of the 
international community starting from the end of 2015. Following the adoption of a strong 
resolution by European Parliament that condemns the use of excessive force by the security 
forces in Oromia48 in January 2016 and the US State Department statements on the situation in 
Ethiopia, the international community's silence on the violence against Oromo youths was 
lifted. As this appeal to the international community began to gain attention, non-Oromo groups 
who were silent also began to express their actions of solidarity with the protests in Oromia, 
while the demands of the protesters this time expanded to include respect for human rights and 
expanding democratic space.  
5.3.3 Third round protests 
In 2016, the third round of protests, which lasted from late January to July, was not only 
widespread, but also attracted other regions to join the movement. Despite the termination of 
the Master Plan, these protests began in Guder West Shewa Oromia zone, and in February they 
escalated to an unprecedented level, spreading to other areas, but the demands in this round 
were different from its predecessors. This round of protests was triggered by the fact that, 
despite recognizing the protesters' demands as just and legitimate, the regime did not take any 
concrete actions in support of the concessions made in January. The regime also continued to 
view youth protests as a terrorist operation to justify the use of force, so the decision to halt the 
controversial Master Plan that initially sparked the protests could not end the crisis.  
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By mid-February 2016, in the West Arsi in Oromia, near the town of Shashamene, federal 
police arrested a bus full of wedding guests singing Oromo songs in honour of brides and 
grooms. Police claimed that Oromo activists were about to foment protests. The incident 
sparked clashes between crowds of local farmers gathered around the bus and the federal 
police. Police quickly used their weapons indiscriminately, causing multiple deaths and 
inflicting heavy damage in the nearby towns of Siraro, Shala and Shashamene (BBC News 
Africa, 2016). Police violence continued for almost a week. Led mostly by high school and 
university students, the new protests quickly gained momentum after they quickly spread to 
over 400 different locations across the Oromia region, with farmers, government officials and 
other groups now joining the students (Kelecha, 2019).  
One of the key political developments in this round, according to one activist, was that the non-
Oromo groups began to openly express their actions of solidarity with the protests in the 
Oromia region49. The persistence of Oromo protests in the face of the government’s harsh 
reaction inspired other regions to air their grievances, especially Amhara region, where the 
persecution and imprisonment of many outspoken individuals who were members of the 
Committee advocating for the reintegration of the Wolqait area into Amhara and other groups 
advocating for the identity issues of the Qemant people, together spawned an uprising in 
Amhara region since late July 2016.  
Amhara activists claimed that the administrative district of Wolqait was part of Gonder in the 
present Amhara region, but following the seizure of state power by the TPLF in 1991 and the 
introduction of a new federal structure, it was placed under the Tigray region50. The public had 
already deep grievances with these actions, so protests erupted as security forces tried to arrest 
Wolqait's self-determination and identity committee leader, Colonel Demeke Zewdu, on 
terrorism charges. There were as well repeated rumours about the transfer of border lands to 
Sudan which were spread by opposition groups and the diaspora in the United States. The 
Ethiopian Satellite Television and Radio (ESAT), a Washington-based opposition television 
station, repeatedly aired these issues. A politician said online activism and ESAT provided 
space to articulate Amhara's grievances, which soon escalated into the Amhara uprising and 
spread to Debre Tabor, Bahir Dar, Debre Markos, as well as other towns and districts across 
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the region, taking advantage of a prolonged surge of anger against what they perceived as a 
discriminatory regime towards the entire population of Amhara51.   
Mass protests in the country's two largest regions, Amhara, and Oromia, quickly began to 
reflect and reinforce each other's indignation against the regime's repressive practices and this 
spawned a strong national movement. As the regime continued to militarily respond to all 
political demands in both regions, these still competing movements, the Amhara uprising, and 
Oromo protests, began to feel more united to express dissatisfaction with the dominant position 
of the TPLF and the lack of rule of law and gross violations of human rights, for which there 
was no accountability.  
In a nutshell, the third round of protests was widespread and engulfed the country, attracting 
other regions to join the movement and voice their grievances. As usual, the government 
continued to use excessive force against demonstrators and accused foreign elements of 
inciting protests. An activist, who used to organize public solidarity actions in London, said 
that as government repression against protesters worsened significantly as the movement grew, 
protesters also continued to expand their demands and were determined to find their own 
delivery52. By expanding their support base, the third round of protests mainly focused on 
issues of autonomy and rights enshrined in the constitution, as well as on the demand to bring 
to justice those security officials and politicians who violated the law and committed atrocities 
against the protesters. 
5.3.4 Fourth round protests 
The fourth round of protests, which ran from August to September 2016, marked a turning 
point in the youth protest movement for several reasons. In August 2016, two major events 
took place: the first was a Grand rally, and the second was the solidarity protests of athlete 
Feyisa Lelisa at the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro. Third, after September 2016, activists 
applied new tactics of civil disobedience that attracted widespread attention, further fuelling 
the protests.   
August 6, 2016 was very important to the youth organizing the protest movements because the 
grand rally showed a clear departure from previous demonstrations in terms of coordination 
and mobilization. This rally was the first ever Oromia-wide protest, which mobilized more than 
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200 districts and 20 zonal cities in the region on the same day including the capital Addis 
Ababa. It marked the culmination of a year-long demonstrations and served to express the 
youth’s collective grievance and suffering at the hands of the EPRDF regime, reflecting, 
according to one activist, ‘a shared desire for a just peace’53. The protests were unprecedented 
in scope, and hundreds of thousands of people took part in these largely non-violent protests 
(Horne, 2016). The rally demonstrated the ability of online diaspora and social media activism 
in an authoritarian country with limited internet penetration, an activist argued54.   
One of the protest leaders said that the grand rally came at a time when the regime lost all 
possible reasons to hide its authoritarian practices, placing self-interest and repression over 
justice, equality, and democracy55. This indicates that the demonstrators united in their anger 
and indignation against the brutality of the military towards the civilian population. Thousands 
of people also marched in solidarity with the youth demonstrators, especially in Gondar and 
Bahir Dar in Amhara region, with protesters seen carrying banners expressing this solidarity 
(BBC News Africa, 2016). This created a sense of marching in the company of all the people 
who were offended by the regime’s ruthless dictatorial practice. As one activist explained, “the 
youth protesters categorically and unequivocally expressed their rejection of the regime at this 
rally, urging them to uphold justice, equality, and freedom for all”56.  
There were also other reasons that made this grand rally unmatched when compared to other 
protests in the past. One of the reasons was that the residents of Addis Ababa managed to 
openly voice their grievance at a demonstration that took place in Meskel square at the heart 
of the capital, braving the harsh security measures of the authorities. The second reason was 
that the grand rally had a significant impact on the protest movements, signalling the end of 
the EPRDF regime, clearing the doubts among the public as to whether it was a movement or 
a protest. On August 6, 2016, when Oromo and Amhara activists organized a nationwide 
protest joining in solidarity, they realized that they had created a unified, disciplined, and 
national movement so that they had the confidence and ability to unleash their utmost effort to 
put an end to the EPRDF’s rule in Ethiopia. Thus, the rally made it clear that the protests were 
no longer a protest against one issue, rather a movement aiming to end the rule of EPRDF 
regime.  
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The defiance of athlete Feyisa Lelisa at the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, crossing his 
arms over his head - a symbol of the youth resistance - was another vital political event in this 
round that added another monumental significance to the mass protests. The athlete’s gesture 
came directly from the nonviolent resistance movement that was organizing demonstrations 
across Oromia and Amhara regions. A dozen international media interested in the meaning of 
his symbol went further, covering the protest movements in Ethiopia, presenting the story of 
how Feyisa Lelisa won silver for running, but gold for bravery. An athlete, who is herself a 
gold medallist, said Lelisa used the Olympics stage as a venue to draw the attention of the 
international community to injustice and symbolize the death of democracy in Ethiopia57.  
While the grand rally in August 2016 created a movement of national protests, the defiance of 
athlete Feyisa created international awareness of the youth protests. This led to the fact that the 
regime came under heavy pressure due to the youth protests in the country and pressure from 
the international community and the media from the outside. Lelisa's solidarity action served 
as a call for global public consciousness. An academic explained that the story was covered by 
international media for several weeks and marked a turning point for the activists, who until 
then needed global attention58. Hence, activists used this opportunity to fit into their narrative 
of the protest movements. One activist explained that for the first time the protesters got the 
opportunity to be heard by a global audience59. 
Along with attracting the attention of the international community, Lelisa’s bold actions had a 
diplomatic influence on the Ethiopian government: it put the Western allies in an awkward 
position, exposing their silence about massive human rights violations in Ethiopia. EPRDF 
authorities could no longer dismiss the causes of protests as an act of what they described as a 
handful of extremist saboteurs in the diaspora and neighbouring countries such as Egypt and 
Eritrea.  
It is clear that the youth protesters had global networks and global connections, as technological 
advances allowed new structures such as satellite TV channels and social media to play an 
increasingly important role in mobilizing youth across the country, facilitating engagement 
with the diaspora. Noting the role of the mainstream and social media in mobilizing the public, 
the government passed cyber legislation restricting online activity and also designated media 
such as the Oromia Media Network (OMN) and Ethiopian Satellite TV (ESAT) as terrorist 
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media. Diaspora solidarity rallies in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Europe have 
been held in support of the youth movement and to hold the Ethiopian government and its allies 
accountable for development and security assistance given to the regime. Moreover, there was 
a humanitarian aid team in the diaspora that, through local networks, provided coordinated and 
effective assistance to victims of security forces. There were also groups that supported 
diplomatic efforts in a strategic and coordinated manner to help fight to end TPLF's dominance. 
Feyisa's actions contributed to the mobilization of such diaspora solidarity actions, which 
further strengthened the protest movement as it attracted the attention of the international 
community. 
In addition to solidarity protests across the diaspora, political prisoners Bekele Gerba and 
others declared a three-day national mourning, which began on August 25, 2016. In response 
to a letter smuggled from prison, citizens shaved their heads and dressed in black clothes as a 
sign of solidarity with the imprisoned protesters and of grief over those who were killed by 
government security forces. In Ethiopian cultures, shaved head and black clothes are part of 
the process of mourning after the death of a loved one. One opposition politician explained that 
the protesters used local culture as a way to resist the regime, urging people to mourn those 
who were martyred and visit the families of the martyrs and those who were hospitalized with 
injuries sustained during the peaceful protest60.  
Building on these achievements, the protest movements entered a new phase in September 
2016, as the protesters started to apply a new set of tactics of civil disobedience known as 
nonviolent coercion. Nonviolent coercion is a mechanism of change in nonviolent action by 
which protesters' demands are met against the will of the regime, undermining, or wresting the 
regime's effective control over the situation through widespread non-cooperation and defiance 
(Sharp, 2012). Changes in tactics and strategy of resistance used during this round were the 
result of the continued atrocities that the protesters faced with the security forces. Accordingly, 
protests in Oromia and Amhara regions, changing their strategies, demanded a weekly boycott 
of the market, measures aimed at using their resources more effectively to support the people's 
struggle for freedom, while putting pressure on the financial basis of the regime, which has 
since become an integral part of their struggle.  
Protesters deliberately chose the festive seasons, especially the weeks leading up to major 
holidays since intense economic activity is always observed at this time. One opposition 
 




politician explained that the activists mobilized people not to spend a cent if that would impede 
their struggle61. An activist also explained that the market boycott campaign was used not only 
to weaken the economic power of the regime, but also to distinguish between businesses that 
meet people's needs for social justice and those that support the oppressive system62. Activists 
negotiated with farmers, business owners and merchants to refrain from delivering their 
products to the markets of major cities. Merchants and businesses who violated the call for a 
boycott were considered as the TPLF supporters, therefore, their business activity and 
movements were interrupted. A civil engineering graduate who made a living driving Bajaj 
explained that elders played an important role in mediating between protesters and business 
owners, mostly encouraging business owners to cooperate positively by closing their 
businesses during market boycotts63.   
The stay-at-home campaign aimed at avoiding mobility, except for time in churches or 
mosques for prayer with people of their faith. Everyone remained at home, remembering their 
martyrs, and reflecting on the strategies and tactics of their struggle for the next steps. For 
example, the initial premise of these measures was that, because of the huge contribution of 
the Oromia region to the country's economy, the Oromo protesters believed that they 
themselves had financed the killing machine, which the TPLF used to kill their children, so it 
was necessary to stop it. An activist explained that “these actions were not an ordinary measure, 
as they required enormous economic sacrifices, nonetheless activists had no choice but to resort 
to these temporary economic sacrifices because the lives of the entire generation were at 
stake”64. This was a legitimate concern expressed by the campaigners and successfully served 
the purpose. The attack on the economic system that feeds the TPLF regime was considered as 
a reward to protesters who waged a national struggle for emancipation.  
The measures were also aimed at conveying the movement's message and spreading the new 
acts of resistance in ordinary places of people's daily life, so the newly adopted nonviolent 
actions seriously made resistance a household item. For example, boycotting the Ethiopian 
Commercial Bank (CBE) service was one of such measures taken by activists in this round of 
protests. People were encouraged to use private banks instead of the CBE for their banking 
needs, so that they could reduce government revenues. Ethiopian diaspora communities around 
 
61 Ibid  
62 Interviewee Nr. 2, Activist, April 8, 2019, Addis Ababa. 
63 Interviewee Nr. 25, A Bajaj driver, May 9, 2019, Adama.  




the world were also advised to use alternative methods of sending remittances and avoided 
transferring to CBE accounts. In this regard, one academic explained that “the residents of 
towns like Nekemte and Ambo literally took all their money from state-owned banks, 
observing the demands of the boycott campaign. When such news spread, the government 
immediately turned off the Internet and the telephone line, and CBE refused to allow people to 
withdraw their own money”65.  
As human resources are also the most important source of power for an authoritarian regime, 
activists pushed for the country's bureaucracy to join non-cooperation or stay at home actions 
to make the administrative apparatus ungovernable as they represent important people and 
groups who obey, cooperate, or help the system operate. Such measures helped the protest 
movement boldly project social issues, allowing everyone to participate in the protests in every 
possible way. Acts of resistance manifested themselves in all their diversity in the public daily 
life, as soon as the boycotts and stay-at-home campaigns began, which made the story of youth 
protests part of the history of everyday political resistance. The protests in this round, beside 
carrying voices in the search for justice, had an incredibly successful, mostly non-violent, 
resistance that restored their power and undermined the regime's ability to control and oppress. 
They remained committed to horizontal peace, despite provocations by the regime's 
sympathisers, against other ethnic groups, especially ethnic Tigrayans (Gardner, 2018). 
All of the above tactics of protest have demonstrated the growing maturity of civil disobedience 
in Ethiopia, as activists followed a commendable non-violent form of resistance, thereby not 
only demonstrating complete rejection of the regime, but also dampening the false narrative 
that the regime used to label them as terrorists. The regime’s partners also continued to express 
deep concern and were urged to allow the United Nations to investigate serious human rights 
violations in the country. However, the regime knew that allowing the UN investigation would 
expose the unspeakable atrocities that the world did not pay due attention, so the regime 
rejected all international calls for independent investigations (Horne, 2017).  
5.3.5 Fifth round protests 
The fifth-round protests that lasted from October 2016 to the end of July 2017 are linked to the 
stampede that killed many people during the October Irreecha festival in Bishoftu, a town fifty 
kilometres from the capital, and the subsequent declaration of a state of emergency by the 
 




federal government. Irreecha is a most important cultural Thanksgiving festival of the Oromo 
people, where millions gather to celebrate the end of the rainy season and welcome the harvest 
season (Regassa and Zelek, 2016). Attendees usually use the gathering as an opportunity to 
sing resistance songs, express their grievances, condemn human rights violations, and demand 
respect for their rights. Thus, October 2, 2016 hoped to be an important day for the youth, 
especially those at the forefront of the protest movement, to seize the opportunity to reaffirm 
their determination to continue the struggle with a new spirit and strength. 
However, the regime also sought to use the opportunity for its own political gain, as this time 
coincided with UNESCO's inscription of the Gada system, the indigenous democratic socio-
political system of the Oromo people, on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural 
World Heritage of Humanity in 2016 (UNESCO, 2016). An activist claimed that government 
officials massively transported their members and supporters to Bishoftu, where a celebration 
was held with instructions to block anti-government protesters66. A government official 
explained that, deliberately ignoring the sacred cultural norms of the Thanksgiving events, 
some authorities tried to take over the festival stage, but youth activists blocked them and booed 
the impostors off the stage67. The chaos, tensions and anger over these machinations quickly 
turned to unified expressions of protest. The crowds held up crossed wrists above their heads 
– a popular gesture that had by then become the symbol of resistance.    
The mood at the festival shifted as youth started chanting and singing resistance songs. One 
activist explained that “it was in the midst of such a peaceful protest that Ethiopian military 
helicopters began to fly over the crowd at low altitude, escalating fear, and tensions. But, 
defying the military efforts to intimidate the crowd, the protesters moved forward and some of 
them took the stage”68. Another interviewee who attended the festival further explained that 
while these machinations were taking place, a student named Gemeda Wario grabbed the 
microphone from one of the speakers on stage and echoed the budding revolution that heralded 
the end of TPLF rule; chanting in English: "Down, Down, Woyane!"69. Woyane is the 
colloquial term for the authoritarian TPLF leaders. The security forces then raised their heavy 
hand against civilian protesters, causing a stampede in which dozens of people died. As usual, 
the funeral service of the victims turned into anti-government protests.  
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According to protesters, the Irreecha atrocities were a planned and coordinated act of revenge 
for the youth protests that had handicapped the state machinery. One activist firstly stated that 
government officials knowingly carried out the act of sabotage to override sacred cultural 
norms. Second, he claimed that federal special commandos were deployed to mingle with 
festival attendees dressed in Oromo cultural clothing to target the protest leaders70. What 
reinforced these claims were the fact that federal authorities disarmed Oromia police ahead of 
festival day, fearing a possible clash with federal security forces, as there were signs that some 
Oromia police officers had begun to refuse to shoot at peaceful demonstrators. This 
arrangement suggests a well organised plot of security forces to provoke a stampede that 
ensured the deaths of people fleeing bullets and tear gas. The stampede at the festival sparked 
sporadic public actions that caused destruction of government institutions, including dozens of 
foreign factories and flower farms they believe had exacerbated their suffering. Anger against 
foreign firms was mostly fuelled by those firms that underpaid their employees, or those that 
protesters said were government accomplices and operated to evict people from their lands 
without creating the promised jobs for the local population. On the other account, many local 
people who were employed in those firms lost their jobs after the destructions. An activist 
explained that protesters defended their actions as evidence that an economic model based on 
a denial of democracy that robs people of their basic human rights will not be sustainable71.  
Declaring a six-month’s state of emergency on November 9, 2016, the EPRDF regime 
intensified its repression, deploying federal military to subside the protest movements. Another 
activist explained that the main goal of the state of emergency was to curb the wave of protests 
in Amhara and Oromia regions by instilling fear in the people's minds, silencing critical voices 
and locking up suspected dissidents, whom the government considered “ringleaders”72. 
Following the visit of German Chancellor Angela Merkel amid the state of emergency in 
October 2016, Prime Minister Hailemariam pledged democratic reforms to ensure proper 
parliamentary representation for Ethiopians. Some opposition representatives also called on the 
government to hold early elections, believing that the crisis could only be resolved through 
new elections. This the government ruled out, indicating the elections would be held on 
schedule in 2020 (Rinke & Maasho, 2016). 
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Instead, the regime began to lean toward an "accommodation" approach to achieve a settlement 
of some demands of youth protests, and as such a settlement was mainly intended to bring some 
positive benefits to the government to defuse tensions and create an impression of "fairness" 
to improve the regime's international image. For example, Prime Minister Hailemariam 
Desalegn announced cabinet reshuffles that gave high-profile ministerial appointments to 
Oromos, replacing some of the TPLF positions with OPDO members. As such, the 
communications minister and government spokesman Getachew Reda, who called the 
protesters “witches” with “satanic” actions (Gabisa, 2016), was removed, and replaced by 
Negeri Lencho, and Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom was also replaced by Workneh 
Gebeyehu (Financial Times, 2016). But unfortunately, this time the cabinet reshuffles did not 
satisfy public discontent, because the protesters had already shifted their demands to regime 
change. Farmers in the troubled West Shewa Oromia region were the first to reject a political 
response in a cabinet reshuffle, as protesters sought a change of government and a new system. 
In the words of one politician, the appointment of few cabinet ministers with Oromo origin was 
a move “too little, too late” to curb protests and was unable to reassure the demonstrators73.    
On the other hand, after the regime ruled out the possibility of holding early voting, according 
to one activist74, the protesters, changing their tactics during this state of emergency, began 
working clandestinely with the Oromo and Amhara nationalist members of the ruling party. 
The activist further explains that an agreement was reached through bargains and negotiations 
between the reforming wing of the ruling party and organizers of the youth protests during 
secret meetings they held in Europe and US. The reform group was convinced that it would not 
be able to continue its closed policy and repressive methods due to pressure from popular 
protests. Thus, the option of political openness and the transition to a democratic system was 
agreed with the organizers of protest movements (Siraj, 2020). After setting these common 
goals, they worked together on a mechanism that allowed nationalist OPDO and ANDM 
members to take charge of the party in defiance of the norms of democratic centralism of the 
ERPDF. This made the OPDO the first party to start destroying democratic centralism when 
on 23 October 2016 it elected Lemma Megersa as party chairman and president of the Oromia 
region. On this occasion, the OPDO for the first time elected its own chairman and president 
of the region, relinquishing leaders that had previously been appointed by the head of the 
TPLF/EPRDF. How the OPDO's new leadership came to power was consequential, making it 
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the first political space in the coalition to challenge the power hierarchy, assisted by the public 
protests that threatened the cohesion of the ruling elite, expanded the capacity of those in need 
of change, and gradually joined popular protests. As the nationalists took over the party, they 
continued to push for changes from within the government, while activists and diaspora groups 
from outside mounted diplomatic pressure on the regime.    
Taking advantage of the regime's misdiagnosis of the state of emergency as playing a 
stabilizing role, activists made a conscious decision to regroup and strategize their struggle, 
transforming street protests into a power struggle between the federal government and regional 
authorities, which were under pressure from mass protests. The former tried to incapacitate the 
regional administration in order to allow the federal army to operate without restriction to 
contain the movement, while the latter opposed the federal government's encroachments on its 
constitutional autonomy and self-rule. Thus, for the first time, the demands of the Oromo 
protests, encapsulated as Abbaa biyummaa (i.e., self-governing Oromia), began to be openly 
defended by the nationalist leaders of the region, which simply turned street resistance into a 
power struggle between hardliners and soft-liners within the government.  
The altercation forced the EPRDF to go through a period of a self-examination and criticism 
in line with the party's norms, to which they agreed for the first time on the need to create an 
independent committee to investigate human rights violations during the state of emergency. 
Again, instead of responding adequately to public discontent, the federal government attempted 
to wash its bloody hands by issuing a report from the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission in 
early April 2017 that publicly accused ODPO officials of being responsible for the deaths 
during the Irreecha celebration on the pretext that they could postpone the festival75. One ODP 
official explained that during the hearing of the EHRC's report in the parliament, as well as in 
cabinet meetings, OPDO officials were held accountable for the atrocities, rather than federal 
officials and security forces that orchestrated the stampede76.   
The report not only angered the nationalist OPDO members, but also solidified the split within 
the ruling EPRDF, federal and regional governments, as the report was a tactic to exempt and 
justify federal authorities who were directly responsible for the stampede and repressions 
inflicted on the non-violent protesters. As the TPLF began losing the battle at the federal and 
regional levels, it changed its strategies and arguably orchestrated conflicts between ethnic 
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Somalis and Oromo, providing military support to the Somali Liyu police to incite violence on 
the Somali-Oromo border areas. Oromo activists have also claimed that Somali Liyu police is 
the creation of the TPLF, toeing the TPLF line, and that many of Liyu's police leaders include 
TPLF military officers (Lefort, 2017). This was to frame the nationalist leaders of Oromia 
region as complacent of the then-outlawed OLF, who unprecedentedly defended their 
autonomy and prevented the federal government from interfering in the region’s affairs, one 
activist explained77. Trapped in a power struggle and intra-elite competition within the ruling 
EPRDF, the two regional governments (Somalia and Oromia) entered into open conflicts, as a 
result of which Somali and Oromo masses suffered collateral damage in this clash. One of the 
Somali officials interviewed stated that more than a million people fled from the Somali region 
of Ethiopia after clashes between Somalis and Oromos, while hundreds of people from both 
sides were killed as a result of clashes78. These conflicts were perpetrated by state actors using 
regional security forces and militias, so it was the government that perpetrated violence against 
the protesters. As such, it should be noted that violent government reactions do not indicate the 
failure of nonviolent method, nor it can be the reason to characterize the movement as violent. 
If one thing the government's violent response indicates is that the nonviolent movement poses 
a serious threat to the dictatorship. In short, with fewer protests during the emergency, there 
could have been real progress in meeting public demands if the regime had been ready. In 
contrast, the TPLF engaged in proxy war with the Oromia regional government and extended 
the state of emergency by four months in March 2017, believing that they would emerge 
victorious with its help.  
5.3.6 Sixth round protests 
The final, which is the sixth phase of the protests took place from August 2017 to April 2018. 
In this round of protests, much of the relationship between the protesters and the police turned 
into friendship. For example, Oromia police began to defend protesters from federal security 
forces. During the economic boycott and the stay-at-home campaign, which activists 
announced after the lifting of the state of emergency in early August 2017, federal security 
forces tried to carry out deadly actions against protesters. Oromia police protected protesters 
in Ambo and this protection has since become more widespread (The Guardian, 2017). This 
was supported by progressive forces within the regime, who began to realize that failing to 
accommodate public grievances would lead the country to a deeper crisis, so new leaders from 
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Oromia and Amhara regions began to openly oppose the disproportionate security response 
seen in indiscriminate shooting during mass protests. 
One Oromia cabinet member convincingly illustrates the above fact as follows: "then-President 
Lemma Megersa openly welcomed the protesters' demands, tried to exercise the region's 
constitutional power, resolve some of the popular grievances and managed to prevent military 
intervention during demonstrations in different parts of the country"79. President Lemma also 
took measures on investment projects that acted in violation of the rules and regulations, 
revoking their license, and returning unused land illegally controlled by investors to the state 
land bank (Addis Fortune, 2017). Regional television such as the Oromia Broadcasting 
Network (OBN) and the Amhara Media Corporation (AMC) in an unprecedented way began 
to broadcast public discontent directly without censorship.  
More importantly, the solidarity between the Amhara uprising and the Oromo protests got 
official recognition from the forces governing the two regions in November 2017, when the 
OPDO reached out to ANDM in a spirit of solidarity and cooperation. This gave the protestors 
legitimacy in the official politics of the country, which they did not have in the past, and 
therefore strengthened the desire to put an end to the dominance of the TPLF. However, the 
broader alliance established by the OPDO and ANDM to wrestle power away from the TPLF 
was tactical from the outset, and not strategically anchored on a shared political vision. 
Evidence of this is the continuing tension between the Amhara and Oromo branches of the 
newly formed Prosperity Party over the type of federal system needed for the country's future, 
as well as the country's constitution. Ethiopia’s political history shows the difficulties faced by 
the main elites of Oromo and Amhara to ally themselves durably. The TPLF often tried to use 
ethnic and ideological cleavages between Oromo and Amhara as a political tool to legitimize 
and strengthen its political and economic dominance, as well as to precipitate the fall of popular 
movements (Kelecha, 2019).  
However, the persistence of the youth protest movements provided an incentive for community 
solidarity to overcome divisions, at least temporarily. The tactical alliance between the ANDM 
and OPDO was an unprecedented blow to the TPLF, as it forced the TPLF to hold a long 
meeting that took about 35 days from November to early December 2017. At the last critical 
moment of the country and with deep paralysis within the party, the TPLF was subject to self-
examination and criticism, which remained the only way to fight for survival. And then, in 
 




December 2017, the EPRDF Executive Council held a meeting that lasted 17 days amid 
divisions between hardliners and groups within the party that needed change. In response to 
the ANDM and OPDO's demands for an end to TPLF dominance during the meeting, one 
official from Oromia clarified that TPLF had proposed to dissolve EPRDF and form a strong 
merger party, which OPDO and ANDM rejected as the merger would reverse their gains and 
weaken their assertiveness80.  
After the meeting, the leaders of the four coalition parties appeared on television to admit and 
acknowledge their wrongfulness, as well as to take responsibility for it, and appealed to the 
population with a request for time and calm while they try to solve the problems. EPRDF 
leaders made it clear that the lack of unity of purpose and action, the lack of democracy, mutual 
distrust, and erosion of the party’s commitment to people's demands, were the main problems 
diagnosed at the meeting, emphasizing that TPLF dominance played a negative role in the 
development of the country's democratic process. Although they admitted their problems, they 
could not work in harmony with each other. They began to act alone and in competition, 
demonstrating the fact that the ruling EPRDF was eaten alive from the inside, leading the party 
to a troubled state, lost, stumbling, and at a crossroads. As a result, the TPLF's position within 
the EPRDF weakened and it lost the ability to act as its own power structure began to collapse, 
lacking even the appearance of control over them. This signalled almost the collapse of the 
regime. At last, the EPRDF's balance of power divided, eventually empowering the group that 
needed change to take the lead, offering an alternative future for the EPRDF and Ethiopia.  
With support from the youth movements in Amhara and Oromia regions, the soft-liners in the 
ruling EPRDF pushed the party towards further serious reforms, leading to the resignation of 
Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn on February 15, 2018 (Washington Post, 2018). A 
second state of emergency was also declared the day after Hailemariam’s resignation, mainly 
to subdue tensions within the EPRDF by placing the country under military control. The 
resignation was another great concession to the Oromo protests and Amhara uprising that 
already created a rift between hardliners and soft-liners in the ruling coalition. Encouraged by 
the protests in the two regions, which created a general atmosphere of ungovernability, the 
ANDM and OPDO outplayed the TPLF in the selection process of the party chairman that led 
to the election of Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minister on April 2, 2018.   
 




In short, Abiy’s rise to power brought a promise of fundamental changes, which were 
characterised by numerous political reforms. By embarking on legislative reform to increase 
political participation and inclusion, measures such as opening up political spaces, the release 
of political prisoners, the repeal of harsh laws restricting civil society organizations and the 
media, the return of exiled opposition political groups, and peace rapprochement with Eritrea 
had received widespread international media coverage and earned Abiy the 2019 Nobel Peace 
Prize. This created an atmosphere of "Abiy-mania" with almost all Ethiopians rallying behind 
him, leading to a gradual slowdown in street protests. However, the honeymoon period quickly 
ended, and Abiy’s popularity has gradually given way to growing scepticisms and open 
opposition (Østebø and Tronvoll, 2020: 619).  
5.4 Post-protest road to democracy 
There are several ways in which anti-authoritarian protests affect the transition to democracy. 
First, anti-authoritarian protests can lead to democratic reforms through complete 
disintegration and overthrow of the incumbent regimes. Huntington (1993) called this path of 
linking anti-regime protests to democracy "replacement". Second, anti-authoritarian protests 
can push for democratic reform, forcing the incumbent elite to make concessions, creating 
divisions among the elite through negotiations between regime soft-liners and the opposition. 
O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue that with the drive coming from popular mobilization, 
soft-liners distinguish themselves from hardliners in their increased awareness that the regime 
they have created or in which they hold important positions must benefit from some form of 
democratic legitimacy. Huntington (1993) called this process "transformation." This path also 
corresponds to what Gene Sharp (2012) referred to as “conversion”. Third, another possibility 
that can potentially achieve democratization, given sufficient pressure through protests and 
pressure from the international community, is a negotiated transition between the opposition 
and ruling parties. Huntington (1993) also called this process “transplacement”. This process 
is believed to coerce the ruling party and the opposition to negotiate the transition, which is 
guided by a jointly developed roadmap. Fourth, anti-authoritarian protests can also push elites, 
such as the military, as in Sudan, to overthrow the incumbent and offer political concessions 
under the existing regime or through a new coalition (Berridge, 2020). 
Some of the above scenarios’ characteristics can be traced in the chronological analysis of 
recent political dynamics presented in this chapter. However, as indicated in the introduction, 




what Gene Sharp referred as conversion. In the case of Ethiopia, the overthrow of the regime 
was dangerous given the fact that the state, government, and party are merged. Moreover, since 
Ethiopia is an ethnically fragmented state with a mobilized, polarized, and intensified 
contending nationalism, the overthrow of the ruling party raised fears among protesting public 
that the process could lead to the collapse of the government and even the state. The non-
existence of credible and viable opposition political parties operating in the country, as well as 
the fragmentation of the ruling party following the death of strongman Meles Zenawi, made 
the transition through transplacement also unviable, as reaching binding and reliable 
negotiations was difficult. Hence, activists openly advocated a transition through 
transformation or conversion, as this scenario was viable in the case of Ethiopia, because 
activists knew that popular protests had already created a rift within the ruling party, and the 
soft-liners began to distinguish themselves from the hardliners. The results of the Arab Spring, 
such as the collapse of Libya, Syria and Yemen, also reinforced the belief that attempts to 
overthrow the EPRDF regime would pose a threat to Ethiopia, protester leaders argued81. 
There are also various mechanisms that the protesters use to bring about the collapse of 
authoritarian regimes, such as undermining the legitimacy of the incumbent regime and 
creating new relationships and resources that increase the solidarity of protesters to overcome 
barriers to mobilization (della Porta, 2014), exposing regime crackdown to shape international 
diplomacy, condemning repression (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Security officials may object to 
repression for moral reasons or fear of persecution and public retribution, and this latter case 
was crucial for the military defection during the Arab Spring (Nepstad, 2013). Such 
mechanisms allowed the removal of authoritarian regimes and leaders such as Omar al-Bashir 
in Sudan, Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt, and the TPLF in Ethiopia. But ultimately 
democratization must take place through reforms and negotiations between politicians, with 
popular mobilization to strengthen the negotiating power of the opposition groups in need of 
democratization (Slater & Wong, 2013).  
Be that as it may, while these actions may increase the likelihood of regime collapse, for anti-
regime protests to increase the likelihood of a democratic transition, they must be non-violent. 
Social movement theorists argue that the goals and organizational structure of nonviolent 
movements are more likely to contribute to democratic process than the goals and 
organizational structure of violent movements. As such, the goals of nonviolent regime change 
 




and democratization movements are more attractive to social groups and regime elites than 
violent movements (Gleditsch et al, 2015). Moreover, the organizational structures of 
nonviolent movements also tend to be more horizontal, which promotes power sharing, 
bargaining and negotiations, compromise, and openness (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013). In this 
perspective, the key result of the Oromo and Amhara protest movements was the mobilization 
of youths in defiance of the TPLF, solidifying their resistance and expanding the social base of 
the movement, which proved to be broad enough to challenge the status quo and topple a deeply 
entrenched authoritarian regime. In particular, the expanding social base of the protest 
movements, which remained largely leaderless and clandestine, relied on non-traditional forms 
of organization and communication, and focused on broad demands such as regime change and 
broad-based democratic reform. These characteristics of protest movements meant that it 
allowed the protesters to spiral out of control and withstand the state's repressive apparatus, 
gathering international condemnation and solidarity action against the EPRDF regime.  
However, these same natures of the movements, such as becoming clandestine and somewhat 
leaderless, also limited the movement’s potential to exploit the political opportunities created 
after the fall of the authoritarian regime. Indeed, the post-protest environment is one in which 
the dominant theme is the return of the “old”. This is largely taking the form of re-applying old 
regime tactics to solidify the interests of new elites who played a role during the protests, 
positioning themselves well to secure an advantage over the opposition in the post-protest 
environment.  
Moreover, the results of this chapter are partly consistent with della Porta's (2014) assertions 
that nonviolent protests mobilized for regime change and democratization continue in a post-
protest environment to bring about democratization, mobilizing against authoritarian 
tendencies and its legacies in the transition process. From this perspective, while the protests 
continued as in della Porta's claim, the role of activists and academics who had played a pivotal 
role during the protests diminished. They were either side-lined or lacking personal political 
ambitions to engage in formal politics after change was achieved. In the absence of strong 
countervailing forces and the diminishing role of activists, the new elites leading the transition, 
instead of addressing the demands of protesters, they arguably began to redefine the process in 
ways that enhance their prospects in future elections. Particularly, Abiy’s medemer political 
philosophy, leadership style, the hasty dissolution of the EPRDF, postponement of elections 
under the pretext of covid-19, the crackdown on prominent opposition leaders following the 




importantly, the ineffective management of the transition process has drawn much criticism 
from Ethiopia's increasingly polarized political landscape (Østebø and Tronvoll, 2020: 619). 
This allowed, the EPRDF’s elites and allies continued to dominate the country during the 
current political transition. Such unequal power relations within the ruling coalition had often 
been a source of political crisis and rifts among party leaders until recently, when the front 
dissolved in late 2019 and was replaced by a new merger party, the Prosperity Party.  
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a chronological analysis of recent political dynamics in Ethiopia with a 
focus on public protests in Amhara and Oromia regions, as well as the crucial roles of reformist 
factions from the ruling party. As such, the chapter explains how Amhara and Oromo youth 
activists as well as the reform wing of the dissolved EPRDF have played a role in advancing 
the conditions for a transition to democracy in Ethiopia. The findings are also partly consistent 
with the claims of transition scholars such as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) that the transition 
to democracy required splits within an authoritarian regime as a condition. Moreover, as Della 
Porta (2014) argued, nonviolent protests against the authoritarian regime can increase the 
likelihood of democratic transition, as initially happened with the youth movements in the two 
regions, the effects of which stimulated political liberalization in early 2018. The post-protest 
context is also shaped by the numerous reforms carried out by the new prime minister, earning 
him to win regional and international recognition, as well as the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, 
creating an atmosphere of "Abiy-mania" with almost all Ethiopians rallying behind him. 
However, the honeymoon period quickly ended, and as we will explore in the next chapter, 
Abiy Ahmed's popularity has gradually given way to growing scepticisms and open opposition. 
More importantly, in the absence of strong countervailing forces to bargain on behalf of the 
protesting public, as the Amhara uprising and Oromo protests illustrate, non-violent protests 
and splits within an authoritarian regime in and of themselves do not necessarily guarantee a 
transition to democracy. Ethiopia's case seems to demonstrate a failure to bring about either 
democracy or peace after years of protests (The Economist, 2020). Despite the fact that the 
mass protests provided an opportunity to transform the country to a genuine democracy, the 
groups leading the current transition have so far been unable to bring about the decisive changes 






Chapter Six: Unsettled Democratization in Abiy’s Ethiopia 
6.1 Introduction  
As we have seen in previous chapters, democratic participation completely diminished under 
the EPRDF, leading to a sharp closure of the political space. These measures, along with 
increasing barriers and contradictions in the practical implementation of the developmental 
state, sparked a growing crescendo of mass protests and political unrest that engulfed the 
country. The mass protests erased the status quo as the advent of change also gave way to 
renewed hope that Ethiopia could finally be democratized, with Abiy taking the lead.  
With Abiy's rise to power, the winds of change began to blow in Ethiopia, creating a euphoric 
atmosphere in which Ethiopians everywhere were discussing possibilities for a genuine 
transition to democracy. This change marks that Ethiopia is entering a third transition period, 
after the first in 1974 and the second in 1991, but both transitions failed to transform Ethiopia 
into a democratic state. The current transition has begun with hope and several inspiring 
reforms. Measures that have created a euphoric mood include, inter alia: media freedom has 
expanded with the unblocking of news sites. Thousands of political prisoners were released, 
and armed opposition groups were decriminalized from a list of designated terrorist 
organisations. Repressive laws – such as those on counterterrorism and civil society 
organisations – are replaced by more liberal ones. The youth, who were at the forefront of the 
anti-government protests, for their part felt victorious because their protests led to the defeat of 
the TPLF, as this was one of their main demands during the protests. Abiy Ahmed's inaugural 
speech and his early political reforms reinforced this growing hope and morale of Ethiopians 
as he made great strides in decompressing the authoritarian regime that he inherited from the 
past, which are also seen as an expression of a strong desire to create a stable democratic space 
on a wider scale.  
However, as the euphoric sentiment gradually subsided, public opinion began to differ in 
relation to events occurring in the transition process, mainly taking two forms. Regime 
supporters argue that change is happening too quickly, and some even believe the movement 
has already reached a high degree of democratization, as the lifting of media restrictions 
allowed people to write and enthusiastically debate about the promises made during the early 
honeymoon period. Regime critics see the prime minister’s actions as misplaced priorities to 
divert the public attention from groping for a genuine democracy due to his rejection of 




negotiations are not held on an agreed roadmap for managing inclusively the transition process. 
This slowly but surely led to the fading of the initial optimism regarding genuine 
democratization, increasing the spread of violent ethnic conflicts throughout the country. With 
the advent of political liberalization, the long-standing ethnic tensions that had once been 
buried began to resurface as hostile rhetoric, leading to mass displacement and the breakdown 
of the rule of law across the country, threatening progress on major reforms (Crisis Group, 
2019; Yusuf, 2019). This obscures the transition, creating an uncertainty of whether Ethiopia 
will successfully undergo a democratic transition after years of protests and decades of 
repressive authoritarian rule.  
It is in this context that this chapter analyses the changes that have occurred, and the challenges 
associated with the reforms under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The analysis 
emphasizes current gains and opportunities for democracy, as well as the challenges facing the 
transition, both within the regime and from the outside. Accordingly, the chapter assesses the 
progress made in deepening democracy in Ethiopia in terms of three elements of the theoretical 
framework, namely the role of civil society organizations, cultural democracy, and liberalized 
autocracy, which are the determinants of democracy identified in the second chapter. Cultural 
democracy claims that only democracy compatible with a country's history and culture can 
create the political conditions conducive to successful democratic development (Osabu-Kle, 
2019). From this perspective, this chapter uses the opportunity to understand and appreciate 
the guiding principles of the liberal model, as well as the institutional characteristics of Oromo 
democracy, to contribute the democratization of politics by extracting functional elements from 
the Gadaa system to help shape local governance in Oromia. Moreover, the chapter also 
critically examines the conceptions of democracy in Ethiopia in line with Robert Dahl's (1989) 
definition of democracy, which means a political system that includes participation, 
representation, deliberation, and civil and political rights, so that democratization becomes 
political reform aimed at achieving these goals. This approach sheds light on the hurdles and 
structural obstacles of modern electoral democracy and encourages reflection on the 
democratic institutions and forms that would better suit the complexities of Ethiopian societies 
that are not readily suitable for simply emulating foreign ideologies from the outside.  
From the perspective of liberalized autocracy, the chapter also examines whether the reform 
launched after Abiy Ahmed came to power was a genuine initiative to move the country to 
democracy. Or were there deliberate actions taken by the regime to meet some of the demands 




avoid the high costs of dealing with social crises, viewing "limited reforms" as less costly? The 
reason Dahl's definition of democracy is considered more useful for this study is that it provides 
a wide range of relevant criteria for identifying the elements that should be included in the 
current transition period for successful democratization. 
With these goals in mind, this chapter is divided into seven sections: Following this section, 
the second section analyses the liberalization measures that Abiy Ahmed took in the first 
months of his premiership, as well as the main factors that led to the current transition. The 
third section provides an analysis of the main factors hindering the current transition. The 
fourth section discusses the different understanding and form of democracy in Ethiopia. The 
fifth section is a discussion that focuses on the rationale for the need to base Ethiopian 
democracy on Ethiopian foundations, drawing inspiration from the country's various 
indigenous practices to overcome the country's democratic deficit, as well as the problem of 
emulation. The sixth section presents an analysis that interrogate the Western liberal model as 
well as Oromo indigenous democratic culture as one example to decipher the relevant elements 
that need to be preserved. The final section, section six provides concluding remarks.  
6.2 Factors that cause the current transition.   
The appointment of Abiy Ahmed as prime minister marked a turning point in the political 
development of Ethiopia, marking a sharp shift in the country's rhetoric, increasing tolerance 
for dissidents, and expanding reform of governance structures. Thus, for Ethiopia, 2018 was a 
significant year of political change, which showed resolve for positive results in human rights 
and in the intention to fundamentally change the political and economic trajectories of the 
country.  
Despite the steadily declining trend over the decade to early 2018, Ethiopia was among the 
most improved countries for 2019 on the Fragile State Index (FSI) (The Fund for Peace, 2019). 
The improvement of the FSI's score by 5.3 points in 2019 was considered as a success story 
for Abiy's political reform. The main driving forces of this dramatic shift were the changes that 
led to the bold measures of economic, social, and political openness, adopted by Prime Minister 
Abiy Ahmed. In the international arena, Ethiopia has made historic strides in securing peace 
and security, ending a 20-year border dispute with Eritrea. These early audacious actions 
demonstrated a significant increase in Abiy’s popularity and inspired hope of transformation, 
making headlines in many international media outlets and earning him the 2019 Nobel Peace 




The causes of this political shift are multiple, as there are cases and factors that are diverse and 
complex in nature leading to political changes, as well as the outcomes. Since the factors of 
political changes are inherently diverse and complex, the current changes in Ethiopia also 
cannot be explained by one factor. As such, it is important to highlight the main driving forces 
behind these changes in Ethiopia, as several actors have played their part in bringing about the 
current transition. As remarked above, the ruling EPRDF has long rejected change, suppressing 
opposition and curbing reformist elements within the party. The repression forced some groups 
to take up arms against the regime, as they believed that there was no alternative to challenge 
the EPRDF authoritarianism other than armed struggle. But the current transition is not 
associated with any of the rebel movements that waged armed struggles against the regime. As 
evidence of this fact, many of them were invited to the country after protest movements forced 
then-Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn to resign and brought Abiy Ahmed to leadership. 
Opposition forces failed to meaningfully challenge the EPRDF due to their extreme 
polarization and fragility, in part due to their own repressive policies. Thus, no opposition 
parties, their leaders or ideology can fake political history and claim the victory of a political 
current that they did not initiate, control, or deliver.   
However, there are other several interrelated and important factors that triggered the change. 
First, there were economic, cultural, social, and political factors that exacerbated the crisis of 
the regime and the inability of the EPRDF to effectively confront them. The regime was unable 
to deal effectively with these crises. It lost its legitimacy further as popular opposition against 
it intensified, supported by largely nonviolent movements. Having descended into crisis, the 
EPRDF was forced to embrace political openness and accommodate opposition to overcome 
its problems. 
Second, after the death of the strongman, the late Meles Zenawi in August 2012, concerns 
emerged about the relative balance of power between the political parties that formed the ruling 
EPRDF. In particular, the Amhara and Oromo branches of EPRDF complained that they did 
not enjoy political influence commensurate with their size, even though they represent the 
country's two largest ethnic groups. This has always been a source of dissatisfaction, causing 
constant friction especially in OPDO and ANDM against TPLF meddling in their party affairs. 
For nearly three decades of existence, ANDM and OPDO represented an embarrassment in the 
eyes of their publics due to their deplorable marginal position in the EPRDF alliance to carry 
out the bidding of the TPLF almost endlessly. This carefully designed scheme to keep OPDO 




2012. The so-called EPRDF’s intergenerational succession strategy, which sought to identify 
and develop junior but loyal cadres to hold key leadership positions at regional and federal 
levels, seemed to have worked well to stabilize the country at the beginning of Hailemariam’s 
reign after Meles Zenawi’s death. But soon the project began to crumble, which led to a power 
struggle between several factions within the ruling party who wanted to influence the federal 
government, which, in turn, reduced the power of the prime minister to a placeholder status. 
Although the idea was that Meles chose a "neutral" successor by choosing someone from 
SEPDM, ANDM and OPDO felt they deserved the position of prime minister. However, such 
grievances in the ruling party did not lead to a significant restructuring of the balance of power, 
largely due to the party discipline of democratic centralism, and the TPLF continued to control 
the economy, military, and security structures.  
However, after public protests swept the country, EPRDF faced serious internal problems, 
especially with regards to regional administrations and regional parties, which worsened the 
situation in the federal government. Prime minister Hailemariam also could not maintain the 
same hierarchy as before, so he could not fill the power vacuum left behind by Meles' death. 
The surge in public protests made the federal government weaker than ever and unable to 
control unrest, leading to competition among regional leaders. The loosening of the command 
chain at the federal level helped the Amhara and Oromo leaders begin their emancipation. 
Moreover, popular protests in two regions - Oromia and Amhara - threatened the cohesion of 
the EPRDF, allowing those in need of change to gradually join the protests, which led to 
increased public support for youth protest movements, increasing their persistence and the 
effectiveness of their mobilization against the repressive regime. As protests intensified, the 
rift between hardliners and soft-liners within the EPRDF widened, and in the end reformist 
groups became convinced that moving on the road to democracy was the only safest way to 
avoid the possibility of regime change through popular mobilization.  
Moreover, the absence of strong opposition forces capable of coordinating and spearheading 
the transition increased the bargaining power of reform groups within the EPRDF to continue 
incumbency during the two years of transition, with the promise of expanding democratic 
space. In short, ANDM and OPDO leaders did not change the humiliating path they had been 
on for more than a quarter of a century overnight. The marked transformation of the party is as 
gradual as it is systematic, and inconceivable had it not been for the youth led protests that have 
ravaged Ethiopia since April 2014. As such, the ANDM and OPDO's resurgence in post-Meles 




Third, popular protests in the two largest regions - the Amhara uprising and the Oromo protests 
that shook the country - are the main trigger of the current transition. This change comes on 
the basis of a negotiated agreement between reform groups in the EPRDF and lead organizers 
of popular protests, with the tipping-point provided by TeamLemma after Lemma Megersa was 
appointed president of the Oromia region. The reform groups were convinced that it could not 
continue with closed policies and repressive methods due to the pressure of popular protests in 
the two regions. Thus, the option of political openness and the transition to a democratic system 
has been agreed with the lead organizers of the protest movements.  
As discussed here, the current change is the result of a combination of factors, in particular the 
pressure from popular protests and the political leadership of reform groups within the EPRDF. 
Hence, it is a transition from within the existing system and the youth protest movements. The 
transition process began when the reform group known as TeamLemma became convinced that 
the cost of opening up and democratization was less than the cost of continuing authoritarian 
practices. Since then, this reform group has been instrumental in changing the balance of power 
within the EPRDF and in engineering radical reforms, especially in 2018. The transition 
process was assumed to follow a gradual transformation of the political system in several 
stages: from movement to political openness, a promising transition to democracy through free 
and fair elections, and another stage of consolidating democracy. So far, one thing is clear: the 
old authoritarian elements of the regime have collapsed, but building a new democratic order 
faced a major test as there are enormous challenges, ranging from political, security, economic 
and social problems that required appropriate responses from the new leadership. In light of 
this, therefore, the next section examines whether the reform launched by Prime Minister Abiy 
Ahmed is a genuine initiative to move the country towards democracy, or measures to keep the 
ruling elites in power through mild reforms.  
6.3 Challenges to the transition 
The current transition process in Ethiopia began with the expropriation of power from the TPLF 
and decompression of authoritarian practices that have existed for almost three decades. Early 
measures, such as the release of political prisoners and the expansion of freedom of expression, 
were encouraging steps that reinforced Abiy’s early promises to lead the country to democracy. 
However, over time, Abiy began to face serious challenges in managing the transition process, 
as the obstacles that need to be overcome are growing, creating frustration over the possibility 




April 2018, the team leading the transition appears to have failed to set the country on the right 
path to democracy. Central to this is the fragility of the countervailing forces involved in the 
transition process, the failure to accommodate diverse perspectives in the transition agendas, 
and the complex challenges to the rule of law. In line with this, I classify these main challenges 
of transition into two categories: weak countervailing forces and ineffective transition 
management. These challenges are elaborated as follow.  
6.3.1 Ineffectual countervailing forces 
One of the challenges of democratization is the absence of strong countervailing forces, such 
as opposition groups and civil society organizations, that pressure the incumbent to agree to 
democratization, as democracy can hardly be realized at the initiative of the ruling party. A 
balance of power between competing groups in which no one can dominate others is a 
prerequisite for democracy. Without such a condition, democracy is extremely vulnerable to a 
rollback (Diamond, 1994: 5).  
The situation in Ethiopia contrasts with these facts, as there is no balance of power between 
the government and the opposition, either before or after Abiy Ahmed took office. Prior to 
2018, although civil society was slowly emerging in the years before the May 2005 elections, 
the EPRDF government, with the support of security and the introduction of numerous 
draconian proclamations, closed the political space and harmed the actions of the opposition 
and civil society (Abbink, 2006: 178). After 2018, despite the expansion of the democratic 
space in the early period, the opposition forces are still weak and unable to meaningfully 
challenge the regime to adhere to the measures of democratization because of their extreme 
polarization and fragility.  
Thus, the lack of strong countervailing forces to the hegemonic aspirations of the incumbent 
has always been one of the main obstacles to the transition to democracy in Ethiopia, resulting 
in weak contestation. The current political liberalization is taking place against the backdrop 
of such a social power vacuum in which organized opposition and independent civil society 
are extremely weak, leaving the fate of Ethiopia's democratization in the hands of the ruling 
party itself, the very entity that perpetuates domination and oppressive rule. Although attempts 
are being made to change the state of opposition parties, there are few signs that the situation 
is improving as the imbalance of power persists. Not surprisingly, activists and individuals 
seem to have a greater influence on the transition process than organized opposition parties. A 




opening offices, recruiting members, or fundraising82.  As a result, the structure of the transition 
reflects the continuing imbalance of power, with the opposition and its leaders lagging behind 
in negotiating with the government the steps and measures needed to build a democratic 
system, leading to the dominance of the Prosperity Party in the process. 
The weak organization of civil society is also a key challenge for the current transition in 
Ethiopia. The strength and independence of civil society determines its ability to curb state 
dominance and ensure political accountability, which is a prerequisite for sustainable 
democracy. In this regard, there are two different perceptions about the role of civil society in 
democratization in Ethiopia: some see civil society as the realm of freedom, while others see it 
as the realm of social welfare (Pellerin, 2020: 143). To understand this difference, it is 
important to explain the political situation and the experience of civil society before and after 
2018.   
Until 2018, the EPRDF regime used several suffocating proclamations, including the 2009 civil 
society law, to suppress freedom of association in the country, as this law prohibited any work 
related to human rights or democracy promotion if civil society received more than 10 percent 
of its funding from abroad. Complying with this proclamation was not easy and had frustrating 
consequences. A human rights defender explained that the CSO Law not only forced many 
civil society organizations to move into the field of social welfare services, abandoning 
activities related to democracy and human rights, but also decimated many NGOs, as they 
could not survive without foreign funding83. As a result of this experience, the perception of 
civil society as the realm of welfare services has emerged due to the involvement of many local, 
national, and international organizations in development and relief activities, which the EPRDF 
regime has redirected to align CSO operations with developmental state policies. According to 
this view, civil society is primarily a social welfare site for the disadvantaged, not an 
independent space that can be mobilized as a countervailing force against state power. This 
perception of civil society sees the struggle for political rights as an isolated realm. As a result, 
civil societies did not join the recent citizen’s mobilization against the EPRDF’s rule, nor did 
it actively participate in the political transformation process enacted in early 2018, severely 
undermining their capabilities, roles, and contributions to the current democratization process.  
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After Abiy took power in 2018, the expansion of political space in response to mass protests 
forced the government to repeal previous stifling proclamations. This has allowed the creation 
of many new independent civil society groups working on human rights and democracy, 
redefining the spaces of civil society as the realm of freedom to exercise human and democratic 
rights. In addition, the adoption of a new, much more progressive proclamation on civil society 
organizations in early 2019 has inspired the attempt to open up the political space for the sector. 
Among the most notable changes in the new legislation are the removal of the 10 percent 
restriction on foreign funding and an attempt to facilitate licensing and the operations of civil 
society organizations. This allows activists to join civil society organizations to put pressure 
on the regime to expand political reforms, moving the struggle from the streets to constructive 
participation in formal civil society groups. An academic and activist claim that the shift in the 
protest movement toward more formal civic activism, mainly in the form of oversight bodies 
to pressure reform efforts and hold new government in check, has also spurred the creation of 
other competing civil society groups associated with the ruling party84. As the political forces 
of the protesting public and government use the expanding civic space to advance their goals, 
they also bring divisive views into the new civic arena, replicating the polarized political 
landscape of the current transition.  
6.3.2 Ineffectual transition management   
Successful democratization demonstrates the importance of broad consensus among elites on 
transition guidelines and procedures for public participation. Liberalization and decompression 
of an authoritarian regime, if left unchecked, can quickly lead to instability, sacrificing the very 
legitimacy that the new regime needed most. This is why a transition roadmap is essential to 
bridge the retreating and emerging political orders, as the absence of a clear and inclusive post-
authoritarian agenda can impede the process leading to the birth of a new democratic system. 
In the case of Ethiopia, this inherent danger was ignored from the outset, despite activists and 
political forces demanding that Abiy convene the main political parties to develop a transition 
roadmap. His answer was simple: "I will be the bridge that will ensure a successful 
transition85." Thus, with Abiy showing little inclination to proposal of a roadmap, ineffective 
transition management became a major factor exacerbating frustration over the possibility of 
moving toward democracy. As explained above, opposition political parties were weak, 
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polarized, and disorganized, which convinced many people that if Ethiopia must experience a 
peaceful transition, changes must come from within the ruling regime. The appointment of 
Lemma Megersa as president of the Oromia region made this hope of a transformation from 
within the regime tangible, providing a tipping-point that created the ideal condition that led to 
the election of Abiy Ahmed as chairman of the EPRDF, vested with the responsibility of 
managing the transition to democracy.  
However, limiting this responsibility for managing the transition only to the reformist faction 
within the ruling party has led to incidents of ineffectual transition management process. One 
such case is that the reformist faction, according to one activist, avoids an inclusive approach 
in an effort to control the transition process86. Although Abiy was entrusted with the 
responsibility of managing the process, being deceived by the euphoric response to his early 
reforms, he was unable to create a clear transition roadmap and a multi-party platform for 
inclusive regular dialogue, where opposition political parties can also participate in the 
transition process. That means there was no clear and all-inclusive vision of how to tread the 
uncharted waters of post-authoritarianism. As a result, each politician acted to maximize their 
political fortune, and clashes between their supporters resulted in loss of life and destruction of 
property throughout the country, mostly in Oromia, Amhara, Benishangul, and the southern 
regions, exacerbated by recriminations and hate speech on social media and diaspora websites 
owned by Oromo and Amhara activists.   
In contrast to the democratic imperative foreseen by the change, Abiy continued to act 
unilaterally, redefining his vision and programs for the country with personalized measures and 
decisions. As he continued to defy calls for inclusive dialogue and a transition roadmap, his 
actions begin to lack legitimacy in the eyes of the public. As result, opposition lost confidence 
in the transition process, so the initial optimism of participation in the process quickly faded. 
Rather than becoming a transformative leader who is capable of rallying support and bringing 
together feuding factions, Abiy has often arguably acted as a transactional leader to achieve 
short-term political benefits, redeploying informal army units outside constitutionally 
established security forces, and exploiting the continued presence of the EPRDF party structure 
to influence and dominate the political system. The result of all this is a void in the structure of 
the idea that governs the country, as this makes the transition hostage to the prime minister’s 
generosity. 
 




Another consequence of Ethiopia’s troubled transition is a surge in violence and frustration in 
the country. A look at change and continuity in Ethiopia's political life shows that the release 
of dissidents and a thriving press at the beginning of the 1991 transition did not lead to a new 
democratic order, except that they first raised public expectations, a kind of euphoria that the 
country experienced in early 2018. However, the failure to deliver on promises led to growing 
frustration over the next three decades of EPRDF rule. Thus, for decades, the EPRDF’s 
Ethiopia had known no free expression, governmental transparency, and channels of political 
participation, all of which were under tight control through its party and security structure. The 
expropriation of power from the TPLF and the early swift political liberalization measures 
again gave Ethiopians high, but unrealistic, hopes about the future that political and civic 
leaders could not temper, leading to a steady decline in their positive attitudes on the prospects 
of the transition. Decompression of authoritarianism by itself does not lead to a transition to a 
democratic system if rising expectations are not properly managed and the rule of law is not 
respected. This was captured succinctly from an interview with a political analyst who 
explained that the wide gap between expectations and reality has generated a strong sense of 
frustration, which both the opposition and the ruling party are quickly seizing and exploiting 
for violent purposes87. As respect for the rule of law should be the top priority of the 
government, ensuring peace and order should be a priority for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed by 
establishing the rule of law to resolve conflicts that are spreading across the country.  
Disappointment prevails in the country, as progress toward democracy stalled when Abiy 
arguably indulged in misplaced priorities such as his infatuation with past controversial kings, 
the rushed dissolution of the ruling EPRDF, and the creation of a new merger Prosperity Party, 
with less focus on inclusive political negotiations and cooperation. Accordingly, Abiy's 
misplaced priorities began with lobbying the African Union in early 2019 for a statue of former 
Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie to be erected at the headquarter complex in Addis Ababa. 
This action was followed by a vanity project during the restoration of the palace, featuring life-
size wax replicas of Menelik and Haile Selassie's statues, which caused a rift among the 
population and political classes. Historically, for most Oromo and southern people, the statues 
of the late emperors represent a long-gone dark age, an era of feudal dictatorship, during which 
numerous atrocities were committed against religious and ethnic groups. Abiy did not fully 
understand the consequences of such symbolic gestures for his politics, erecting symbols of 
 




controversial kings at a time when the country hoped to correct past injustices and focus on 
what unites the country for the future. In other words, the fatal mistake of this transition is that 
the new administration did not understand that the goal of the transition was to create a state 
that would meet the long-standing demands of freedom, equality, justice, and human dignity. 
For more than half a century, political struggles in Ethiopia have demanded the realization of 
these democratic values, as well as directed against a centralized political system that excluded, 
marginalized, and oppressed most Ethiopians. Rather than anticipating a reconstructed state, 
the new reform leaders set out to restore Ethiopia's "glorious past as a state" by glorifying 
Ethiopia's controversial kings, but this was seen as a rejection of the sacrifices made over the 
past five decades since the national legacy of these feudal emperors are hardly represent a 
symbol that the majority of current and future generations of Ethiopia could embrace and look 
upon with respect. 
Hence, it was this lingering feudal mindset from the era of absolute monarchy, the lack of 
robust institutions for the development of democracy, rampant violence and lack of order that 
began to raise questions and frustration among the populace about the prospects for the 
transition to democracy in the country. The speed with which Ethiopian societies have moved 
from hoping for a democratic transition to democratic disillusionment is so quick as the soaring 
expectations are met with crushing disappointment, reinforcing the growing perception that the 
country is heading in the wrong direction as a result of the regime’s misplaced priorities as well 
as its inability to manage high expectations.  
There is also strong frustration with government actions, as public services remain weak, 
unemployment is rising, politicians pay little attention to the needs of people and their interests 
to provide enough opportunities for the youth who brought about the changes. Failure to meet 
their demands led to a sense of abandonment, creating a deep sense of hopelessness and despair 
among youth, since the lack of response from the state to their demand is perceived as a betrayal 
of leadership. For example, the lack of attempts to make Afaan Oromo a federal working 
language and to implement the constitutional special interests’ clause of Addis Ababa, as well 
as the ongoing land grab, is seen as a push back against the gains of protesters in Oromia 
according to a regional council member88. Leaders made promises, but none of them kept their 
promises. 
 




The failure to reorient the highly mobilized youth protesting the previous authoritarian regime 
toward building a democratic system is another consequence of the problematic management 
of transition. The advent of political liberalization resurfaced hostile rhetoric and long-standing 
ethnic tensions that were once buried due to repressive rule. As these old grievances are 
combined with a fresh sense of abandonment, the deep disappointment fuels the growing 
embrace of radical and contending nationalist ideologies, which create a perfect storm and ideal 
conditions for inter-ethnic violence that have displaced millions from across the country, 
particularly in Oromia, Amhara, southern Ethiopia, Benishangul Gumuz and Gambella regions 
(Yusuf, 2019: 3). The striking reality is such deep divisions are being used as a political tool to 
advance political interests and influence policy change, as this was particularly evident in the 
regime's slow response to ethnic conflicts and the ensuing media rhetoric. 
The significant increase in the level of access and use of social media and modern technologies 
and tools such as the Internet, mobile phone, Facebook, and Twitter has become an important 
vehicle for mobilization, especially during the protest movements across the country. Parties 
and candidates have embraced them, but the influence they have on the political arena comes 
with treacherous possibilities. Certain aspects of the wave of ethnic conflicts spreading across 
the country can be explained by the increasing use of social media. Moreover, the rise in the 
number of fake news poses a threat to the spread of legitimate news. This is due to the fact that 
a growing number of Ethiopian journalists are frequently using social media platforms to get 
news, which creates the possibility of writing incorrect stories. Thus, with the increasing 
reliance on social media for news and opinion formation, it becomes increasingly difficult for 
the new leadership to ensure that the political news broadcast on social media does not threaten 
peace and public order.   
Another big challenges in managing this transition come from the competing nationalisms and 
their ties to organized politics. The current reform leaders came to power through a social 
movement inspired by Oromo nationalism. They also embraced pan-Ethiopian nationalism and 
were supported by another youth movement under Amhara nationalism.  For some time, the 
three nationalist movements united in their shared rejection of the dominance of the TPLF. But 
this alliance did not last long because their it was not strategically based on shared political 
visions. This aggravates the challenges facing the current transition period. On the one hand, 
bitter rivalry between the three rival nationalist movements has become an obstacle to creating 
fertile ground for the development of a democratic culture. On the other hand, the government's 




democratic transition also becomes threats to the incumbency of the prosperity party in the 
upcoming elections. In fact, the threat to the prosperity party's survival comes from several 
sources: one from its failure to tame nationalist movements, two from its regional rivals, and 
three from its own ranks. As political openness threatens the survival of the Prosperity Party, 
new leaders return to the use of force to overcome the threat that undermines the aspiration to 
democratic transition.    
Moreover, the crisis of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 arrived at a critical moment just as 
Prime Minister Abiy appeared to be wrapping himself in the cloak of previous political 
violence against opponents and critics. Already working to buttress his position, his responses 
to the crisis rapidly moved in the wrong direction, as he quickly took the opportunity to 
postpone the election, originally scheduled for August that year. The postponement of national 
elections further exacerbated an already volatile political transition, sparking a deepening 
debate about a looming constitutional crisis. The squabble continues despite the decision to 
extend the incumbent mandate. And this casts doubt on the legitimacy of the Abiy 
administration, which has already become fragile, adding another layer of complexity to the 
existing political uncertainty as the underlying problems remain unresolved. Abiy arguably 
used the pandemic as cover to continue to alter the balance of power in his favour, ignoring 
calls for an inclusive process on key elements of much-needed democratization and engaging 
opposition and civil society, signalling a return to authoritarian practices.  
Last but not least, the rushed dissolution of the EPRDF and the formation of a centralized 
Prosperity Party was another misplaced priority in the transition process that has become an 
obstacle to push Ethiopia into a clear democratization. The merger process was accompanied 
by a sudden ideological shift in the ruling party, both politically and economically, without 
internal consensus. This exacerbated the divisions within the EPRDF, creating a loser-winner 
dichotomy with accompanying adjectives such as anti-reformer and reformist.  
Following a poorly orchestrated merger process, relations, especially between Tigray and the 
federal government, were practically severed. Both sides began to blame each other and focus 
on defensive measures to neutralize perceived threats, instead of cooperating and negotiating. 
The TPLF accuses Abiy and his allies of being reactionary forces seeking to resurrect the old 
imperial regime, while their main fear is in fact retribution for past wrongdoings (Kelecha, 
2019). Abiy accuses them of creating conflicts in many places and acts of sabotage perpetrated 




reconciliation and peace, which rhetorically dominate Ethiopia's political landscape. As Abiy 
purged the TPLF officials from security and bureaucracy, they began to build up their military 
capabilities in their home region. TPLF fears were compounded by their exclusion from the 
peace process with Eritrea. According to one senior TPLF politician, the peace process with 
their archenemy was motivated by a desire to forge an alliance against them, rather than a 
sincere effort to end years of hostility89. Reconciliation and reintegration of the TPLF into the 
political process were as important as their removal from power for the success of a peaceful 
transition. Failure to do so eventually led to the outbreak of war in the Tigray region in early 
November that year. Hence, the war in Tigray is not an isolated incident, but a direct result of 
a poorly managed transition process. 
In short, Abiy's failure to lead Ethiopia onto an unambiguously democratic path is the result of 
a combination of factors, and the responsibility for the rollback rests with a number of actors 
who rallied behind both the ruling party and the opposition. First, as noted in chapter four, 
Ethiopian politics over the past 50 years has largely been a question of equality and freedom. 
How to establish a democratic order that recognizes the equality of Ethiopian national groups 
has been the subject of almost constant debate. There have been two broad elite stances. The 
first recognizes the existence of national oppression in Ethiopia. These groups organized and 
fought for the respect of their ethnic right, which led to the creation of an ethnic based 
federalism recognizing the rights of ethnic groups. The second rejects the thesis of national 
oppression, and desire to undo the representation of ethnic groups in politics - and therefore 
supports individual rights. Of these two camps, most groups, including the Oromo elites, are 
firmly established themselves in the first. Most of Amhara elites are pitched into the second 
stance.  Instead of being a transformational leader able to rally support and bring together these 
rival groups, Abiy rejected the demand for a transition roadmap, shifting his loyalty between 
Amhara and Oromo groups. He could have brought all the feuding groups around the table for 
dialogue, but he flits between Amhara and Oromo political bases depending on circumstances, 
and this does not bring him the trust or acceptance of any of the groups. Rather, the swing back 
and forth is the cause of open feud between the Oromo and Amhara branches of the newly 
formed Prosperity Party, and in extension the reason for flaring conflicts between Amhara and 
Oromo ethnic groups.  
 




Second, the continued presence of many actors and structures of the previous regime prevented 
a clean break with the past. TPLF stepped down, but the legacy of its regime continued to cast 
a shadow over the Abiy's regime, as deep-seated undemocratic practices persist long after the 
change of leadership, continuing to influence values and behaviour. The lack of new faces, 
especially at the lower levels, and the complex patronage system that operated under the 
EPRDF has largely remained intact, means that political competition creates instability, 
causing frustration in society. Even more worryingly, the continued tensions and hostilities 
between the TPLF and federal authorities also raise serious concerns and limit the scope for 
change, pulling the country into open warfare since November 2020. Third, with the division 
of Ethiopian society along ethnic, cultural and linguistic lines, the opening up of political space 
has intensified ethnic conflicts over competing demands. When Abiy came to power in early 
2018, he was supposed to address the legacy of political exclusion and economic 
marginalization that characterized successive Ethiopian regimes by striking a balance between 
the competing demands of the country’s national groups. However, his inability to tame fiery 
and competing nationalisms became another exacerbating factor. While many hoped that Abiy 
would be able to pacify raging nationalisms by satisfying their basic demands or creating the 
conditions for a national dialogue where they could discuss and agree on the country's future, 
he arguably played a counterproductive role instead, shifting priorities depending on what 
would solidify his power. As a result, the diverging ethno-nationalist aspirations of various 
groups, a lack of common demands among the leading ethnic elites, and historical discontent 
created a dynamic that prevented Abiy from advancing his reform. For example, the opposition, 
in particular the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), has its share of responsibility for ineffective 
transition management in this regard. OLF wavered between pursuing a peaceful struggle by 
demobilizing its fighters and seeking a power-sharing agreement with the Prosperity Party to 
secure important positions; and, alternatively, the continuation of the armed struggle to take 
over the country. This ambivalence exposed its vulnerabilities, allowing the Prosperity Party 
to do everything in its power to prevent it from organizing, such as closing its offices, harassing, 
and imprisoning its cadres. Thus, the intransigence and impending hegemony of the Prosperity 
Party and the continued failure of the likes of OLF have created an unstable vicious circle that 
led to the backsliding of the reform enacted in early 2018. 
6.4 Conceptualizing democracy in Ethiopia 
One of the events of this episode of political reform is the creation of an important new space 




to democratization of the country. Most Ethiopians agree that democracy is the solution to the 
existential problems facing the country: poverty, instability, and authoritarianism. However, 
reaching a consensus on what this democracy means is not so easily recognized. As the next 
sections will show, Ethiopians mainly understand democracy in three different ways. The first 
understanding sees Western liberal democracy as an active model of a governance system 
whose ideas, methods, and institutions can be borrowed to solve the country’s problems. The 
second understanding of democracy is that because Western democracy lacks a framework to 
address the multifaceted injustices in ethnically divided countries such as Ethiopia, 
consociational democracy that encourages a participatory approach with equitable power 
sharing is a more appropriate method of democracy to respond to the country’s problems. There 
is a third perspective on democracy that has recently emerged in Ethiopia’s political landscape, 
which Abiy advocates as the guiding “philosophy” of his reforms that he called “Medemer 
Democracy.” In light of this diverse understanding, the next section analyses the ideas wrapped 
in these three “models” of democracy to explain in detail their implications for the current 
transition. And then explore the ideals of cultural democracy to justify the need to explore an 
alternative paradigm of democracy rooted in indigenous traditions to contribute to the broader 
discussion of democratic innovation.   
6.4.1 Ethiopia's experience of electoral and consociational democracy 
The understanding of electoral democracy as an active model for resolving the long-standing 
problem of democratization in Ethiopia prevails among youth who were at the forefront of anti-
government protests. They advocate this formal democracy as an alternative to decades of 
authoritarian practice in the country to be able to elect their leaders through institutional 
mechanisms of free, credible, and competitive elections. In the view of one activist, electoral 
democracy can serve as a starting point for the realization of their democratic rights, allowing 
them to elect responsible leaders who prioritize respect for the rule of law and the consolidation 
of democratic norms and institutions90. One of the claims of the mass protests that effected the 
current change was that the EPRDF regime often could not satisfy these needs of the Ethiopian 
people (Siraj, 2020). Democracy in the above senses is in a minimalist understanding, which 
narrowly institutionalizes procedures expressing a democratic content and the criteria for 
evaluating an electoral process (Bohman, 2005). However, some incumbent party members 
hold a fearsome view of electoral democracy: one politician claims that democracy means 
 




increasing the chance of losing the strength and resources needed to defend against your 
opponents in the electoral contest91. This perception of democracy negatively impacted the 
EPRDF democracy project in the past, giving the impression that they were building 
democracy while effectively restricting freedom of political action, the media and civil society 
organizations with the draconian laws.  
The reason liberal democracy became an ideology of protest and was considered an important 
first step in the fight against authoritarianism is in the belief that it will provide the opportunity 
and tools to create an enabling environment to reflect on realities and conditions of the country. 
One youth who has been at the forefront of anti-government protests reasons that there are 
serious structural obstacles to creating democracy, even in its liberal form92. He continues, 
explaining that there is a widespread complaint, especially among youth, that if Abiy is ever 
serious about transitioning the country into a democracy, then he needs a paradigm shift in his 
approach, allowing a bottom-up approach of engagement, a deep and broad process that 
involves the peripheries of the country and encourages indigenous mechanisms of public 
deliberation in the development of policies and decision-making on political, economic, and 
social issues93. Failure to do this only contributes to the social, economic, and political crisis 
in the country.  
Moreover, some scholars and political elites argue that the procedural construction of 
democracy ignores the Ethiopian context because practice allowed the EPRDF regime to 
express itself in the form of Western democracy, reducing the whole concept of democracy to 
an electoral ritual that created fertile ground for electoral authoritarianism (Gudina, 2011; 
Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008; Kassa, 2020). These practices ultimately contributed to the 
conditions that sparked political unrest: the simple terminological camouflage of “electoral 
democracy” that lured the EPRDF regime to classify itself as democratic was a dubious 
legitimacy generated by simple electoral rituals held every five years.  
Ethno-nationalist groups take a different view of democracy from the aforementioned 
understanding, commonly known as consociational democracy, and believe that such a 
democracy is compatible with a multi-ethnic society such as Ethiopia. Consociational 
democracy involves a grand coalition of major ethnic elites to ensure fairness in the system 
through proportional representation in politics, as well as an expanded form of autonomy in 
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managing their internal affairs (Lijphart, 2018: 3). Ethno-nationalists defend this scheme as a 
viable solution to the country's political crisis, believing that a grand coalition of equals, 
proportionally composed of major ethnic groups, may satisfy the demands for power in the 
centre. 
It is also important to note that some aspects of consociational democracy are not new to 
Ethiopian politics, as the EPRDF has tried to create such an image, at least in principle, for the 
past three decades. Some attempts have been made under the EPRDF’s rule, which include the 
ruling party's rhetorical tendency towards intraparty division of powers within the EPRDF, 
proportionality in the representation of ethnic groups in the House of Federation and the 
reservation of certain seats in the House of Peoples Representative for ethnic minorities, and a 
federal constitution that grants not only the right to self-government, but also the right to secede 
from the state itself. However, these elements of the consociational arrangement of the post-
1991 political dispensation were actually circumscribed by the centralised practices of the 
regime. As John Markakis notes: “the elite in the centre continues to rule; the elite in the 
periphery continues to administer” (Markakis, 2011: 282). This remains a structural fault that 
continues to serve as a source of instability in the country, creating obstacles to a peaceful 
transition to democracy.  
Moreover, since a consociational system is also a form of elite rule, it tends to actually 
disempower people of their right to rule in practice, which reduces the quality of democracy in 
such arrangements compared to non-elite forms of democracy (Dixon, 2020: 120). Such an 
elitist democracy cannot meet Ethiopia’s aspirations for a democratic society since power 
sharing among ethnic elites alone cannot address the multifaceted structural problems of 
creating stable democracy. Also, the problems of economic redistribution and meeting the 
needs of disadvantaged social groups are not part of the definition of elitist democracy: it does 
not cope with the long-standing grievances, simply by sharing power or electing representatives 
with no power to solve deep issues of historical, economic and social injustice. Hence, a 
satisfactory response to political, social and economic injustice in Ethiopia will most likely 
come from a “democracy of ends” rather than a “democracy of means”, since the former 
provides an opportunity to define democracy through an inclusive, participatory approach to 
political, economic and social issues. Such an understanding of democracy in a maximalist 
sense means that the concept of democracy cannot be reduced to election methods or power-
sharing mechanisms but must embrace its actual exercise to satisfactorily meet political, social, 




speak of democracy as if it were merely a mechanism for electing representatives or sharing 
power among the ethnic elites.    
6.4.2 Thoughts on “Medemer democracy” 
Medemer is an Amharic word for addition, but is also translated as coming together or synergy, 
which is rhetorically similar to the Latin motto e pluribus unum — “out of many, one”. This 
has been Abiy's motto since he ascended to power in April 2018, reflecting his ambitions and 
vision to rebrand Ethiopia. Abiy claims that his “Medemer reform” focuses on people and has 
three interconnected elements: vibrant democracy; economic viability; regional integration and 
openness to the world (Abiy, 2019). Abiy argues, in a sharp departure from revolutionary 
democracy, and hence the developmental state ideology of the EPRDF that puts economic 
development first over democracy, that his "Medemer” reform sees democracy and 
development as interlinked (Abiy, 2019: 24). Hence, he reasons that building a vibrant and 
pluralistic democracy is required to bridge the gap with swift and decisive measures to increase 
citizens' confidence in government.  
In his book Medemer, published in October 2019, Abiy elaborated on the need for an Ethiopian-
centred approach to address the country's democratic deficit, even though he could not explain 
an approach that set him apart from his predecessors who applied ideologies and theories from 
outside. Abiy (2019: 13) claims that modern ideological systems have sought to address issues 
of freedom and equality in different ways. He argues that liberalism in its original formulation 
developed as a belief in the right of individuals to freely pursue their goals by means of their 
own choice, without infringing on the freedom of others. He reasons that liberalism resolutely 
resists state economic control and seeks to find answers in a market economy but creates 
inequality by concentrating power and wealth in the hands of a few capitalists. He argues that 
socialism is a reaction to liberalism and seeks to find a solution by creating an economy that 
maximizes equality even at the expense of political freedoms, which makes it vulnerable to 
becoming authoritarian. Thus, he presents his “Medemer democracy,” which appears to be a 
meandering idea, as a third way between socialism and liberalism, with attempts to reconcile 
these two opposing ideologies in their approach to freedom and equality. Abiy (2019: 18) 
argues that Medemer does not subscribe to any particular prevailing ideology but aims to avoid 
ideological rigidity and to suit itself with a changing and multipolar world, as necessary. 




seeking to balance the liberal market economy with redistribution and state regulation to 
overcome the issues of inequality. 
The pillars for building a "Medemer democracy" in Ethiopia are national reconciliation to 
address long-standing grievances, consensus building to encourage indigenous participatory 
practices, civic nationalism to develop shared national values and an understanding of critical 
issues that represent common interest of all citizens of the country (Abiy, 2019: 103). He 
explains that when these pillars of his "Medemer Democracy" are fully operational, it 
contributes to the emergence of a stable and unique Ethiopian democracy that is consistent with 
local cultural values, balancing freedom and equality through structures and processes that seek 
to correct past mistakes, building on existing positive achievements, and expanding 
cooperation to address future challenges with new innovative ideas. 
However, Abiy's Medemer is not well received by many people, especially among influential 
figures who argue that now is not the time to experiment with new ideas, but to focus on 
addressing some of the big demands that the public has placed on the new leaders (Ephream, 
2019). An academic interviewed, for example, sees “Medemer” as an attempt to create yet 
another model of hegemony that mimics the previous failed top-down approach, relegating 
Ethiopians as passive recipients of the decisions of "all-knowing experts94”. In the past, such 
approach has not only limited people's freedom to participate in decisions that affect their life, 
but also undermined Ethiopia's aspirations for democracy and prosperity. An activist also 
claims that “Medemer” is a marketing tool that not only lacks concrete solutions to the 
country's pressing problems, but also contradicts the principle of self-determination enshrined 
in the national constitution95. He added that Abiy only rhetorically presents democracy as a 
high value to Ethiopia, but in practice he is trying to redirect public opinion from politics to the 
economy, as was the case with the developmental state, to solidify his personalized rule by 
reducing political competition96.  
Regarding the claim of striking a balance between individual and group rights, expressed in 
the form of freedom and equality, the activist continues that, since it is impossible to reconcile 
socialism and liberalism, the Prime Minister simply hides under the buzzword "Medemer" to 
push the values of the liberal West into the Ethiopian political market97. This not only gives 
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primacy to individual rights, but also goes against the collective rights enshrined in the federal 
constitution. Given the deep-rooted historical injustice, respect for individual rights will not 
automatically lead to respect for the group rights in the context of Ethiopia, says one activist, 
but on the contrary: if group rights are respected, so will individual rights98. 
Similarly, the demand for civic nationalism is not without concerns since the type of 
nationalism promoted by the prime minister in practice does not consider the value of shared 
citizenship. One respondent, an online commentator, argued that Amhara's identity and values 
are being promoted under the guise of civic nationalism due to its historical spread and 
dominance in the country99. If Ethiopia is to be remedied from its past injustice, then the civic 
nationalism that this country needs, both in principle and in practice, must recognize all the 
country's cultural communities as equal and rights-bearing citizens, united by a common set of 
national identities, political values, and practice.   
In his book, Abiy argues that “Medemer democracy” would strike a balance between pan-
Ethiopian nationalism and ethno-nationalism (Abiy, 2019: 107). Ostensibly, Medemer 
democracy is intended to serve as an antidote to thoughts of polarization and alienation of 
citizens, finding a middle ground between ethno-nationalism and a reformed overarching pan-
Ethiopian nationalism, providing them with a safe political landscape in which they both find 
a conceptual space in which they can mutually reinforce, rather than exclude each other. 
However, this search for a middle ground is not an easy task, given the contending nature of 
nationalism in Ethiopia. In fact, one of the biggest challenges on the road to democratic 
transition in Ethiopia is balancing the demands of those groups that Fukuyama calls 
megalothymia and isothymia, the former representing a group that wants to be recognized as 
superior of others, and the latter representing groups that want to be recognized as equal to 
others (Fukuyama, 2018: 21-23). This clearly summarises the purpose and content of the 
contending nationalisms in contemporary Ethiopian politics.  
6.5 Rationale for establishing Ethiopian democracy on Ethiopian foundations.  
Following the end of the Cold War, the promotion of liberalism and liberal values as an 
ideology - with the universal truth and the only future civilization of mankind - has seriously 
undermined the emergence of an alternative vision with a multitude of political imagination to 
decipher the necessary democratic values of civilizations, consistent with the aspirations of 
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building a democratic and prosperous society, especially in the global south (Saul, 1997). Since 
this singular ideology combined with the autocratic rules of authoritarian regimes, borrowing 
from other ready-made solutions has become a seemingly insurmountable problem and has 
hindered the ability to reflect on local circumstances.   
Similarly, Ethiopia's rulers also tried to apply borrowed foreign ideologies, without much 
thought of local conditions, in their quest to build a democratic and prosperous state. As such, 
the autocratic rule of emperors since the creation of the modern Ethiopian state in the late 19th 
century and its successor, the military regime, has been marked by the absence of voices for 
democratic ideas. The emperors destroyed the traditional institutions that could serve as the 
basis for democratization, since their goal was complete domination. Ethiopian intellectuals 
also did not write broadly on democratic thoughts, mainly due to oppressive political 
experience, and also because some have fallen into Eurocentric assumptions that downplay 
indigenous practices.   
Despite limited democratic thoughts written by Ethiopians, democracy has always been the 
driving force of political movements since the 1960s, but its protagonists have, all-too-often, 
indulged in violence and bloodshed (Abbink, 1995: 136-7).  The political forces that emerged 
from the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM), such as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Party (EPRP) and the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISON) called for democracy but 
engaged in mutual assassination in its name. Inspired by the Ethiopian student movement, the 
emergence of republicanism led to the overthrow of monarchy by the army that adopted 
socialist policy without much thought how to apply it in local conditions. To stay in power, the 
military regime copied red and white terror campaigns from other socialist countries to fight 
against its opponents. When the socialist economy failed, it tried a mixed capitalist economy. 
But it was too little, too late, since several guerrilla forces were groping for power, putting 
ethnic self-determination rhetoric on their agenda. In its later period, the military claimed to 
have pursued “socialist democracy,” but in 1991 it was overthrown by the TPLF-engineered 
EPRDF regime, which introduced “electoral democracy”, yet remained a minority ethnic 
dictatorship. 
After the overthrow of the military regime, the West pressed liberalization of the economy and 
politics, which forced socialism to morph into a “revolutionary democracy” under the EPRDF, 
which, in turn, mutated into a “developmental state” with the intention of achieving economic 




above by the TPLF reproduced oppression disguised as freedom. The difference between the 
military regime, which did not practice electoral democracy, and the EPRDF, which practiced 
electoral democracy, is only of rhetoric and of the masks that authoritarianism wears. The 
military regime used the rhetoric of "class" and the mask of "socialist democracy," and the 
EPRDF uses the mask of " self-determination" and the rhetoric of "revolutionary democracy." 
In all the regimes, political, social, and economic violence are the main instruments of 
governance as there is no space for public reasoning and democratic discourses.  
Finally, the TPLF was confronted with its Frankenstein moment, as resurgent groups within 
the ruling EPRDF coalition it created in the 1990s captured the centre and caused the creator 
(i.e., TPLF) trouble, aided by street protests that helped propel Abiy Ahmed to power in early 
2018. Like his predecessors, Abiy also promised to deepen democracy, stressing that building 
a democratic system is an existential matter for Ethiopia. Abiy’s rise to power led to the 
rejection of both the developmental state and revolutionary democracy; instead, he replaced 
them with the new ideology, which he called "Medemer" as the new guiding “philosophy” for 
the changes he initiated in the country.    
However, despite the jump from one ready-made model to another, Ethiopia's fundamental 
problems, such as poverty, instability, and authoritarianism, remained unresolved. The viable 
solution to the myriad problems facing the country is not just moving from one ready-made 
panacea to another, that is, from socialism to liberalism or from revolutionary democracy to 
developmental state, etc. Rather than jumping from one pre-packaged foreign ideology to 
another, I argue that Ethiopian democracy should be based on Ethiopian foundations, 
formulating views and ideas that are compatible with Ethiopia's needs and realities. To do this, 
unpacking the package itself should be the first step to see its contents and sort what is needed 
from what is not.  
As such, the next section critically assesses the limits of Western liberal democracy and the 
extent to which it is relevant to Ethiopia. Moreover, as the jump from one foreign paradigm to 
another did not solve the country's problems in the past, embracing the past in the name of 
cultural authenticity will not solve it either. Even some elements of traditional and cultural 
institutions, values and practices are likely to be rejected by many religious communities. In 
other words, since the imposition of foreign ideologies has not worked in the past, the 
imposition of indigenous ideas may similarly fail unless there is thorough public debate on the 




within, this does not mean a complete rejection of the Western paradigm per se. Rather, I 
suggest to critically reflect on both the Western paradigm and indigenous practices through a 
thorough and compassionate study of Ethiopian history, cultures, communities, religions, etc. 
These efforts of identifying positive cultural and political values and practices from Ethiopia's 
complex past that can serve as the basis for building robust democracy and social justice should 
not be expected to be easy, but this gruelling journey must begin with a sincere engagement of 
Ethiopian history.  
Bonnie Holcomb (2004: 123), in her work Contending Democracies, in which she analysed the 
form and content of Western liberal democracies versus indigenous Oromo democracy, argued 
that the main factor explaining why the post-1991 political transition ended in one-party rule 
is due to the contradictory notions of democracy represented in the struggle over the fate of 
social system that had prevailed in Ethiopia. She noted that each of the political forces that 
joined the transitional government in 1991 used the term "democracy" to describe their political 
goals, while devising different and fundamentally conflicting plans for the country's future, 
leading to the collapse of the project of building a vibrant democracy. As explained here, 
although democracy is seen as a solution to the country's problems, the struggle for it has done 
little to develop or maintain the reality of democracy. A good lesson from past decades is also 
that the transplantation of foreign ideologies has caused enormous damage to Ethiopian politics 
or has done little to develop the reality of a democratic culture. Without a democratic culture, 
no forms of democracy can be sustainable, and this is evident in the many challenges that 
Ethiopia faces. For example, Christopher Clapham (2006: 144) argues that Ethiopia tried to 
solve its long-standing political and economic problems by imitating models from other 
countries, but they all failed. Thus, regardless of the regime types, the obstacle to building 
democracy in Ethiopia is that the country suffers from uncritical emulation of ideas and 
concepts created in a different cultural environment, copied, and pasted in Ethiopia. Borrowed 
models cannot take root unless they are socially and culturally grounded. Ethiopia’s democratic 
efforts often fail due to the lack of ground given to indigenous ideas and models that consider 
the country’s realities. My fieldwork has revealed a general interest in building a democratic 
culture in Ethiopia, with a political imaginary that generates the expression of social realities 
through the indigenization of democratic theories. Like theories, democratic cultures cannot 
simply be imported from outside.   
In the past, political thoughts that could articulate approaches to building a sustainable and 




exercise, were beyond the reach of most Ethiopians, despite decades of reforms and 
revolutions. The working definition of democracy adopted in this thesis also makes such an 
approach the centre of its overall objectives. As indicated in the study framework, Dahl's 
criteria of democracy (Dahl, 1989) help to reflect on democratic institutions and values that fit 
better with the complexity of Ethiopian societies. We must learn from gruesome failures of the 
past and be able to create an environment conducive to reflecting and deciphering values and 
meanings that are important to Ethiopia's history, culture, and realities. 
Public discourse and reasoning are not alien to Ethiopian culture, and Ethiopian traditions are 
full of such cultural practices that the country can draw inspiration from them. For example, 
Somalis have the most effective traditional legal system known as Xeer (Leonard & Gilbert, 
2013), Amhara has a traditional mode of litigation known as Yatayyaq Muget (Jembere, 1992), 
Gurage has effective traditional conflict resolution mechanisms known as Yajoka Kitcha and 
Gordena Shengo (Gudina, 2017), the Sidama people has the indigenous moote political system 
(Kia, 2019), Oromo has an indigenous democracy known as the Gadaa system (Legesse, 2000) 
etc. The recent expansion of the political space has also provided such an opportunity for 
inspiration to reflect on the source of the country's cultural heritage. For example, the Prime 
Minister wrote a book about it, call it Medemer, which has now become the guiding ideology 
of his party and the government he leads. In this book, the Prime Minister claims that the idea 
of "Medemer" originated from Ethiopian cultural values and he believes that it can help meet 
the aspirations of building a democratic Ethiopia (Abiy, 2019: 49). Given the importance of 
cultural institutions among Ethiopians, deepening the indigenous democratic institutions 
through inclusive participatory mechanisms may have a greater contribution to the 
development of an organic democratic culture. However, this should not be taken as a complete 
rejection of modern theories and their importance but considers the possibilities of using the 
indigenous system as a basis for deciphering the values and practices of the existing paradigms 
to make them relevant in Ethiopia's context.    
As noted above, the Oromo people, like other communities in Ethiopia, are endowed with many 
traditional institutions and practices. Especially, Gadaa, an indigenous Oromo political system, 
demonstrates great potential for local governance in particular. In this context, the next section 
attempts to reflect on the governing ideals of Oromo indigenous democracy, deciphering its 
most important elements as an example, in order to establish the importance of various 
indigenous practices from which Ethiopians may draw inspiration to shape a unique Ethiopian 




Asmerom Legesse argues that Gadaa has several features that are applicable under the 
circumstances of the twenty-first century (Legesse, 2000). Building on decades of such 
anthropological work on democratic characters of the Oromo political tradition, I provide a 
detailed analysis in the next section on the substantiveness of participation, representation, and 
deliberation in Oromo democracy.    
6.6 Deepening indigenous Oromo democracy.  
A careful analysis of the institutional features of Gadaa can serve as the basis for inspiration to 
rethink relevant values and principles of indigenous political traditions that can be preserved 
to institutionalize the ideal of popular power, particularly at the lower administration level. 
Democracy as the rule of the people is what the political scientist Robert Dahl suggested, 
arguing that it is a system in which all members of a society have an equal right to participate 
in the decision-making process (Dahl, 1986: 37). This section explores such a concept by 
carefully examining what is missing in representative democracy and what features are present 
as remedies in Oromo democracy. I would argue that Oromo indigenous democracy has several 
important features that can be preserved to help shape local governance in the Oromia region. 
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis, it is necessary to make some caveats here. Despite 
the fact that electoral democracy grossly fails to live up to the idea of a genuinely popular rule, 
which I discuss in detail below, it is nonetheless not an endangered system because it still 
functions fairly in its minimalist sense. More importantly, modern representative democracies 
have progressively eliminated some archaic restrictions on who can stand for elections and 
hold political office, with the exception of the remaining age restriction. Likewise, Gadaa is 
not without its limitations, as it possesses some archaic undemocratic features that must be 
eliminated. One such undemocratic feature is that women are actively excluded from political 
life. This means that they do not have the right to elect their representatives and be elected as 
members of the Gadaa decision making bodies.  
Some scholars argue that since Gadaa was originally conceived as a military organization, 
women were excluded from the system because they were not supposed to become warriors, 
which was the prerogative of men (Gnamo, 2014: 37). However, this assertion in no way 
justifies the prevailing strong patriarchal ideology and patrilineal social norms that often 
prevent women from playing an important political role in society. As such, the exclusion of 
women from Gadaa decision-making process is unacceptable, and the system need to adapt 




egalitarian societies in history, while some societies are less hierarchical and more egalitarian 
than others. Oromo is no exception in this sense because the lack of ideal equality does not 
diminish the importance of egalitarianism, which is easily observable in Oromo culture and 
thought systems.  
Another caveat: Gadaa has lost many of its historical, traditional, and political attributes due 
to various factors that are beyond the scope of this thesis for discussion. Nowadays it is 
practiced in a reduced form among southern Oromo in places like Borana and Guji, which have 
become often-visited sites for anthropological studies because their memories are still 
relatively fresh there. Thus, since Gadaa has lost many of its attributes due to various factors, 
this thesis does not claim it to be applicable in current circumstances. The argument presented 
here is that there are relevant elements to be extracted from the Gadaa institutions that will help 
rethink democratic governance at the lower levels of administration in the Oromia region. With 
these caveats, let me move on to points that might make Gadaa a more substantive form of 
indigenous democracy. I begin the discussion with a brief analysis of some of the familiar flaws 
of modern democracies, and then offer my arguments on the governing ideals of Oromo 
democracy, which I think may address some of the flaws of representative model.  
Recently, it is widely believed that liberal democracy in the Western World is in crisis. The 
reasons for this are largely attributed to the rise of right-wing, nativist, populist candidates and 
movements in Europe and the United States, which have caused deep public discontent with 
the elites slipping back onto an authoritarian path (Diamond, 2017). On the other hand, 
Landemore (2020:33) argues that there is reason to believe that even the most democratized 
version of modern democracies cannot fully meet the ideal of popular rule, that is, a rule in 
which all members of society enjoy equal right to participate in politics. This means that the 
crisis of democracy is not only the result of popular frustration with elites who have often failed 
to deliver on their promises of democracy, but also the product of the limitations in the 
construct of the model itself that is unable to meet the growing democratic expectations.  
Landemore (2020: xiv) claims that the main flaw of the liberal model is more related to its 
liberal-republican design, which primarily focuses on the protection of certain individual rights, 
rather than a democratic construct that envisions the empowerment of citizens as such. As a 
result, with the institutionalization of elections as the sole marker of a democratic feature, in 
the representative version of the design, the idea of people's consent to power takes precedence 




is reproduced as the indirect rule of ordinary citizens, and thus the decisions of the elite are 
viewed as the citizens' choice. This distorted view of equating elite decisions with popular 
choice has long been taken for granted due to the complexity and size of modern states. In 
short, representative democracy was originally conceived as a form of elite rule, as opposed to 
that of ordinary citizens. These are conceptual errors that were made in the design of this form 
of regime and have not yet been overcome, even if over time some of its undemocratic features 
have been gradually eliminated.  
However, with the rise of democratic expectations, which, unfortunately, are often met with 
frustration, many experiments with democratic innovation in recent years have begun to 
question this distorted equation. This is mainly because the design of the model is considered 
insufficiently democratic and, apparently, tends to mutate into an oligarchic and plutocratic 
regime in countries such as the United States and France in recent decades (Cagé, 2020; 
McCarthy et al, 2016). 
Democratic innovations in recent years have formulated the concept of liquid democracy to 
address these problems of Western democracies, which they consider obsolete. Liquid 
democracy is a type of electoral democracy, but it applies a more fluid version of electoral 
representation. With liquid democracy, people delegate their vote to the candidate they like, 
either for a certain period or on specific issues, but retain the ability to withdraw their votes at 
any time, so they always have the right to participate directly (Meyer, 2012). While many 
scholars claim that this system is innovative and new, the fact remains that it existed in a similar 
form for hundreds of years in the Oromo indigenous democracy. Thus, joining the ranks of 
scholars who are sceptical of the democratic nature of existing democracies, I argue below that 
Oromo democracy has institutional features of flexible representation that make it a more 
substantive form of democracy. 
Gadaa is an indigenous paradigm of democracy that flexibly combines the advantages of both 
representative and participatory democracy, while avoiding their flaws. This free and fluid 
account of the system shapes its governing ideals that institutionalize egalitarian and less rigid 
structures, thereby reducing barriers to the exercise of power by ordinary citizens and 
expanding their participation and representation rights. Oromo democracy has several 
principles that constitute its governing ideals and provide the structures needed to 
institutionalize an indigenous form of popular rule at the local level: participation; deliberation; 




described as the right to democratic representation and equal participation in deliberation to 
shape the values of democratic politics: equality, empowerment, and inclusion. Thus, given the 
normative preferences of these democratic values for measuring ideal popular rule, as Robert 
Dahl (1989) argued in his definition of democracy, the analysis below focuses on the quality 
of participation, representation, and deliberation in both the modern representative system and 
the indigenous Oromo democracy. 
6.6.1 Participation in Oromo democracy  
Participation is one of the governing ideals of Oromo democracy. The question we need to 
answer, however, is what distinguishes participation in Oromo democracy when it is widely 
claimed that this right is already being applied in electoral democracies. Participation rights in 
electoral democracies are translated into actual political rights, such as the right to vote, 
freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of association, etc (Landemore, 
2020:134). These rights were originally conceived as consent to power, and not as its exercise. 
For example, the right to vote means, in the first place, the right to elect representatives. It does 
not include the right to agree or disagree directly on political agendas, except in the rare case 
of referendums. For this reason, the right to vote cannot be seen as a genuine right to participate. 
Likewise, the remaining political rights were designed primarily to counterbalance potential 
abuse of power and were not intended to directly induce citizens participation rights (Ibid.: 
136).   
On the contrary, the hallmark of Oromo democracy is its participatory political culture. In 
Oromo democracy, there are several important mechanisms through which ordinary citizens 
exercise their right to participate. The first of this mechanism is through the age-grade 
organization called hiriyaa. Hiriyaa, that is, peer groups, is the most important institutional 
features of Gadaa, which allows citizens to enjoy the maximum participation rights. This 
organization represents not only the stages of development that a group goes through, but also 
defines the type of activities, responsibilities and duties that groups constantly assume during 
their active career (Legesse, 1973: 51). It allows every member of the society to participate in 
public affairs through a structure that socializes people into different stages of life from 
childhood to old age.  
Under the Gadaa system, members of society are organized in 11 age grades with an eight-
year separation that ranges from birth to death. These are: Dabballe (0 to 8 years old); Gamme 




old); Raaba Doori (33 to 40 years old); Lubaa (41 to 48 years old, also called Gadaa because 
it is the stage in which a peer group entered this stage, elect their Gadaa leaders to assume 
political leadership); Yuuba – consists of four stages of semi-retirement from 49 to 80 years 
(yuuba VII, yuuba VIII, yuuba IX and yuuba X). During these stages of partial retirement, 
members do not actively participate in the day-to-day affairs of the Gadaa government, but 
they continue to play an important legislative and advisory role to leaders in power. The last 
age grade is Gadamojjii, which is the stage of full retirement and is over 81 years old (Legesse, 
1973:50).  
These classifications mean that all members of the community take on different roles that are 
appropriate to their age. Accordingly, the transition from one stage to the next is symbolized 
by an externally visible emblem, signifying their corresponding roles in the society. Various 
hairstyles or turban headgears are used to indicate where the person is on the cycle. The 
visibility of the emblem invites community members to participate in the socialisation of the 
individual into a certain position, either rewarding the person for acting appropriately or 
punishing failure to act according to the requirements of that position. It is for this reason that 
Legessee (2006) argued that Gadaa is the embodiment of a democratic political culture that 
not only allows but also requires the participation of a person in all stages of generational roles, 
including assuming the highest responsibility of political leadership in society. 
Besides the distribution of authority and responsibility, the other significance of this cultural 
practice is that it provides a mechanism to prepare future political leaders for 21 years before 
they assume public office. Nomination of the future leaders takes place within the framework 
of an institutional election process known as Lallaba, when they become young adults aged 
between 25-32. This is when they are initiated into an age category called Kuussa, that is, when 
they begin to take serious social responsibilities. Senior leaders and experts are assigned to 
guide and counsel these youths in the importance of political leadership and other social 
responsibilities so that they can grow with the wisdom and social capabilities they need to lead 
society when they take power. This tradition, while it allows the future leaders to learn to 
govern and prepare for public administration, also allows people to watch their performance 
and check if they are worthy of the office. Once they are vetted for approximately 21 years, 
those who are qualified will hold public office for only eight years, when they become 
luuba/Gadaa, which is ruling age grade from 41 to 48. As the responsibility for socialization 
also extends to the general public, given the current youth bulge in the country (World Youth 




from violence to drug addiction or other problems, especially in adolescence, allowing them to 
become part of an institution that enables them to participate constructively in social 
responsibilities. While a 21-year period is currently unrealistic, however, modern political 
parties that compete for political office may create an institutional mechanism to prepare their 
members for future social responsibility beyond formal education. This can be done by creating 
a department that reviews the performance of their members, making them responsible for 
carefully reviewing government policies and actions, and offering alternative policies.   
The second important mechanism through which ordinary citizens exercise their rights to 
participate are the various assemblies known by different names, such as Qixxee, Chaffee and 
Gumii. These are important democratic forums that serve as laboratories of Oromo democracy, 
as they are the assemblies of equals in which all members of the public have an equal 
opportunity to participate in shaping public agenda, except for women, which needs to be 
corrected for application in this era. 
Qixxee are local assemblies, comparable to contemporary citizen assemblies that grew out of 
Robert Dahl (1989: 340) ideas of minipopulus, which inspire an innovative mechanism to 
involving citizens in public issues. But unlike Dahl's minipopulus, which is made up of 
randomly selected citizens, the Qixxee forums are open to all as a platform for grassroots 
democracy. However, mass participation all the time is not a precondition in the Qixxee forums 
as this depends on the importance of the agenda. Except in cases where the agenda of 
deliberation is directly related to the person obligated to attend the forum, it gives citizens 
options to decide for themselves how much and how often they can participate at a given time. 
For example, the Qixxee forum can sometimes deal with a specific topic of interest to some 
members of the community, so members of that community are involved. During normal times, 
citizens can appoint representatives, or when collective security or interests are at stake, large 
numbers of citizens can directly participate in Qixxee, even from neighbouring communities, 
to make decisions on matters of common interest and concern. Such practice increases citizen 
participation in collective decision-making, while reducing barriers to the exercise of power by 
ordinary citizens. Modern technological developments can also help improve such forums to 
make them effective and useful. 
Chaffee is the traditional Oromo parliament. What sets Chaffee apart from Qixxee is that 
Chaffee strictly follows the specified calendars, while Qixxee can be held any time when the 




open to all people. Another important point to noted here is that, unlike modern democracies, 
Gadaa establishes citizen legislature as opposed to elective legislature, in which the most 
important policy-making institutions such as Qixeee, Chaffee and Gumii are open to all 
citizens, so that members of the community have the right to participate in these institutions 
both as group through delegation and individually. The goal of these assemblies is to empower 
ordinary citizens so that deliberation in shaping public policies is as accessible as possible. 
The National Chaffee, known as Gumii, is a gathering of multitudes and a manifestation of the 
sovereignty of the people, as it is a body superior to all other political structures. In Oromo's 
political traditions, the highest authority resides in this open national assembly, in which all 
Gadaa classes and assemblies, aspirants and in power, including able citizens, active and 
retired are represented (Legesse, 2006). All binding decisions concerning almost all areas of 
Oromo's life are deliberated and decided at Gumii assemblies. Gumii’s decision cannot be 
reversed by any other assemblies. But other assemblies can make binding decisions regarding 
almost all areas of their local life, in accordance with the decisions made in the Gumii assembly. 
Gumi is open to all citizens who have opinions about the ruling Gadaa class or the laws of the 
country and have the ability to express these views.   
As Gumii is the supreme body over all political structures, it has the authority to make decisions 
on all unresolved issues by other bodies of the political system, and mediate when an impasse 
arises between the members of the Gadaa group in power and the councillors in the Gumii 
assembly. This can be a very important political tradition that the Oromo people can offer to the 
modern world to address gridlock problems. For example, gridlock is a constant feature of American 
political life. The US Congress was dysfunctional and could not pass legislation during most of 
Obama's rule. This is because the Founding Fathers did not make any provision to it, perhaps 
because they never foresaw this would happen (Ezra Klein, 2015). Perhaps by adopting a supra-
institutional structure such as the Gumii, Western states may improve their political culture, making 
it less uncompromising.   
Gumii is such a democratic assembly in which the Oromo community as a whole has the 
opportunity to participate in decision-making on an equal basis. It encourages people to work 
together, allowing people to participate in political decisions even when they are not in power, 
which fosters the unity and tolerance that helped Oromo develop a culture of pluralism. An 
interesting example of this fact is that Yuuba groups (outgoing gadaa party) become most active 




Gadaa leadership. The reason they are considered semi-retired (yuuba) is because given their 
experience and knowledge they gained during their previous leadership, their expertise is 
required in the legislation and leading Gumii assemblies. Although they are semi-retired from 
the Gadaa leadership, they remain members of the multitude and play an important role as 
councillors in the various tasks of the assembly. Hence, unlike modern democracies, leadership 
in Gumii assemblies is provided to senior leaders with the necessary knowledge and wisdom 
from members of outgoing Gadaa leaders (parties). In modern democracies, members of the 
incumbent dominate and take over the leadership of the legislature. However, legislative 
leadership in the Gadaa tradition is acquired only after leaders have effectively fulfilled their 
role in the executive office. This helps ensure the continuation of best policies and practices of 
the previous regime and serves as a mechanism to control the authoritarian tendencies of Gadaa 
leaders, who may change laws in their favour, for example, like the problems that have recently 
become prevalent in Africa to extend presidential term limits through constitutional 
amendments.  
In short, what distinguishes Oromo democracy from the electoral model is the existence of an 
institutionalized system of participation at all levels of the social system. Marco Bassi (1996: 
160) explained that a unique feature of Gadaa's polity is its diffused and capillary participatory 
structures in all types of decision-making in various assemblies from the bottom to top, with a 
general flow from peripheral assemblies to the higher pyramidal assemblies of the multitude. 
Participation is embedded in the entire Gadaa system and permeates its age-grade 
organizations and various citizen assemblies, which place great importance on citizen 
participation in decision-making. This feature makes the traditional Oromo political culture, 
certainly, a democracy, even by the standards of Lincoln's conception of democracy as 
government of the people, by the people, for the people. Greater participation in decision-
making and the political process that effectively moves from base to centre makes it more 
democratic than even modern electoral democracy.   
6.6.2 Representation in Oromo democracy 
Given the size and complexity of modern states, democracy is likely to remain representative 
in one form or another, but here again important question needs to be answered is whether the 
representation allows ordinary citizens to be in charge of their matters. As noted above, even 
the most democratized versions of existing democracies do not measure up to the full potential 




its two principles: periodic elections and independence of representatives. While periodic 
elections are the basis of democratization, the main problem, however, is the ideological 
dominance of elections as the sole marker of political legitimacy. As such, not only is the 
practice of electoral rituals arising from problems such as campaign finance, vote rigging and 
biased media coverage that pose serious problems from a democratic viewpoint (Gastil and 
Wright, 2018: 305), but the very design of the system is incompatible with the principle of 
democratic representation. With elections being used as a means of authorizing the mandates 
of representatives, an elusive conception of electoral representation emerged, in which 
elections are understood as transferring the consent of voters to the elected representatives 
(Landemore, 2020:83).  
 
In other words, consent at the ballot box is not only an expression of the equal principle of one 
person, one vote, which is necessary to create democratic credentials. Thanks to the majority 
principle, it also provides the benefits of political legitimacy by allowing elected 
representatives to act on behalf of all citizens, including those voters who voted unequivocally 
for other candidates. This remains the main problem with the consent theory of legitimacy, 
since it cannot explain why elected representatives automatically claim to represent the entire 
body of citizens, while there are at least a portion of the citizens who voted for other candidates. 
 
Failure to adequately address this problem of consent theory gives rise to the second 
controversial principle - the independence of representatives, which is intended to give elected 
elites yet another political legitimacy under the pretext of their independence. It means that the 
relative independence of the elected representatives from their constituencies is necessary to 
create meaningful space for debate among elites (Urbinati, 2006:45). This implies that they can 
agree or deviate from the preferences of their constituents if necessary. Rights such as freedom 
of expression seek to counterbalance potential abuses of power by elected elites, such as misuse 
of their independence rights, by ensuring responsiveness and accountability through public 
criticism of their decisions and choices (Diamond, 2015: 60). However, it is also worth noting 
here that while freedom of expression is an excellent tool for exerting discursive pressure on 
elected representatives, it may or may not represent the necessary voices in actual decision-
making. This is because actual decision-making power is ultimately exercised by the elected 
elites in conformity with or against expressed preferences. In short, as Manin explained, 




democracy as genuine popular rule due to severe constraints in terms of inclusiveness, so it 
may not produce the best possible results, working with fewer votes and viewpoints (Manin, 
1997: 79).  
 
The solution to these problems lies in rethinking the concept of representation in terms of ideal 
democratic traditions to make it more inclusive, egalitarian, and empowering. For example, 
Gadaa combines democratic features of both representative and participatory models. This 
allows the system to embrace a richer ecology of various forms of democratic representation, 
as opposed to the representative model, which offers limited and rigid account of electoral 
representation. Oromo democracy has two age-based organizations that integrate the lessons 
of the institutional success of both participatory and representative democracy, allowing the 
system to institutionalize multiple forms and sites of representation mechanisms.  
 
The two age-based organizations in Oromo democracy are Hiriyaa (peer groups) and 
Goggessa, which are the five Gadaa parties. As explained above, Hiriyaa (peer groups) are a 
site for participatory democracy, where each member of society takes on different social 
responsibilities appropriate to their age. It also serves as an accountability mechanism for the 
entire system, ensuring that their members are aware of their duties and responsibilities, 
keeping them under the supervision of their peers and the general public.  
 
Goggesa is very similar to modern political parties that run for political office and leadership. 
In the Oromo political tradition, there are five gogessaa groups, which means there are five 
Gadaa parties that assume political power in sequential and cyclical order, each for a period of 
eight years. This means that political power rotates between the five Gadaa parties through a 
succession system that determines who gives power to whom. If we assume that these parties 
are A, B, C, D, E, then the order of succession is always as follows: ‘A’ transfer power to ‘B’; 
‘B’ to ‘C’; ‘C’ to ‘D’; ‘D’ to ‘E’; and ‘E’ back to ‘A’, thus completing a forty-year cycle of 
five eight-year office term. No two parties can ever be Gadaa (assume power) at the same time, 
because the system is structured in such a way that when one group passes the Gadaa stage, 
the next one follows it, etc. In other words, each Gadaa party has to wait forty years to return 
to Gadaa power. Periodic rotation is designed to ensure that ordinary citizens who are granted 
access to power to serve the entire political body do not lose sight of the interests of the general 




non-renewable eight-year term of office (mandate) that alternates between five Gadaa parties. 
There is no institutional mechanism for the extension or renewal of the mandate of the Gadaa 
officers, including the Abbaa Gadaa (the president). Second, there is also a mid-year review 
mechanism for the group in power in which citizens can hold their leaders accountable and 
impeach them when necessary and justified.  
 
Another important point to note is that, unlike modern democracies, in the Oromo political 
tradition, party loyalty and membership is passed down from the father to all his children, 
although the children are free to change their loyalty and membership later. This means, the 
entire Oromo population belongs to one of the five Gadaa (goggessaa) parties in their area, 
and they retain this as their identity along with members of their peer group who were jointly 
initiated into the Hiriyaa organization. In other words, every Oromo man is a member of one 
of the five Gadaa parties that he inherited from his father. But unlike modern electoral 
democracies, in the Oromo political tradition, Gadaa parties do not compete with each other 
for political power. Electoral competition always takes place between members of the same 
peer group. This does not even include members of the same party other than their peers. In 
other words, each peer group competes for political power within itself, not even with other 
peer groups in the same party. As noted above, there are up to eleven peer groups, each of them 
separated by eight years (age-grade organization).  
 
Moreover, electoral competition is limited not only to who competes with whom for political 
power, but also to when members of a particular peer group can exercise this right. In other 
words, each peer group exercises its right to elect and run for political office only when they 
reach the Lubaa (Gadaa) grade. All members who jointly initiated into the same peer group 
(Hiriyaa) enjoy this right concurrently when they are lubaa (Gadaa) for eight years.  
 
Although the formal exercise of this right is strictly limited to the lubaa (Gadaa) class, the 
practice begins at an early stage. In other words, the voting age, and the age at which members 
of the peer group assume power are separate. In the Oromo tradition, the voting age is when 
peer groups reach the kuussa grade, that is, when they are between 25 and 32 years old. It is at 
this stage that each peer group begins to assume serious social responsibilities and can 
nominate future leaders from among their peers. But nomination into the cohort of future 




scrutiny of the general public and their peers for a period of 21 years until they become lubaa 
(Gadaa). The system is designed to ensure that all parties have an equal opportunity to hold 
public office but must go through all the necessary stages and gain the wisdom and knowledge 
that the position deserves, which are vetted by senior councillors assigned to them and members 
of the public.  
 
Also, all peer groups that pass the lubaa (Gadaa) grade and become yuuba after eight years of 
political leadership automatically lose their right to elect and run for political office, so they do 
not possess this right all the time. The reason is that elections are organized for the executive 
position, and the executive's mandate cannot be extended beyond an eight-year term, so 
outgoing members automatically lose those rights as they relinquish their executive role in 
Gadaa government. However, this does not mean that the outgoing leaders do not play a role 
in government. Oromo political traditions allow outgoing leaders to continue to play various 
roles, with the exception of political leadership, in the Gadaa's government through other 
structures such as the legislature. This remains the same for all peer groups, so it is only over 
time that all peer groups enjoy these rights equally through the practice of rotating political 
power in a sequential and cyclical order among the five Gadaa parties. Thus, because of the 
rotation of political power every eight years between the five Gadaa parties, de facto access to 
power is strictly equalized over the span of forty years in the long run. Periodic rotation, as 
well as a non-renewable executive mandate, are designed to facilitate the peaceful transfer of 
political power and reduce violent ways of seizing power.  
 
The system does this because it distributes political power across its structures from lower to 
higher levels, rather than stagnating with fewer elites. Unlike the representative model, which 
restricts policymaking institutions to elected elites, Oromo political traditions make such 
institutions open to all able citizens, both elected and unelected, aspirants and in power, active 
and retired to be represented and make their impact on political decisions. From this 
perspective, Gadaa imposes severe restrictions on the scope of the right to vote in political 
elections and run for office, compared to modern democracies, which allow all eligible citizens 
to exercise this right on a regular, periodic basis. This is perhaps the most important feature of 
Oromo democracy that can be reconstructed for use in this era to overcome the ideological 
dominance of elections as the sole marker of democratic exercise. As noted below, by 




echelon, Gadaa makes important political institutions accessible to ordinary citizens. This not 
only helps prevent stagnation with fewer elected elites, but it also provides multiple venues for 
representations and increases the accessibility of such platforms for ordinary citizens. Another 
mechanism is that, as indicated above, by reducing contestation between political parties, 
Gadaa increases the intra-party contestation for electing the most fit candidate for political 
office. Modern democracies often overlook intra-party competition, investing much into the 
competition with other rival parties for political office. Moreover, Gadaa parties differ only in 
leadership styles, not ideologically. Such a continuity of the founding ideology from one Gadaa 
party to another may have contributed to a peaceful transfer of power every eight years, while 
the outgoing Gadaa party automatically takes the place of opposition. The oppositions to the 
ruling Gadaa party do not come through revolt, but in the form of public reasoning and 
arguments in favour of public values and social justices (Jalata, 2012, 132).  
 
Thus, as I tried to explain in detail above, the Lubaa (Gadaa) class practices the type of 
democracy comparable to the version of democracy we today call representative, but this 
election is for the executive, not the legislature. The legislature is open to all capable citizens, 
so those who can, they can directly participate, and those who cannot, can delegate someone 
they trust or believe they have the necessary knowledge of the subject in the policymaking 
process. Moreover, since the majority principle that imposes the will of the majority on the 
minority is unknown in the Oromo tradition, all decisions are approved by consensus. The 
advantage of this practice is that it effectively transforms individual subjective preferences, 
which are used by elected elites to automatically assert representational legitimacy over the 
entire body of the citizens, into a more objective consensus that is either discovered or 
constructed by bringing the final decision closer to collective judgment through open 
deliberation.   
 
In addition to the aforementioned age-based organizations, Oromo democracy has other 
structures through which it distributes political authority, institutionalizing open and flexible 
representation. For example, institutions such as Qixxee, Chaffee and Gumii provide a good 
experience of democratic representation. The most distinctive feature of these assemblies is 
that they make the legislative power accessible to ordinary citizens in the deliberation that 
follows a consensus decision. Any member of the community could participate on an equal 




representative. Anyone with knowledge of Gadaa laws, rituals, history, chronology, and time 
reckoning can be participate directly in these forums. More interestingly, members of the 
Gadaa party in power do not have any special decision-making prerogative compared to those 
who are not in power, especially in the Gumii assembly. In other words, the decisional influence 
of the party in power is very limited, since they constitute only a minority among the various 
officers who have equal rights in the policy decisions in the assembly of the multitude. 
 
In general, the following two features distinguish Oromo representation from electoral 
representation. First, a unique feature of Oromo representation is that it offers a flexible 
representative structure that significantly emphasizes the value and exercise of popular power, 
ensuring that citizens do not have to wait until the end of the term to recall their representatives. 
The mid-term review mechanism is one way to recall incompetent and underperforming 
representatives in Oromo democracy. This ability to recall means that accountability will be 
much stronger than electoral representation. Second, the number of representatives is not 
limited or fixed, since Oromo democratic assemblies can number in the hundreds or thousands, 
and their number varies from agenda to agenda. Thus, representation in Oromo democracy is 
open to all and expresses the values of inclusion and equality. The benefit of this practice is 
that it gives people the freedom to participate flexibly in the political process, directly or 
indirectly, by delegating decision-making authority to the most competent individuals on the 
agenda presented for deliberation.  
6.6.3 Deliberation in Oromo democracy 
Deliberation is the discursive process that distinguishes Oromo democracy from electoral 
democracy, as there are various factors that make the latter insufficiently democratic. One of 
such factors is that the discursive process in electoral democracy relies on parties to structure 
public debate as a competition between political platforms that is subjected to partisan interests. 
Thus, it manifests itself to a large extent in purely minimalist Schumpeterian versions that 
emphasize elite competition and voting moments, as opposed to a deliberation in which 
ordinary citizens participate.  
 
Unlike the electoral paradigm, Oromo democracy embraces deliberation as a key institutional 
principle. The different levels of deliberation that include ordinary citizens as equal 
participants, one at the national level, which is the largest and supreme body on all pan-Oromo 




binding decisions are made at these assemblies by consensus with the direct or indirect 
participation of the person involved. The absence of a quorum concept that defines a minimum 
number of members for a deliberative assembly and the process of reaching consensus can 
make the process challenging, but the system has ways to deal with these issues.  
 
Reaching consensus is not a spontaneous process, as there are a number of procedural rules 
and norms that are used to prevent or overcome impasse. All assemblies always begin with the 
chairperson encouraging participants to abide by established principles of productive 
discussion and to avoid offensive or quarrelsome speech. Important decisions are not made in 
haste but are seriously considered in lines of past precedents and careful deliberations.  
 
Civility in deliberation is encouraged as this helps facilitate mutual respect in democratic 
deliberations. Asmerom Legesse argued that the fundamental principle of Gadaa's discourse is: 
"Look for the best of what others have said to gain common ground, not the worst of what they 
said to win an argument." Participants are asked to leave all of their "cleverness" behind, as 
"cleverness" is the undoing of democracy” (Legesse, 2000: 214). There is also a mechanism to 
pacify public discourse when politicians become violent as we see nowadays especially in 
emerging democracies, where people fight in Parliament. When that happens, Oromo uses the 
blessing of the Gadaa leader who chairs the meeting as a mechanism to pacify emotions. The 
longest blessing is given when tempers get out of hand. As emotions subside, they return to 
discussion with civility and attention to each other. The whole purpose of the blessing is to 
pacify frayed nerves and return to rational discourse. This not only helps to maintain peace in 
democratic discourses, but also balances individual freedom of expression, on the one hand, 
and an orderly discussion environment, on the other.  
 
In a nutshell, while the West may have contributed greatly to the development of modern 
democratic thought and its complex structure, the fact remains that Oromo among other 
societies had such all-encompassing democratic republics in the 16th century, even before 
European travellers arrived on the shores of North America and only later built democracy in 
the seventeenth or eighteenth century (Jalata, 2012: 130). Thus, as I have argued in this thesis, 
reconstructing the indigenous institutions, values, and culture can have transformative impacts 
on the democratization of Ethiopia, helping to overcome past mistakes made by imitating 




Rethinking democracy in the context of the current political transition is necessary to counter 
the characterization of indigenous political traditions as inferior. Political thinking which does 
not recognize this, and continues to merely emulate others, cannot contribute to the 
development of democratic culture in the country.  
6.7 Conclusion 
The findings in this chapter show that Ethiopia under the EPRDF had never fulfilled Robert 
Dahl's interpretation of what democracy means, as the three elements such as participation, 
representation and civil and political liberties were under repression, restrictions, and tight 
control. In rhetoric, the regime presented democracy as an indispensable value to the Ethiopian 
people, but in practice, authoritarianism was promoted as a revolutionary democracy. Contrary 
to Robert Dahl's criteria, the regime introduced several harsh laws restricting civil society, 
completely closed political space, closed most independent media outlets, and suppressed 
opposition political parties. These measures sparked a growing crescendo of mass protests that 
changed the status quo, bringing Abiy Ahmed to power.  
In the first months of Abiy's rule, the political reforms undertaken somehow fit Dahl's 
definition of democracy. Political measures such as revision of repressive laws and expanding 
political space are consistent with the constituent elements of democracy, although this was in 
the Schumpeterian sense, nevertheless encouraging participation, public debates, and respect 
for civil and political rights. However, weak countervailing forces and mismanagement of the 
transition created uncertainty as progress on early reform rolled back.  
In short, taking stock of Ethiopia's progress towards democracy, a pattern of return to 
authoritarianism appears to have emerged, as Abiy's liberalization measures were only aimed 
at inviting more guests into the living room for a "coffee talk", with a few people welcome to 
stay over for dinner. Despite the fact that the public protests that brought Abiy to power 
provided an opportunity for a transition to true democracy, the prime minster is unable to 
achieve the decisive changes expected in the functioning of the political system, misplacing 
the priorities. The early start on the liberalization project was not to genuinely advance 
democratization; rather, it appears to have aimed to offset public discontent and consolidate his 
power through continued presence of the ruling party structure and the deployment of informal 





In line with the research framework adopted for this thesis, this chapter has reflected on cultural 
democracy to present an argument against the drive to emulate foreign models, especially 
Western liberal democracy. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed seemed to understand this fact when 
he stated that the idea of "Medemer" is rooted in Ethiopian history and cultural values, although 
he does not mention the Ethiopian values from which this idea originated. Thus, this study 
seeks to contribute to filling this gap by extracting relevant elements from Gadaa as an example 
to demonstrate the importance of indigenous traditions to overcome the problem of emulation. 
Accordingly, this chapter provided the rationale for the need to base Ethiopian democracy on 
Ethiopian foundations, creating a common political framework from the country's indigenous 
political traditions, emphasizing equal participation, democratic representation, and 


















Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
The objective of this thesis was to explore the challenges and prospects of democratization in 
the current political reform process in Ethiopia. With this general objective in mind, the thesis 
presented an analysis of how the struggle for democracy was activated, how Amhara uprising 
and Oromo protests led to the downfall of a powerful authoritarian regime in Africa, What 
were the role of party competition, factional squabbles, and intra-elite rivalry of the ruling party 
in bringing about the current transition, how major political actors attempted to respond to the 
challenges of democracy and the nature of political relations in the post-protest transition 
process.    
For addressing these research questions, this study employed a qualitative approach of a 
deductive nature, which allowed the formulation of a theoretical framework for analysing 
Ethiopia's political development over a longer historical trajectory that helped to determine the 
extent to which Ethiopia meets the nine conditions identified as the determinants of 
democratization. This reflects on and advances Robert Dahl's (1989) theoretical understanding 
of democracy adopted in this thesis, which provides a set of criteria for assessing the quality of 
democratic institutions. The nine conditions defined in the theoretical framework are as 
follows: economic development, management of social heterogeneity and polarization, the 
existence of robust statehood, the existence of a vibrant civil society, cultural democracy, press 
freedom and social media, nonviolent social movements, the role of the diaspora, and 
liberalized autocracy. This synthesis of nine conditions allows an examination of the extent to 
which any or all of these preconditions existed in Ethiopia during the current transition process, 
shedding more light on the types of institutions and policy approach needed to address the 
challenges that impede the development of a vibrant and stable democracy in the country.  In 
short, since there is no single ideal or teleological condition that should be emulated by all 
countries, this thesis has combined relevant components of the three dominant approaches to 
democratization: structural, transitional and modernization. This not only helps to overcome 
the limitations of these approaches, but also better explains Ethiopia's current transition to 
democracy, as well as provides a broader and more solid framework for understanding the 
challenges of democratization in African countries. In this perspective, this concluding chapter 
offers a synthesis of the findings in relation to the nine determinants applied in this study, as 




   7.2 Synthesis of the determinants of democracy in the Ethiopian context 
For the past half century, Ethiopia has been in a continuous struggle to establish a democratic 
system. When the imperial regime was toppled in 1974 with the student revolution of 1960s 
and 1970s, which the military regime took over to replace Emperor Haile Selassie, the goal 
was to transform the country into a republic in which the government of the people would 
become a new order to address major grievances of Ethiopia’s oppressed people. But over the 
next seventeen years, Ethiopians had to endure the brutality of the military regime and civil 
war, despite some steps toward religious equality for Muslims and the passage of a law that 
abolished imperial landlordism. 
Seventeen years of gratuitous atrocities came to an end in 1991, leading to the emergence of 
the second republic with a multinational federal settlement, with the rise to power of a rebel 
movement led by the TPLF, which was later joined by three other regional parties to form the 
EPRDF, promising to advance multiparty democracy and development in Ethiopia. However, 
over the next three decades, the country again faced serious human rights violations with the 
violent regime changes that saw the brutal military dictatorship replaced by another ethnic 
minority, leading to the commission of authoritarianism.  
Ethiopia has entered its third transition again following the recent victory of the Oromo protests 
that led to a change of leadership in the EPRDF in April 2018, an early period of which heralded 
an unprecedented political change in Ethiopia's modern history. Ethiopia's transition in April 
2018 was the result of long-standing social grievances such as lack of political freedoms, land 
grabbing, widespread suppression of dissent and rampant federal mismanagement. This led to 
public protests that effectively set-in motion a nationwide order of disobedience, creating an 
atmosphere of ungovernability until Abiy Ahmed came to power in April 2018, riding the wave 
of national discontents and echoing the rhetoric of democratic change. 
As such, the student movement of the 1960s and 1970s that led to the first transition in 1974, 
as well as the guerrilla forces that made the second transition in 1991, both brought about a 
regime change, but neither led to the creation of a democratic system. However, there is a 
marked difference between the current and previous transitions. Unlike previous violent regime 
changes, the change in 2018 was the result of largely non-violent social movements that 
brought forward new leaders who won votes in the then ruling EPRDF coalition. Undoubtedly, 




the repression of government, as well as reformist elements in the EPRDF, were the driving 
force behind the radical transformation seen in early 2018. 
7.2.1 Non-violent social movement  
As discussed in this thesis, the movement that led to the current transition originated in early 
April 2014 and has its roots in the Oromo protests against the controversial Addis Ababa 
Master Plan, as well as the Amhara uprising against the TPLF authoritarianism. The protests 
that began at the universities soon spread to urban centres, but only to face extreme brutality 
from the government. As the protest gained momentum and the May 2015 elections 
approached, the government had to issue statements pledging to halt the master plan, so it 
helped subside the protests. However, on November 12, 2015, the protests resumed in the small 
town of Ginchi against the government's decision to clear the forests and soccer field for an 
investment project. Since then, protests have continued and expanded and spread throughout 
Oromia, with the participation of farmers and other sectors of society. The government's violent 
response to protesters increased the intensity and scope of the protests, rather than suppressing 
them. 
Although the immediate cause of the protests was the publication of the Addis Ababa Master 
Plan, the ultimate goal was to end the repressive system imposed by the TPLF and ensure the 
transition to democracy. This goal of democratic change only became clearer during the Grand 
Oromo rally, which began on August 6, 2016, and was attended by Oromo and Non-Oromo 
groups in solidarity, mainly Amhara youth from Gondar and Bahir Dar. Its instilled confidence 
in the depth and scope of the protest movements as the rallies simultaneously organized in over 
200 rural towns across Oromia, including Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa. As the Grand Oromo 
rally was organized in the face of the suppression of the regime, it confirmed that the protests 
had already become a movement that instilled confidence to bringing down the repressive 
regime in the next phase of resistance. The rally was a decisive turning point, proving that the 
movement has the strength it needs to put constant pressure on the regime through a nationwide 
movement.  
With the confidence gained from the Grand Oromo rally, protest organizers began to plan how 
to achieve the desired transition by pressuring and encouraging reformers within the regime to 
begin seizing power from the TPLF and its loyalists. This was first accomplished through 
takeover of power in the Oromia region, where the protests were intense, allowing Lemma 




replaced them with reformist figures. After the takeover of power in Oromia, the next move 
was to create an alliance of moderates from members of the ruling EPRDF, in particular 
between OPDO and ANDM, with the aim of eventually wresting the federal power. The TPLF 
opposed the reformist takeover of Oromia, so they began to use more brutal repression to stop 
progress arguably through a proxy war, creating conflicts on the borders of Somalia and 
Oromia regions, as well as blaming100 reformist groups for the stampede that resulted in the 
death of several people during the cultural festival on October 2, 2016.  
After that, a state of emergency was declared, but this did not produce the desired results. 
Rather, it intensified the power struggle between EPRDF hardliners and soft-liners, giving 
protesters more room to regroup and strategize, forming a security network that connects 
mainly OPDO and protest leaders. In the weeks following the lifting of the state of emergency, 
protesters boycotted markets and held demonstrations. This made it clear that the youth 
movement not only survived the emergency, but also used the time to build a better 
organizational structure with security links with the moderates in the ruling EPRDF, allowing 
them to return with greater strength and confidence.  
The reformers, in particular Lemma, supported the protesters and blamed the government for 
the crisis, indicating that the only way out was to address the grievances of the protesters. As 
the reformers sympathized with the demands of protesters, by the summer of 2017 the rift 
between reformists and hardliners within the ruling party had widened, tightening reformist 
control over federal power through the party structure and the formation of the OPDO and 
ANDM alliance.  
Thus, as protests intensified and the reformist coalition consolidated, the TPLF lost confidence 
and began to show signs of retreat. With support from the youth movement, the soft-liners in 
the ruling EPRDF pushed the party towards further serious reforms, leading to the resignation 
of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn on February 15, 2018. Empowered by the protests, 
which created a general atmosphere of ungovernability, ANDM and OPDO also outplayed the 
TPLF in the selection process that led to Abiy Ahmed's appointment as Prime Minister on April 
2, 2018.  
In short, by rallying youth in support of democratic transformation, the 2014-2018 youth-led 
protest movements employed one of the rare types of nonviolent mechanisms called conversion 
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to spearhead political change in early 2018, with the result that the Oromo and Amhara elites 
in the ruling EPRDF were convinced of the just cause of the youth movement in bringing down 
the TPLF authoritarianism. As shown below, this thesis explored the changes taking place in 
the country and the direction that has been taken since the new administration came to power, 
which helps to understand how they all fit into the dynamics in which Ethiopia lives today.  
The early phase of the post-protest context was unprecedented in modern Ethiopian history, as 
prime minster Abiy introduced several political reforms that has earned him acclaims. This 
includes expanding political space, reforming restrictive legislatures, and replacing the 
principle of revolutionary democracy by Medemer as the guiding ideology of the ruling party. 
Relations with the diaspora were renewed, recognizing them as an integral part of the identity 
and development of Ethiopia. This was a clear departure from the hostile relationship between 
government and diaspora for most of the previous decades.  
Most Ethiopians, dissatisfied with the previous regime, inevitably linked their hopes and 
expectations to a utopian vision of the future. Instead of replacing one dictator with another, 
hopes grew for a system of accountable and democratic governance, in which real power is 
transferred from a clique of self-serving elites to the people to enable Ethiopians to exercise 
their civil right to shape the country's destiny. However, such opportunities have all too often 
been presented in the past with the hope of democratic change, but one after another they have 
shattered. Amhara uprising and Oromo protests is also one of such opportunities that helped 
defeat the oppressive regime in Ethiopia's modern history, bringing Abiy to power with the 
promise of fundamental democratic change. If there is a lesson to be learned from the previous 
two transitions, it is that the current transition should not be taken for granted. Like the two 
previous regime changes in 1974 and 1991, which did not transform the country into a 
democracy, the current transition is also fraught with several risks that have emerged over the 
past three years.  
As such, despite the tremendous opportunity created by youth-led protests for the country's 
transition to true democracy, it took Abiy only a few months to undo the progress made in his 
first months in office. However, Abiy's failure to lead Ethiopia onto a democratic path is the 
result of a combination of factors, and responsibility for the rollback rests with a number of 
actors. One is the refusal to adopt the roadmap led to mis-prioritization of transition agenda; 
second, the deep-rooted undemocratic practices and complex patronage systems operated 




ethno-nationalist aspirations of various groups, the lack of common demands among the 
leading ethnic elites; fourth, OLF's ambivalence between peaceful struggle and armed struggle; 
fifth, recrimination and hate speech on social media, as well as historical grievances, created a 
dynamic that prevented Abiy from advancing his reform.  
Moreover, the political events of past three years point to this grim future of the country, like 
the previous regimes, where all forms of atrocities and brutalities are justified in the name of 
Ethiopia's unity and integrity. There are several factors that easily work against the realization 
of the country's democratic aspirations. The culture of absolute power and authoritarianism is 
an important structural obstacle to democracy. For example, rather than embracing an all-
inclusive vision of change for managing the transition, the new leaders put forward a unilateral 
vision of the future, demonstrating serious threats of a return to authoritarianism. The presence 
of strong countervailing forces, organized pressure from citizens, as well as civil society 
organizations are critical to forcing the regime into fulfilling its democratic obligations. 
However, since these forces are fragile in today's Ethiopia, the fate of democratizing the 
country is in the hands of the ruling party itself, which is hardly promising.   
Open disagreements between the federal government and the regions, ethnic based violence, 
disputes, and further divisions within the EPRDF are also manifestations of the post-2018 
transition. One of such tensions escalated into military operations in the Tigray region since 
November 2020, aimed at removing the retreated regional ruling party, the TPLF, from power. 
Before 2018, such issues were effectively managed through the ruling party channels, imposing 
democratic centralism as a mechanism for enforcing hardlines policies and suppressing dissent. 
However, as the ruling prosperity party lacks such cohesion compared to the dissolved EPRDF, 
the practice of democratic centralism has been severely restricted by the new elites from the 
Amhara and Oromo groups.  
Hope for better days quickly turned into despair specially among youth as new elites continued 
to unilaterally define the country's future, and the stability the country had been seeking has 
slipped away with various ethnic clashes as well as the recent escalation of conflict between 
the federal government and the Tigray region. This pattern of political development seems to 
further reinforce the evidence that the regime is curbing free political competition, reversing 
initial liberalization measures to create a monopoly of power for Abiy and his party, the 
Prosperity Party. The coronavirus pandemic also complicated an already fragile transition, as 




2020, leading to a constitutional crisis that accelerated the rollback of reforms introduced on 
the onset of Abiy's rule.  
7.2.2 Liberalized autocracy  
Based on these findings, this thesis concludes that Abiy’s early embarkment on the 
liberalization project was not necessarily to genuinely advance democratization. Rather, it 
aimed to offset some public discontent with the introduction of mild reforms to improve the 
regime's image, while effectively consolidating Abiy's power through the continued presence 
of the ruling party structure and the informal army unit created outside the constitutional 
mandate to influence and control the political system. This is consistent with the understanding 
of liberalized autocracy, which scholars such as Brumberg (2002) have argued as deliberate 
actions of authoritarian regimes aimed at bringing some benefits to the regime, but the main 
goal is to allow the ruling elites to remain in power.   
7.2.3 Civil societies   
However, this thesis emphasizes that the key to the success of the current reforms lies in 
building a political order in which all citizens, political actors and civil society in the country 
can find their place in the reform process, but this seems daunting, as evidenced by the 
trajectory of transition over the past three years. As this thesis points out, when citizens are 
denied the opportunity to express their grievances through institutional mechanisms such as 
civil society, they are unlikely to succumb to such actions. The continual diminution of civil 
society space during the brutal rule of the EPRDF led to massive anti-government protests 
across the country, forcing the regime to pursue political reforms. One of the results of this 
reform process is the repeal of the repressive 2009 CSO law, which made civil society 
organizations virtually impossible to operate, except those associated with the ruling party, and 
its replacement with a new liberal law in February 2019. According to the 2009 law, only 
Ethiopian charities were permitted to work on political issues related to democratic and human 
rights, while foreign charities were permitted only to work on social and economic 
development issues. This classification strictly based on funding sources, as those who raise 
more than 10 percent of their funds from outside were not allowed to work on democracy. The 
new civic space provides civil society organizations with a space in which they can advance 
the cause they believe in. However, this same civic space also became the site of the 
contradictory and polarized political landscape that dominated the country. Both the 




of assembly guaranteed by the constitution to create affiliates civil societies to promote their 
political agendas among the communities. Indeed, while the new law was inspired by the 
opening of the political space in early 2018, the real challenge lies in its practical 
implementation ahead. 
7.2.4 Role of diaspora and international engagement  
The role of the diaspora in national politics has always been very active, especially during the 
EPRDF, but almost all of them were against the regime. Many Ethiopians were forced to leave 
the country en masse, fleeing oppression and repression. As such, it is now clear why Oromo 
protests have global networks and global connections, besides technological advances that have 
allowed new structures such as satellite TV channels and social media to play an increasingly 
important role in mobilizing youth across the country, facilitating engagement with the 
diaspora. Diaspora solidarity rallies in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Europe were 
held in support of the youth movement and to hold the Ethiopian government and its allies 
accountable for development and security assistance given to the regime. Moreover, there was 
a humanitarian aid team in the diaspora that, through local networks, provided coordinated and 
effective assistance to victims of security forces. There were also groups that supported 
diplomatic efforts in a strategic and coordinated manner to help fight to end TPL's dominance.  
7.2.5 Press freedom and social media  
Ethiopia's political challenges stem from different understandings not only of its past and 
future, but also of the present, which underlines the urgent need to reorient political discourse 
from polarized ideological rhetoric to a deeper understanding of the structural problems. An 
independent and free media can play an indispensable role in shaping such a democratic 
political culture in Ethiopia, paving the way for reconciling disagreements over policies and 
practices for peaceful discussion among citizens. Social media played a central role in the 
public protests that led to the 2018 reforms, largely because there were no reliable alternative 
channels of critical information due to the growing intolerance of the EPRDF government. 
Following changes in early 2018, the bans were lifted from several websites as well as media 
designated as terrorist, although some of the independent media are recently closed by the same 
government that lifted the ban as they became critical of the way the government is managing 
the transition. However, the government claims that their closure is due to a wave of ethnic conflict 
spreading across the country as a result of an increase in the number of fake news and incorrect stories 




commendable given the fact that press freedom is an important and powerful tool in the struggle 
for democracy, the mismanagement of political liberalization could have also contributed 
greatly to deepening polarization in the country.  
7.2.6 Economic development 
This thesis places the application of developmental state ideology as well as economic 
development in the broader context of the demands of political freedom, democracy, and social 
justice. One of the main factors behind the instability of Ethiopia is the general inefficiency of 
investment projects that led to land grabbing and waste of public resources. Despite rapid 
economic growth over the past decade and a half, the economic system is essentially held 
captive by the ruling vanguard political party that has failed to address Ethiopia's rampant 
poverty. The regime economic policy not only had little impact on the lives and freedoms of 
people, but also exacerbate the problems of land grabbing. Critical challenges facing land 
policy and governance in Ethiopia include the alienation of land from farmers by leasing large 
tracts of land to wealthier people at significantly higher prices, which was a great recipe for 
mobilizing the public protests. In its futile pursuit of political legitimacy through economic 
performance, the EPRDF has brought in unprecedented levels of institutional venality, 
resulting in colossal public investment failures and significant losses in megaprojects.  
As for the economic development as a determinant of democracy, Ethiopia has pursued the 
developmental state thesis, which argues for “development first, democracy later”, subscribing 
to the argument of modernization theorists that most countries that have succeeded in creating 
stable democracies have achieved high economic development before they transitioned to 
democracy. However, the Ethiopian experience shows that economic development does not 
necessarily lead to democracy; rather, it seemed to support the deepening of authoritarian rule 
by creating a dominant party regime that controlled security, military, politics, and economy 
under the ideological guide of revolutionary democracy, which remained an anti-thesis of 
democratic development. As a result, EPRDF governance exemplified contradictions in 
economic growth, pursuit of political and economic dominance, limited participation, and 
violation of civil and political rights of citizens, relying on low and high intensity coercive 
methods to foster its authoritarian policies. 
Moreover, Ethiopia's attempts to achieve a developmental state in the context of a multinational 
federal system of government not only deviated from the prevailing centralist model in East 




unrest. The findings of this thesis also indicate that it was difficult to replicate East Asian 
development model in Ethiopia, because conditions that allowed the creation of a successful 
developmental state in Asian countries are absent in the Ethiopian context, especially in the 
absence of competent, autonomous, and capable bureaucracy. An ineffective framework for 
managing the private sector's contribution to the economy and widespread rent-seeking 
behaviour among ruling elites is another problem that makes it difficult to replicate the success 
achieved in East Asia.   
7.2.7 Existence of robust statehood    
Along with the absence of these crucial elements, there are also problems of state and nation-
building, which continue to undermine the development of "common sense" of national 
identity, which is a prerequisite for democratization. The lack of a common national identity is 
the result of the contradictory understanding of the state-building process that reinforces the 
global north-south dichotomy in Ethiopia's version. This dichotomy represents the political 
distance from the Ethiopian state, where the north was the political core, and the southi the 
political periphery. The political distance is further compounded by social and cultural 
differences, leading to radically different perspectives on the interpretation of historical 
dynamics that have shaped the political lens through which the national groups see their 
relationship with the Ethiopian state. For example, most elites from the political north, who 
followed in the footsteps of early 20th century intellectuals such as Gebrehiwot Baykedagn, 
argued that Ethiopia was a nation in quest of modernization to overcome its underdevelopment.  
On the other hand, there are several ethno-nationalist groups that view Ethiopia as a state that 
has inflicted so much suffering and oppression, especially on its southern national groups, that 
it has spawned “nationality questions”. Several liberation forces also see the Ethiopian state as 
a colonial empire that has conquered independent neighbouring communities and territories 
with the support of Western imperialists. Ethiopia's elite paradox is perhaps the most enduring 
factor in all the changes that have made to date, efforts that can be described as attempts to lift 
Ethiopia out of its underdevelopment or transform it into an inclusive and prosperous state free 
of oppression.  
However, the desire to overcome past oppression, as well as the country's underdevelopment, 
is always constrained by the concentration of political power in the hands of a small number 
of elites belonging to a particular ethnic group. A hallmark of political development under the 




controls government institutions down to the local level through its members or affiliates. This 
significantly diminished hope for a democratic transition as the ruling elites consolidated power 
and control over resources through overlapping roles in government and party structures until 
2018. The transition, which began in early 2018, is also in trouble due to misplaced priorities, 
which are being pushed from top to bottom. This remains the seed of its decline, as all previous 
changes that enacted a top-down approach to reform in which reform ideas were imposed from 
above by self-proclaimed “all-knowing” experts have always been unsuccessful. 
7.2.8 Management of social heterogeneity and polarization  
In short, the origins of Ethiopia’s political contradiction date back to the late nineteenth 
century, when the more monolithic Abyssinian polity expanded southward through conquests 
led by King Menelik, leading to the creation of the modern Ethiopian state. The contradiction 
that originated with the conquest of the south has since remained at the centre of political 
discourse and development in Ethiopia, demonstrating the centrality of identity politics in 
determining the pace and direction of political changes. As such, Dahl's (1989) arguments that 
unequal social relations are detrimental to democracy are consistent with the findings of this 
thesis. Before 1991, modern Ethiopia with its Abyssinian core pursued a policy of assimilation 
as the basis for a nation-building project. Ethiopia in the post-1991 period recognized its 
diversity and created a federal structure that was intended to address past injustices. But, the 
dominance of the identity and language of the historically privileged group continued to be a 
source of political tension, easily turning into violent struggles for monopoly of narrative and 
state power.  
Building on this historical contradiction, this thesis provides a critical analysis of pan-Ethiopian 
and ethno-nationalist views of Ethiopia's past and future, which explains the country's 
difficulties in overcoming its democratic deficit. Pan-Ethiopian nationalism extols Ethiopia's 
past achievements in an attempt to cover up the atrocity inflicted by the state on various 
members of ethnic and religious communities. On the other hand, ethno-nationalists impose 
wary nationalist discourse within the ethnic group that they purportedly represent to refute 
hegemonic narrative that the pan-Ethiopians have produced and reproduced to mask the dark 
side of the past regimes. These contending nationalisms reinforce each other in opposite way: 
the narrative of one group becomes a recipe for another to create counter narratives to dominate 
the political discourse and mobilize their political base, which often leads to violence. For 




ever for various reasons, but they also stem from contradictory narratives that are aggressively 
pursued by contending nationalisms over the country's federal system. 
While the debate over the institutional structure of the Ethiopian federation has continued for 
nearly three decades, since 2018 this debate has intensified in the context of the political 
liberalization and freedom of expression that accompanied the reform process. One of the most 
controversial political issues in Ethiopia since 1991 is the restructuring of the previous unitary 
state into a multi-national federal structure. Opponents of the federal system, most of whom 
are pan-Ethiopian nationalists, despise it as the source of all the problems the country has faced 
over the past three decades, stressing its divisive nature, which they believe severely 
undermines national cohesion by privileging ethnicity over national identity (See section 
4.3.4).  
Proponents, most of whom are ethno-nationalists, see multinational federalism as a panacea for 
the country's long-standing problems, such as the deep-seated inequality and oppression that 
marginalized groups have endured for decades. For this group, the federal system is an 
important political settlement that ensured the survival of Ethiopia, which was on the brink of 
collapse in early 1990s due to the proliferation of liberation movements, most of which were 
separatist. From this perspective, Oromo's struggle for democracy is trapped between groups 
that associate the problems with the inherent defect of the Ethiopian state as a colonial empire 
in the late 19th century, so resolute to regain independence from the very state that inflicted 
the oppression, and the groups, which largely resort to finding a solution to the crisis of the 
state itself, including Oromo grievances, by democratizing current multinational federalism.  
As in the past, the paradoxical experience of post-imperial Ethiopia, where citizens are 
empowered but constantly constrained by political action despite legal recognition of their 
freedom and equality, the actual implementation of the federal system was also circumscribed 
by the authoritarian practices of the same regime that vows to defend it. Such a paradoxical 
experience, which forms a vicious circle between maintaining the status quo, making progress, 
and then completely abandoning any gains of the past, blocks the path to a more transformative 
politics and robust democratic order, further impoverishing national politics. This vicious circle 
of expansion and contraction of democracy has long been a constant feature of the Ethiopian 
state. Thus, shaping Ethiopia's future requires a critical reflection on what went wrong in the 
past to allow political compromise and overcome the problems of polarization and 




notes that among the elements that have gone wrong in the past are uncritical emulation of 
foreign development and democratic theories to solve the country's problems. 
7.2.9 Cultural democracy 
In this respect, Ethiopia's experience is unique compared to other African countries, as its rulers 
fell into the trap of imitating foreign development models as early as the mid-19th century. For 
many African countries, emulation of foreign models is largely a post-Cold War phenomenon, 
with the World Bank's development assistance programs driving Western liberal values around 
world since the 1990s. It began with the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the 
final form of governance system for mankind, as Fukuyama argued. This hegemonic drive of 
Western liberal values has been linked to the identification of a lack of democracy as the root 
cause of poverty in Africa, which has made the continent dependent on the West for 
development assistance.  
However, the application of Western liberal democracy in Africa is marked by electoral 
violence and fraud, which has led to the deterioration of the security and well-being of poor 
African societies, as well as their indigenous systems of government that had survived the 
colonization of West in previous years. Interestingly, the failures of Western models in Africa 
are also attributed to African cultural values as anti-democratic, as opposed to the paradigm 
itself. Contrasting this disposition, this thesis notes that donor-imposed uncritical imitation of 
Western values and ideas is one of the main factors explaining the failure of liberal democracy 
in Africa.   
Thus, rather than emulating Western liberal democracies and structures, Africans seek to 
develop their indigenous development and governance frameworks that reflect African 
realities, culture, and values. Cognizance of this importance, Escobar (2020) argues, in his new 
book, “Pluriversal Politics: The Real and the Possible”, that the plurality of worlds affirms the 
existence of multiple realities appropriate to other worlds, which he calls the pluriverse, 
explaining that politics is thus predicated on multiplicity, as opposed to the current globalists 
and the neoliberal world, which tries to impose its realities on others. This has always been 
detrimental to the emergence of an alternative epistemology that permits a plurality of thought 
and existence, especially in the post-Cold War period.  
While Eurocentrism denies the democratic political history of Africa and portrays African 




of African culture. The failure of Western democracy in Africa does not make the cultural 
democracies of African societies any less democratic or suggest that being different from the 
West should mean inferiority and be devalued. It simply means that African cultural democracy 
has institutional features that make it suitable for the pluriverse African societies, as there is no 
single best political organization or ideology that every country should emulate. Thus, this 
thesis argues that an eclectic approach to indigenous traditions may prove useful because of 
the fluidness and flexibility of its institutional governing ideals to address the flaws of liberal 
democracy. Such an approach should seek to decipher positive cultural values and practices 
that help deepen democratic norms and institutions, as the institutional arrangements for 
representation, participation and public deliberation may differ across societies and cultures.  
This thesis is also complemented by a theoretical exploration of various concepts of democracy 
in Ethiopia, including the ideological guide of the current reforms, which the Prime Minister 
called Medemer. They are analysed from the point of view of the criteria of Robert Dahl (1989) 
that a democratic system should embody. Reflections on cultural democracy also serve as an 
argument against the drive to emulate foreign models, as well as expanding the democratic 
ideals of representation, participation, inclusion, and enlightened understanding that Robert 
Dahl included in his definition of democracy.  
Accordingly, the study argues for the need to establish Ethiopian democracy on Ethiopian 
foundations, creating a common political framework more rooted in the country's indigenous 
political traditions. There are also some important elements from Gadaa that this study has 
extracted as an example that can serve as an inspiration for a democracy more rooted in 
indigenous culture. For example, in Oromo democracy, popular rule does not mean, as in the 
representative model, consent to power at the ballot box. Rather, it means that the ordinary 
citizen has access to the exercise of power through various mechanisms that place them at the 
center of political institutions. Among the many Oromo traditional political institutions that 
foster equal participation, flexible representation, and democratic deliberation that enable 
citizens to exercise power include age-based organizations known as Hiriya and Goggessa, 
and Qixxee, Chaffee, and Gumii assemblies. These institutions allow the system to have both 
a representative and participatory version of democracy, providing a robust example of 
democratic representation that is flexibly exercised through direct participation, appointed 
representatives, and rotation of power. This system also allows the recall of a delegated person 
when that person does not properly represent their requests or questions. Such flexible 




democracies that use a rigid representational system. And the goal of these institutions is to 
empower ordinary citizens so that deliberation in shaping public policies is as accessible as 
possible. The openness of these assemblies is an important institutional feature that radically 
distinguishes Oromo democracy from elective assemblies of representative system, which 
rarely have direct contact with the public. 
More importantly, these institutions not only allow individual citizens to impact the decision-
making process, but also serve as mechanisms of allocating authority and responsibility across 
the life cycle of the Oromo society on a sequential scale, helping to ensure that power is never 
concentrated in one place. Of these institutions, Gumii is a gathering of the multitude and a 
manifestation of the sovereignty of the people entrusted with the highest authority. Thus, what 
makes Gadaa unique is that it not only establishes a system of checks and balances between 
the branches of government, but also establishes a supra-institutional structure in which the 
three branches of government are represented, including ordinary citizens in solving social 
issues that are not resolved by other Gadaa institutions. The lesson from this is that modern 
democracies, beside the established system of checks and balances between the branches of 
government, they also need to create a supra-institutional structure such as Gumii, in which 
three branches of government are represented. And the responsibility of such supra-
institutional structure is to resolve issues that the three branches do not resolve through their 
institutional mechanisms and cause a gridlock, thus, it may combine both legislative and 
judicial authorities. In conclusion, I argue that the application of some features of Oromo 
democracy, given that women become an integral part of the system as men, even in its reduced 
version can serve as an inspiration to limit the resources that the centre controls and the powers 
delegated to the political centre, and that it may normatively redefine the current transition by 
changing the way political leaders see opportunities for change and the role of ordinary citizens 
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